The DPP’s Disaster: The Mishandling of Marriage Equality

After being carried in in a triumphant landslide in the 2016 legislative and presidential elections, the DPP was swept out ignominiously in the local elections of 2018. The scale of the blowout was a breathtaking reversal, losing cities and counties in territory the DPP considered strongholds–Kaohsiung being most notable–and losing the key battleground territory of Central Taiwan, including Taichung and Changhua, which bodes ill for the party in the 2020 national elections. This was a far greater loss than the typical swing one normally expects in the local equivalent of a midterm election.

There are many reasons for the big swing against the DPP. Typical midterm reversal, the stunning rise of the populist KMT mayoral candidate Daniel Han Kuo-yu in Kaohsiung and the inevitable loss of some civil servants and military personnel and their families as pension reform hit their pocketbooks are some of the major factors. Chinese election meddling may have played a role, though solid proof of this having significant impact is hard to come by. Efforts by overseas-based journalists in the international media to sex up the story as a major push-back by the voters against President Tsai Ing-wen’s China policies, however, are largely off the mark. Almost no local analysts considered that a major factor.

Dissatisfaction with the administration of President Tsai certainly played a role. Much of this comes from their handling of domestic political issues. The president’s diplomatic efforts have been consistent, persistent, clear and resolute. But on domestic politics her administration has been inconsistent, sometimes incoherent and curiously haphazard. On the issues of, for example, pension reform and transitional justice, her administration has shown resolve, patience and careful follow-through: Predictably offending opponents and rallying supporters, but overall a result of successful planning, consultation and implementation. On others, however–like labor reform and marriage equality–the administration bungled so badly they lost the support of nearly everyone, on all sides of the issues. That cost them dearly and gave the party the appearance of incoherence and incompetence. The Tsai administration’s bungling of marriage equality is the poster child in point of misstep after misstep after misstep, earning the party and the president the enmity of supporters and opponents alike.

The DPP’s mishandling of marriage equality

On the day of the Taipei Pride Parade on October 31, 2015, and during the presidential campaign for the January 2016 election, then-candidate Tsai came out personally in support of marriage equality in strong terms in a video released on her Facebook page, declaring “Before love all are equal. I am Tsai Ing-wen and I support marriage equality. Let everyone be free to love and pursue happiness.” Though at the time opinion polls showed either a majority or a plurality in favor of making this the law of the land, that a leading candidate for president would make such a clear and unambiguous statement was a bombshell. The party’s campaign materials started using rainbow themes.

In the January 2016 election, Tsai won by a landslide buoyed by the support of a hopeful electorate while the opposition crumbled. Her party won a solid majority in the legislature, while a fledgling new party–the New Power Party (NPP), which embodied ideals like marriage equality–entered the legislature for the first time as the third largest party.

Supporters of marriage equality were euphoric, and though the wait until May for the presidential inauguration seemed long, it was a small price to pay. The incoming government led by President Tsai, the electorate, and even McDonald’s, had embraced the inevitable change coming in society–one that was sweeping the West and in Taiwan, finally had reached a welcoming beachhead in Asia.

There was one huge problem. After her initial announcement, Tsai made clear to specify that her support was personal. In other words, she wasn’t speaking for the DPP, it was never part of the party platform, nor was it ever a campaign promise. Seasoned political watchers caught the distinction, but the average voter–especially marriage equality supporters–did not. This was a set up for a huge, huge let down.

The reality was that the DPP was very much split internally on the issue. While many DPP legislators have come out in favor, almost all of them are party list legislators: Hand-picked to fill pre-assigned seats allocated to political parties. Almost none of the DPP legislators who were directly elected by the public were in favor, with many openly against and most dodging the issue as much as possible. Much of the DPP’s support is in the conservative rural south, and the party has long standing ties with the Presbyterian church–much of which (though not all) is strongly against marriage equality.

After the president and the new strong DPP-majority legislature were inaugurated in the spring of 2016, the issue was quietly dropped. Initially supporters remained quiet on the subject; clearly the new president had a lot on her plate and would get to it soon. But as the spring turned to summer turned to autumn, disquiet began to set in at the near total absence of the topic from government and legislative discussions.

In the fall, a retired professor and filmmaker suffering from depression after the passing of his long-term partner died from suspected suicide. The professor also was known to have suffered from the lack of rights a spouse would normally have when his partner died, which galvanized supporters to try to force the government to put the issue on the agenda. The tragedy was a stark reminder of the human costs of putting off the issue further. That autumn’s pride parade in Taipei–the same event that had coincided with Tsai’s initial announcement of support just a year ago–drew an estimated 80,000 people, the biggest ever at that point, and three bills from different parties finally reached the floor of the legislature.

President (and DPP party chair) Tsai, however, resolutely refused to expend any political capital on the issue and washed her hands of it by punting the decision to the legislature saying “I believe that in the near future, all members of the Legislative Yuan will freely express their opinions on the amendments according to their own beliefs, values, judgments and the direction of public opinion. Regardless of the outcome, I will respect the decision of the Legislative Yuan.” Her own Ministry of Justice then came out in favor of a civil partnership law, which was echoed by the DPP legislative whip. With the introduction of the half-measure of a civil union law, the waters of support for full marriage equality began to muddy. The bills in the legislature didn’t go anywhere. The president made a show of meeting with supporters and opponents of marriage equality, and then saying that society still hadn’t reached consensus on the issue, implying that she was not ready to put the issue on her agenda.

The fight gets ugly  

Meanwhile, like supporters of marriage equality, opponents also mistakenly thought that once Tsai was elected and with a DPP majority in the legislature that marriage equality was a sure thing. Fear of it becoming a reality galvanized opponents, who began to mobilize into a potent political force greater than ever before. And the longer the DPP avoided tackling the issue, the more opponents grew.

Though comprising only an estimated 5% of the population, anti-marriage equality Christians showed their remarkable organizational and mobilization skills. Though not all Christians oppose marriage equality, those that do in Taiwan worked with passion and dedication on the issue. Saving souls from sin or even eternal damnation–as many fear will happen if marriage equality is enacted–is of enormous consequence. Their battle to stop Taiwan from being the first Asian country to legalize same sex marriage and establishing a beachhead for the “corruption” of surrounding nations drew the attention and active support from seasoned activists from overseas–especially the United States–and including some more extreme groups like MassResistance. Local groups like The Bread of Life Christian Church are also very well funded, including by such business titans as HTC chair Cher Wang (王雪紅).

From this active core, they worked to successfully build a strong coalition of allies, including groups from other religions and social conservatives who are concerned about issues such as maintaining male heirs in the family, maintaining traditional gender education in schools and a general sense of “unnaturalness” or discomfort with change. As the president washed her hands of the issue and her own government and party openly worked to move away from marriage equality, opponents held their biggest rally yet on December 3, 2016–bigger than the pride parade held just over a month earlier. The opponents were on the march en masse, and their muscle as a movement was no longer in doubt.

The show of force by the anti-marriage equality movement, the biggest mass rally yet held on the issue by either side, offered significant succor to their supporters in legislature. While up to this point cultural, social and political trends had seemed to be solidly pointing in the direction of legalization, the “quiet masses” the opponents had claimed existed finally showed up in the flesh in numbers of possibly as high as 170,000 in total across three rallies nationwide. They were indeed real, and a real force.

Supporters of marriage equality, while in many cases stunned at this development, were definitely not going to be intimidated: and their rally was held a week later in Taipei with another to be held a week after in Taichung. The Taipei rally was also a tour de force, drawing as much as a quarter of a million people by some estimates, solidly underscoring the strength of the pro-marriage equality movement.

One telling detail, however, wasn’t picked up on much at the time. The pro-marriage equality rally in Taipei was massive–making the biggest ever on the issue. The one the week after in Taichung was tiny, easily dwarfed by the anti- rally two weeks earlier. The anti- rally in Kaohsiung was also well attended, while there was no significant pro- one held. Effectively the two sides had drawn something of a stalemate: The legislative math didn’t change. The directly elected legislators, especially those in the centre and south, had their fears confirmed of a potential backlash–while those party list legislators who owed their jobs to party headquarters in Taipei, or were elected in Taipei, saw the support to confirm their beliefs. But most legislators just saw trouble no matter which way they went on the issue.

So what did the Tsai administration and the DPP dominated legislature do? Nothing. A draft law passed a first reading, then stalled. While some pro-marriage equality members of the DPP and KMT made common cause with the entire–but small–NPP caucus, they were effectively removed from the agenda.

A constitutional and political hot potato

Then on May 24, 2017–one year and four days after the inauguration of President Tsai–the Taiwan’s Council of Grand Justices ruled that barring same sex marriages was unconstitutional. The court gave the legislature two years to amend the laws or write new ones to enact full marriage equality.

Politically this was a gift to the the DPP, if they had chosen to take it. They had the perfect excuse to finally pass the law–the court had mandated it. Legislators could tell their constituents “we had no choice.” It was an electoral get out of jail free card. Even better for the DPP, this would have settled the issue long before the 2018 local elections, and would likely have been largely forgotten by all but the most ardent anti- supporters by that point. It wouldn’t affect the DPP’s electability much, they did what the court ordered them to do, got it done and moved on.

Incredibly, they did no such thing–and they were made to bleed for it at the ballot box.

However, true to form, they once again raised hopes–only to dash them. Facing up to public dissatisfaction with her administration on a range of issues, President Tsai replaced her premier, with Tainan mayor William Lai to head up her cabinet. Faced with the upcoming anniversary of the tragic suicide that had galvanised supporters the year before and the annual pride parade, Lai stated he was hopeful on getting a bill passed by the end of the year. That would have been about the last chance to avoid the worst of the electoral damage from the issue. They didn’t take it. He dropped the issue and didn’t bring it up again.

By early 2018 it was becoming clear that there was no way the DPP was going to tackle the issue until the local elections were finished in November. It was too much of a political hot potato. That left a mere six month window between the election until the court-set May deadline in 2019, but politically they were determined to cross that bridge when they came to it.

The 2018 local elections were the first to feature referendums under a new law enacted by the DPP legislature that significantly lowered the bar compared to an earlier law. The law also wasn’t very limiting on how questions were presented, or what could be asked as long as it didn’t touch on sovereignty. And in this new law, meant by the DPP as a populist, democratic bulwark against potentially more autocratic or China-friendly governments, was seized on by the anti-marriage equality forces. This was both a way to strike a blow at any future marriage equality law–since it still hadn’t yet passed–and complicate matters significantly for the DPP. It also gave them something to organize against. And they mobilized in force.

While the anti-marriage equality forces were mobilizing to get their referendums passed, they also were in effect campaigning against the DPP and very effectively mobilizing campaigners and voters to come out in force. For the KMT, this was a gift from the heavens. The KMT, like the DPP, is split internally on the issue–but unlike the DPP they are the opposition party. All their candidates needed to do was simply point out they weren’t of the hated DPP to these voters to get their support.

Meanwhile many younger and more socially liberal voters, for whom marriage equality is the bellwether issue, were disappointed or outright disgusted with the DPP, which may have depressed turnout.

When the election results were in, the DPP was crushed, a “midterm” landslide like the country had never seen. The rejection of the DPP was across the board, losing long held bastions like Kaohsiung and key recent wins like Taichung. Support was weak for the party nationally, even in most areas they held onto it was by weak margins.

But while of course marriage equality wasn’t the only issue, it was clearly influential in the turnout. It was even more clear in the stunning turnaround in national public opinion on the issue–where the nation had previously shown majority support in polling, the referendum showed the nation had moved significantly on the issue towards the anti- camp, passing all three of their referendums. On the question “Do you agree that marriage defined in the Civil Code should be restricted to the union between one man and one woman?”, 72.5% voted in support. Meanwhile “Do you agree that the Ministry of Education should not implement the Enforcement Rules of the Gender Equality Education Act in elementary and middle schools?” got 67.4% support and “Do you agree to the protection of the rights of same-sex couples in cohabitation on a permanent basis in ways other than changing of the Civil Code?” got 61.1%.

Pro-marriage equality supporters managed to pull together some referendum questions, almost at the last minute, to counter the anti- camp’s questions. If anything, it made things worse. “Do you agree to the protection of same-sex marital rights with marriage as defined in the Civil Code?” only garnered 32.7% support and “Do you agree in accordance with the Gender Equality Education Act that national education of all levels should educate students on the importance of gender equality, emotional education, sex education, and same-sex education?” mustered 34%.

Running out of time

The DPP in two-and-a-half years managed to mishandle the issue so badly they mobilized a mass movement against their party, threw away multiple golden opportunities to defuse the threat and turned away supporters of the issue who had previously been loyal to the party. They’ve created a monster situation where they legally have to ignore the referendum results backed by a clear majority of the voters in order to conform to the court ruling by proposing a law that carefully skirts both. And now they are entering the campaign season for the January 2020 presidential and legislative elections with the issue still unresolved and facing a still hostile electorate.

There are only two weeks left until the court order goes into effect, but no law is passed yet. None of the three draft laws on the table are full marriage equality bills and would face legal challenges, but they are attempting to find a compromise bill using parts of all of them. Some lawmakers are even begging to have voting on the issue done by secret ballot. The systems needed to process same-sex marriages are not ready or in place, leading to a risk of chaos and confusion in the implementation without some quick action and ingenuity. This mess is the subject of the next article.