In what came as no surprise to many observers, the diplomatic relationship between Taiwan and the Solomon Islands has come to an end. The rupture was triggered last month after the Solomon Islands’ Democratic Coalition Government for Advancement voted 27-0 to sever the diplomatic ties it held with Taipei in favor of establishing relations with Beijing.

This decision had been closely monitored by the Taiwanese authorities since the Solomon Islands’ government established a cross-party task force to explore whether or not it should maintain its diplomatic relationship with Taiwan. The Pacific Island country had said months earlier it would take 100 days to evaluate its ties with Taipei, a move which observers had said was ominous.

Days later, Kiribati became the second nation in the Pacific to break ties with Taiwan in less than one week. The reported reason for Kiribati’s decision to establish relations with Beijing was a Chinese promise to provide funds for the procurement of several airplanes and commercial ferries. 

There is a lot to be discussed about these developments—for instance, whether or not the governments of Solomon Islands and Kiribati are falling into a Chinese “debt trap,” and also about how the processes were handled since it was reported that many people in the Solomon Islands protested the move out of loyalty to Taiwan, whom they considered a long-time friend.

But they also raise a question: Is this evidence of a “domino effect” of Pacific countries choosing to break ties with Taipei and cozy up to Beijing?

Whenever there is a switch of ties between Taiwan and one of its diplomatic allies, international and local observers usually give the same warning to Taiwan: This might trigger a domino effect throughout the region, such as when Panama broke ties with Taiwan. As speculation mounted over the fate of the Solomon Islands, plenty of observers wondered whether China was set for a spree of poaching the Pacific Island nations which remain in Taiwan’s clutches.

Looking back, however, is there any evidence that a “domino effect” has ever materialized?

Since President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) took office in 2016, Taiwan has lost seven diplomatic allies. The first to cut ties was the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe, an African nation, in 2016. It was later followed by Panama, which is located in Central America, in 2017. In 2018, the Dominican Republic in the Caribbean, Burkina Faso in Africa and El Salvador in Central America all dropped Taipei in favor of Beijing. This year, China has dangled its investment offers in the Pacific, establishing ties with the Solomon Islands and Kiribati last month. 

By looking at the timing of the diplomatic breaks and the different regions where they have taken place, we can observe that aside from the recent developments in the Pacific, the said “domino effect” has not manifested in any other areas where Taiwan has lost diplomatic allies since Tsai took power and China resumed luring Taipei’s formal allies. (Central America and the Caribbean are considered different areas due to their significant cultural and linguistic differences along with their respective geographic locations.)

This is not to say that the remaining allies of Taiwan are safe from Chinese advancements. It is hardly unlikely that China will stop its efforts to isolate Taiwan, especially now that we are months away from a presidential election and it is well known that Beijing would prefer Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) candidate Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) to come out victorious. 

Even before the announcement of the rupture between Taiwan and the Solomon Islands, there were already reports about offers made to the government of Haiti in exchange for their allegiance, which included interest-free and concessional loans as well as free assistance in areas such as politics, trade, public hygiene, and education. 

The main reason why there is no need for panic regarding a so-called potential “domino effect” in the Pacific is because, regardless of how close two countries might be geographically, there are always cultural, religious and political differences that cannot be linked from one country to another just because of their geographical proximity. If this was the case, Taiwan would have no diplomatic allies left in Central America, given that Costa Rica broke ties since 2007. (Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras and Belize are all among Taiwan’s remaining 15 formal allies.)

The Pacific Island states of Tuvalu, Nauru, Palau, and the Marshall Islands all have independent governments that make their own political decisions. To assume that they will follow what their neighboring countries do would be to assume that they do not have any sovereignty over their nations.

It would also contradict the statements of government officials in those countries. Days after the Solomon Islands and Kiribati switched ties, there were signs of support from all four states.

Lionel Aingimea, the newly elected president of Nauru, said that his nation “has enjoyed a close relationship with Taiwan for almost four decades and he looks forward to continuing well into the future.”

President Tommy Remengesau of Palau also said that his country had no plans to switch ties. “We are friends with Taiwan because our principles and values are similar, our aspirations for democracy and freedom,” he told reporters.

Tuvalu’s foreign minister, Simon Kofe, said in an interview to the Australian Broadcasting Corporation that “the government is quite happy to continue our relationship with Taiwan … I don’t expect any changes.”

The parliament of the Marshall Islands also passed a resolution making clear that its ties to Taiwan remain clear and expressed a deep appreciation to the government and the people of Taiwan. 

All of these are positive developments for Taiwan. It is true that China’s influence and, crucially, its willingness to finance projects, give out loans and provide countries with access to their giant market is something that is hard to refuse for a lot of these developing nations. However, we should not underestimate the value that government officials in the said countries and their populations place on their friendships with Taiwan.

And while Taipei may have lost two official allies recently, it has seen its most important unofficial alliance grow even stronger.

On September 25, the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations unanimously passed the TAIPEI Act, which enables the U.S. State Department to “engage with governments around the world that support Taiwan’s diplomatic recognition while downgrading ties with countries that toe the Chinese Communist Party line on Taiwan and suspending or altering U.S. foreign assistance to such nations.”

Although losing two allies in the Pacific is not something that should be ignored, the approval of this act is certainly a reason for celebration, not only because the act encourages the United States government to support Taiwan in the international stage, but because it discourages U.S. allies from countries like Honduras or Guatemala, historically aligned with U.S. decisions and reliant on its financial aid, from considering a switch to Beijing and facing the consequences of going against Washington’s wishes in the region.

The relationship between the United States and Taiwan continues to improve. Perhaps a trade deal between Taiwan and the United States might be the next step.

 

(Cover photo via Pixabay and Wikicommons)

Juan Fernando Herrera Ramos is a Honduran lawyer residing in Taiwan. He holds a Masters in Business Administration and is a regular contributor to the Taipei Times and La Tribuna (Honduras).
Juan Fernando Herrera Ramos