It was a scene that made Taiwan independence supporters blood run cold: On the night of the 2018 local elections, victorious Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) candidate for Kaohsiung mayor Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) leading a rapturous sea of Republic of China flag waving supporters in singing “Night Attack” (夜襲), a martial law era military song.

The nation was stunned that night by the huge margin of his victory in a city that had been ruled by the pro-Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for 20 years. Even more surprising was the improbable candidate himself. Han is the son of a Chinese (“mainlander”) military family that fled with the collapsing Republic of China (ROC) government after losing the Chinese civil war to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949, running for mayor in a city known for native Taiwanese pride. His campaign was centered around economic revitalization and opening up to China and Chinese investment. He made no secret of his being KMT, or even of being an out-of-towner that barely knew the city, or of his ROC patriotism–any of which conventional wisdom suggests would be automatic deal breakers on getting elected in Kaohsiung. He even punched out and hospitalized pro-independence and locally popular ex-president Chen Shui-bian when they were both legislators in the 1990s.

And it wasn’t just Kaohsiung that fell to the KMT, there was a widespread sweep of much of the country that left analysts stunned. Was this strong shift to the KMT a sign of a revival of Chinese identity in Taiwan?

Just months ago, even asking the question would have seemed ridiculous and sounded like wishful Chinese propaganda. According to the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University (NCCU)’s polls, Taiwanese identity had been strengthening for years, but peaked after the 2014 Sunflower Movement  (Sources: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University). That year, student protesters and activists successfully blocked a trade deal with China, riding on a wave of suspicion towards greater economic integration and reliance on China.

In the last year or two, there had been some signs of a small uptick in Chinese identity. Until just recently, the KMT was considered in serious trouble, with their pro-Chinese identity and China-friendly politics considered a relic of earlier times. The idea that they would not only win a sweeping victory, but also take Kaohsiung seemed about as likely as the American social conservative Republican Rick Santorum being elected governor of California.

Does this stunning KMT victory mean a revival of Chinese identity? Or, could the newly elected KMT local governments actively grow Chinese identity? The short answers to both are most likely “some, but not as big a swing as the election was”–but identity is a complicated and rich subject in Taiwan. (See A History of Taiwanese Identity for a full explanation of how identity in Taiwan has evolved over time).  

Who’s promoting Chinese identity in Taiwan?

The two main sources promoting Chinese identity in Taiwan are the KMT and China, though of the two the KMT is by far the more effective.

In many ways, China is better at turning off the people in Taiwan than attracting them. Efforts by the Chinese government to belittle and bully Taiwan on the international stage and the recent crackdown on freedoms in Hong Kong have soured many in Taiwan on China, diminishing the appeal of Chinese identity. Similarly, political oppression in China is a turn off. When meeting Chinese, most Taiwanese find them culturally different. However, the fast growing Chinese economy, their growing might on the world stage and popular Chinese dramas and pop entertainment provide some attraction for China.

Both the KMT and China appeal to the fact that the majority of Taiwanese people, culture and language originated in China. Much of the appeal is racial: That Taiwanese are part of something bigger than oneself, part of the great Han Chinese race. That is buttressed by references to the long, glorious Chinese civilization and appeals to pride in being part of that tradition. Pride also plays a role in reminders that China throughout history has been one of the greatest, most powerful empires. Taiwanese who grew up during the martial law era and were taught this as children in school tend to have higher Chinese identity than those older or younger. All generations receive this message however, sometimes through education, but also through Chinese arts, literature and entertainment–both historical and present day. Taiwanese today speak and read Mandarin and consume these materials, much as Canadians read Shakespeare and watch Monty Python from England. The Chinese as a race apart message is baked into their thinking, and hence into the works they produce–consciously or not.

Some pro-Taiwan identity supporters try to counter that with similar arguments. People who grew up with the racial identity education of the martial law era but who oppose the KMT especially make the case that centuries of intermarriage between indigenes and Han Chinese immigrants have made Taiwanese racially or genetically unique, and therefore deserves an independent state of their own. Others point out that Taiwan is an immigrant society colonized over hundreds of years, making it more like the United States or Canada which are culturally and linguistically connected to England, but not English by nationality.

The truth is, however, that those two arguments are just that—they’re intended to make a point, they haven’t been able to dictate identity top-down. The racial appeal of Taiwanese as distinct is very recent and lacks depth culturally and historically, though some Taiwanese now consider it cool to have indigenous ancestors. Using the US or Canada as an analogy is more of an intellectual exercise than a source of identity.

What has gained considerable traction in building a distinct identity in Taiwan, especially among the younger generation, is pride in sharing in a special culture, history, traditions and way of life. Taiwanese are justifiably proud of their democratic transition, economic success, technical prowess and accomplishments on the world stage in spite of China’s efforts to stymie Taiwan at every turn. Taiwanese have built a society they can be proud of, one built on local blood, sweat and tears—which China can’t claim credit for. This strongly came to the fore during the Sunflower movement.

The KMT’s recent stunning victories and open displays of ROC nationalism will almost certainly lead to an uptick in Chinese identity. Success draws adherents. Frustration with wage stagnation and a sense of hopelessness, combined with sentimental recollection of economic boom times under the KMT’s one party rule has brought back voters. Many of those voters, especially Han Kuo-yu’s supporters in Kaohsiung, responded to him emotionally. Some of that may transfer over to the comfort of a clear identity as part of the great Chinese race, which Han signalled his support of in his choice of martial music, KMT and ROC imagery and calls to open up to China.

The question isn’t if, but how much and will it last? The majority of voters were voting on economic and local political issues in this last election, not identity. In Taichung, pollution was a key issue. In Taipei voters re-elected an independent candidate with mixed identity politics. Other areas remained in DPP hands, local voters felt those leaders served the people well. It is also worth noting that at the Han Kuo-yu rallies, the military song was played at a rally site near a military base, and Taiwanese songs also featured prominently. Local governments now in KMT hands have vowed to increase exchanges with China, and some may fund cultural projects emphasising Chinese identity, but overall local governments have limited scope to influence identity.

The key to watch is the next elections just over a year from now in 2020. In national elections identity and relations with China are significant issues. This KMT wave energized the base, boosted the faithful and has drawn new people into their camp–but the electorate in Taiwan has been moving away from both parties for some time, creating a huge mass of independents. That has made Taiwan’s elections more volatile and unpredictable.

A good performance by the KMT in the meantime could mean a win by the KMT in 2020, as could frustration with stagnant wages and opposition to DPP policies. A KMT victory alone would not necessarily mean the public wants to move towards a more Chinese identity. It could, however, give the KMT the opportunity to roll back Taiwan-centric educational policies put in by the DPP—though the last time the KMT tried under past president Ma Ying-jeou pro-Taiwan student protestors stormed and occupied the Ministry of Education in imitation of the Sunflower movement. The KMT could also use national control to fund significant cultural support of a greater Chinese identity, and seek to end the transitional justice commission that is currently working to undo some of the damage of the martial law era.

In the short term, and possibly in the longer term on the back of a KMT win in 2020 and more sophisticated appeals from China, there will likely be a small uptick in Chinese identity–especially in the “both” category who don’t necessarily see being both Taiwanese and Chinese as being contradictory.

Ultimately it is up to the people of Taiwan to determine their own identity, but regardless of who wins in 2020, Taiwanese identity will likely remain strong amongst a large percentage of the population. Eight years of KMT rule from 2008 to 2016 saw a strong increase in Taiwanese identity and a drop in Chinese identity, in spite of KMT efforts to change that. China is likely to continue their policies of aggression toward Taiwan politically. Most importantly Taiwanese will continue to show the creativity, talent and skills that win admiration locally and abroad, strengthening Taiwan’s sense of pride in itself.

(Feature photo of Chiang Kai-shek Memorial, by staffanekstrand)