Han Kuo-yu’s Candidacy Might Be the End of Taiwan’s KMT as We Know It

With days to go before Taiwan votes in Saturday’s presidential and legislative elections, all indications are that President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) is set to win a second term in the country’s highest office.

Polls have been wrong before, of course, and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) supporters should take the energetic support for Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) candidate Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜), including last month’s rally in Kaohsiung, as a warning not to rest on their laurels. Tsai’s recent spike in the polls could be down to Han’s irresponsible request for his supports to lie to pollsters, rather than any material gains for her own campaign.

Assuming that Tsai does emerge victorious on Saturday, however, the KMT will suddenly be faced with an identity crisis.

There is an argument that if they can’t win this election—when, just months ago, almost everything seemed to be stacked in their favor—when are they going to win again?

How the KMT Misplayed Its Winning Hand

In November 2018, the so-called 9-in-1 regional elections saw the KMT sweep the board. They won nine districts and secured a total of 48.8% of the vote, an increase of 8%. Such huge gains in local elections are often a sign of what’s to come on the national stage.

The most prominent of their victories was secured by mayoral candidate Han Kuo-yu in Kaohsiung, the DPPs home turf.

Much has been written about Han since he first exploded back onto Taiwan’s political scene. He can politely be described as a populist who has a knack for luring voters to his cause with bold promises and extravagant rhetoric.

To his detractors, Han is a dangerously incompetent and lazy liar. But to his fans, he is an outsider; a charismatic and charming everyman who will shake up the political system they feel has disconnected with them. He irks his opponents, but he inspires fanatical support from those on his side.

It is a chasm in public opinion that will be all too familiar to American readers during the current era of President Donald Trump. But Trump won the presidential election in 2016 and, despite his impeachment last month and the escalating conflict with Iran, all bets are off as he seeks reelection this November.

Han – who won a tough KMT presidential primary against Foxconn founder Terry Gou (郭台銘) has the backing of much of Taiwan’s mainstream media, with scores of pro-KMT and pro-China TV channels and newspapers peddling such partisan coverage of the election, it would make Fox and Friends blush.

He also has the backing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This is not an accusation that he is in direct communication with the CCP—there is certainly no “direct” evidence of that—but there is no doubt that Chinese state forces, not least the so-called “50 Cent Army” of pro-CCP internet propagandists, are attempting to spread disinformation and rhetoric in support of his campaign.

Beijing, after all, has made no secret of the fact it would like to see Han prevail over Tsai.

The Resurgence of Tsai Ing-wen

Tsai, the incumbent, spent years mired in low popularity ratings only to surge ahead in the polls this summer.

Tsai had pushed through controversial policies, most notably the much-needed pension reforms. She has refused to bow to waves of pressure from Beijing, leading to a decline in Chinese tourist numbers and the loss of several diplomatic allies, and she has been leading a party that has been riven by infighting ever since its losses in last year’s 9-in-1 elections.

It is only by appointing one of her fiercest critics, William Lai (賴清德), as her running mate that Tsai has managed to broker a truce within the party. It is only the failure of former DPP vice president Annette Lu (呂秀蓮) to secure sufficient support for her own presidential bid that Tsai is not up against an opponent from within her own pan-Green, or DPP-affiliated, camp, along with Han Kuo-yu and James Soong (宋楚瑜) of the pan-Blue People First Party.

This time last year, everything appeared to be stacked in the KMT’s favor. And yet, here we are, less than two weeks from the election, and Han finds himself behind in the polls and widely expected to lose. Why?

There are a few internal issues that could be put forward as possible reasons. Han is prone to gaffes and scandals and these continue to pop up on a regular basis. His abject failure to deliver on any of the promises he made during the Kaohsiung Mayoral elections, and the fact that he has now abandoned his post to run for President, has certainly not played well with many voters in the south.

The Elephant in the Room

There is no denying that, more than anything, the one factor to flip Taiwan’s politics on its head has been China.

Aside from allegations of media meddling and a relentless campaign to limit Taiwan’s presence on the international stage, China’s behavior in Hong Kong corresponded with Tsai’s jump in the polls.

There were many other factors, including the KMT’s disastrous party list, and it would be a mistake to pinpoint Hong Kong as the sole driver of Tsai’s resurgence. But Hong Kong’s pro-democracy protests unquestionably added fuel to Taiwan’s own battle to preserve its sovereignty.

The KMT, to put it lightly, has not convinced the voters of Taiwan it will protect the country from the CCP’s desire to rule over it – by force if necessary.

The KMT is viewed by many voters in Taiwan as being pro-China and pro-unification. There are certainly plenty of comments from senior KMT figures, including Han himself, that suggest an embrace of such ideas. But the official party position is a little more nuanced than this.

The KMT’s official party line is that it supports the so-called “1992 consensus”—a supposed agreement between the KMT and CCP that both sides agree there is “one China” but agree to disagree on what that means—but is opposed to the “one country, two systems” model which has failed miserably in Hong Kong.

It is worth noting that KMT opposition to the model became more forceful in response to the Hong Kong protests, along with a speech on Taiwan last year by Chinese leader Xi Jinping in which he equated the “1992 consensus” with “one country, two systems” to which the KMT took days to provide a coherent response.

The KMT is steadfastly opposed to Taiwan independence and claims to support the Republic of China (ROC).

Of course, it is worth examining the inherent flaws and falsehoods in the “1992 consensus”—which, after all, may not even be real—and the contradictions involved in the KMT, which once fought tooth and nail against the Chinese Communist Party, being so open to letting the CCP dictate the terms of their relationship.

Here and now, however, the key point is this: While the KMT is not officially arguing for eventual unification with China—and with the CCP—that is how many Taiwanese voters perceive their stance.

Poll after poll shows that an overwhelming majority of Taiwanese people are steadfastly opposed to unification. Most prefer to maintain the current “status quo” and either decide at a later date or move toward independence. And polls show that the little support that remains for unification with China—either now or in the future—has been plummeting for years.

This makes the KMT’s image of openness to warm ties with the CCP extremely problematic for the party’s future.

Many KMT supporters, including the bulk of Han Kuo-yu fans, come from a generation that remembers the booming economy of the 1980s under the leadership of Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) and believes a similar economic boom will come if ties with China are strengthened again.

Unfortunately, these are vain hopes. Beijing’s nationalist domestic agenda and foreign policies are becoming far more aggressive as the country’s own economy shows clear signs of weakness, especially in conjunction with the ongoing U.S.-China trade war.

The CCP’s dealings in other countries—visible throughout Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America—indicate that it does not simply want stronger economic ties with Taiwan. When China extends a line of credit abroad, it is also buying political control.

Han is also a very different character to Chiang Ching-kuo. He is demonstrably more positive and open to CCP involvement in Taiwan—last March, he cheerfully visited CCP officials in Hong Kong, Macau and China. Many analysts believe he will not settle for warmer economic relations alone—or, at least, he is too naïve to see that Chinese promises of thriving trade come with an expectation of political influence.

Few voters appear to believe that Han can ably handle economic ties with China while safeguarding Taiwan’s democracy. Even if he loses, however, it remains unclear whether future KMT candidates can convince the people of Taiwan that it is safe to open the doors to more exchanges with China without establishing firm, unbreakable requirements that Taiwan’s sovereignty will not be questioned.

If the KMT loses this election—and any belief in a benevolent CCP continues to go out the window—is it possible that they can win another?

Can the KMT Reinvent Itself?

It would be naïve to assume that the KMT is not capable of reinventing itself. After all, this is the party of Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石)—and it is now openly advocating for warmer ties with the Chinese Communist Party.

Chiang’s KMT ruled Taiwan as a brutal military regime for decades. But it managed to become a credible political party when democracy arrived in Taiwan, and it has bounced back before from catastrophic election defeats.

This election, however, feels like a de facto referendum on independence vs. unification—or, at least, a sovereign Taiwan vs. a Republic of China eternally bound to the CCP.

There is also a clear generational split in Taiwanese politics. KMT voters (and politicians) skew far older than those of the DPP. In the decades to come, it appears unlikely today’s DPP voters, many of whom have no personal attachment to China, will embrace warmer ties with the CCP.

The question, then, is which prominent figures appear in position to succeed Han Kuo-yu as the party’s scion. Do any of them have the qualities to reinvigorate the party and find an approach to cross-strait relations that’s palatable to the voters of Taiwan?

I would argue not.

Hou You-yi (侯友宜) is one name people will mention. The New Taipei mayor is popular among voters of all parties and has been carefully reluctant in his support of the Han campaign. He could possibly move the party toward a moderate cross-strait stance. But would he succeed in bringing hardline party members with him?

Legislator Jason Hsu (許毓仁) is another name often bandied about. He is no doubt more progressive than many in his party and his support for things like equal marriage could attract younger voters. But the same question of whether he could take the whole party with him remains, and he will not return to the legislature after being left off the KMT party list.

There are other names to throw into the mix, although the KMT has a dearth of young talent in its ranks. Either way, whoever assumes the mantle of party leader will likely need an entirely new way to deal with the “China question.”

In the eyes of most Taiwanese people, especially young voters who do not identify with the ROC, the KMT of today is aligned with pro-China, pro-unification stances. And while the KMT could continue to be a force at local level, their current cross-strait stances could render them unelectable in future national contests.

In other words, we may be days away from the end of the KMT as we know it.

(Cover photo via Creative Commons)