This piece was originally written as a case study for Dr. Maya Tudor’s study of India’s nationalism, at Oxford University. It has been edited for this publication.
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Throughout the tumultuous modern history of Taiwan, national consciousness has invariably evolved in times of political transition. While traumatic episodes in Taiwan’s history have provided a catalyst to the formation of a uniquely Taiwanese character, they by no means serve as its sole basis. Rather, the foundation of nationalism in Taiwan lies in the shared experiences of the island’s inhabitants across these eras of cultural and political transformation.
Between the end of the 19th and the dawn of the 21st century, distinct developments in Taiwanese nationalism are visible in three major events. Firstly, the cession of Taiwan by the Qing dynasty following their defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War which ushered in a 50 year period of colonial rule. Secondly, the establishment of the Republic of China regime-in-exile on Taiwan following the defeat of Japan in World War II and the subsequent loss of mainland territory by Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist forces in the Chinese Civil War. Lastly, and most recently, the gradual process of democratizing Taiwan’s political system and government institutions following 40 years of martial law.
Alongside these abrupt formational events, long term forces have also helped generate the conditions underlying these dramatic moments. For the past 400 years, Taiwan’s demographics have been shaped by a series of colonial and migrational eras. These periods have resulted in two major consequences – firstly, a tendency for the concept of “Taiwanese” to be viewed in juxtaposition to the identities of non-resident groups and secondly, for this frame of this reference to expand to include additional populations over time.
Nowhere are these trends more salient than in the contemporary political context of Taiwan. As a de facto independent and democratic nation striving to maintain autonomy from the authoritarian system of mainland China, the driving force behind the ongoing construction of Taiwanese identity is one of differentiation .
Viewed with this background, some have argued that Taiwanese identity has metamorphosed from ethnic nationalism to a firmly political nationalism (Chen, 2012). By charting historical proclamations of Taiwanese statehood, sovereignty, and self-determination against today’s context, it is clear that there is a strong foundation for this argument. Adding additional complexity to these circumstances is the fact that the constitution in force on Taiwan is actually that of the Republic of China – a legal entity that purports to be the legitimate government of all of China. Paradoxically, this political reality is mirrored in the nationalist narrative employed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which inherently relies on implicit ethnic nationalism via claims of shared cultural and historic heritage to establish the basis of its territorial claims over Taiwan (Brown, 2008).
From 1895 onward, regimes assuming political control over Taiwan have played a major role in shaping its incipient nationalism. This process began in response to imminent Japanese colonization of Taiwan and continues under the threat of annexation posed by Chinese military force. Here, history demonstrates a clear correlation: as the hierarchies of political and economic power hanging over Taiwan have changed, so has the emphasized form of nationalism.
First Phase Identity: Resistance to Japanese Rule
After the Qing dynasty was defeated by Emperor Meiji’s forces in the first Sino-Japanese War, Taiwan’s future was in limbo. Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki required China to cede “the island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa” to Japan (Treaty, 1895).
This news was not welcomed by Qing loyalists and other members of the local gentry on Taiwan. In response, a group of men under the leadership of the Qing governor-general of Taiwan, Tang Ching-sung, declared independence on May 23rd 1895. However, the impetus behind this decision was not driven by a desire to achieve self-determination for the people of Taiwan, but rather to avoid domination at the hands of a detestable ethnic other. As stated in Official Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Formosa:
“ The Japanese have affronted China by annexing our territory of Formosa, and the supplications of us, the People of Formosa, at the portals of the Throne have been made in vain. We now learn that the Japanese slaves are about to arrive. If we suffer this, the land of our hearths and homes will become the land of savages and barbarians, but if we do not suffer it, our condition of comparative weakness will certainly not endure long. Frequent conferences have been held with the Foreign Powers, who all aver that the People of Formosa must establish their independence before the Powers will assist them.” (Davidson, 2010)
While seeking to opportunistically secure recognition for the “People of Formosa”, the declaration is not specific about who constitutes this group. Based on the assumptions of cultural superiority widely held by Mandarins serving the Qing court, it is unlikely to have included the “uncivilized” Austronesian peoples that have called Taiwan home for thousands of years. This claim is bolstered by the fact that feuding based on ethnicity and family origins were frequent in Taiwan during this period (Brown 2008). In short, this first experiment in statehood on Taiwan was driven largely by the ethnic motivations of the ruling elite – both in distaste for the prospect of Japanese rule and in exclusion of indigenous and Hakka peoples. The weakness of the coalition that tried to form around the concept of a Formosan Republic created a fragile state. After a mere five months the short lived era of an independent republic on Taiwan ended and ushered in a 50 year period under Japanese rule.
The Japanese colonial era witnessed the early stirrings of a home rule movement in Taiwan that was punctuated by violent uprisings and political organization. The Tapani Incident of 1915 was led by a union of Han Chinese and indigenous people who coordinated attacks against Japanese police stations in Tainan (Katz, 2005). This rebellion was swiftly squashed, but it is nonetheless an early example of the disparate ethnic groups of Taiwan banding together against their common enemy.
The theme of shared experience and oppression also began to expand to political realms. In 1921, the Taiwan Cultural Association began organizing meetings among intellectuals to discuss politics, economics, history, and other relevant topics of the day. This group eventually spawned an offshoot thought to be Taiwan’s first political party, appropriately named the Taiwanese People’s Party (TPP). Riding on the wave of self-determination movements brought about by Wilsonian ideals, the TPP unsuccessfully lobbied Japanese officials for proportional representation in various administrative councils. Regardless of outcome, the aversion to Japanese colonialism triggered along ethnic lines had began to adapt to a more inclusive, experiential form of national identity in this period.
The 228 Incident and the 40-year Suppression of Taiwanese Identity
Once considered to be an unstoppable imperial force, Japan’s empire lay in shambles following their defeat in World War II. Part of this reckoning required them to relinquish control of Taiwan. This time, however, there was no longer a dynasty in control of the Chinese state. Established after the Qing Dynasty was deposed in 1911 by the Xinhai Rebellion, the Republic of China had suffered through countless growing pains as it tried to navigate a nascent country through the chaos of multiple wars.
Eventually overcome by General Mao Tse-Tung and his Red Army, the once powerful Nationalists were forced to flee en masse to Taiwan. Unfortunately for the inhabitants of the island, this was less of a reunion with cultural cousins than the imposition of a corrupt military state that reappropriated land and other assets at will. The animosity between the “Mainlanders” and the “Islanders” finally boiled over on February 28th, 1947.
Known as the 228 Incident, this tragedy of Taiwanese history killed an estimated 10,000 people (with a wide range of casualty counts claimed by different parties) as the Nationalist (KMT) forces cracked down on protesters battling against the venality of Chiang Kai-Shek’s government. Again, the people of Taiwan were faced with a common enemy, but this time hailing from largely the same ethnic group. For over 45 years the 228 Incident was a strictly censored subject within Taiwan, but it is now viewed as being instrumental towards the construction of Taiwanese identity. This is largely due to the fact that the 228 Incident acts as a watershed moment that effectively separated the “Islanders” from the “Mainlanders”, meaning “victims of the massacre, as opposed to the perpetrators and beneficiaries of the incident who were portrayed as outsiders and the enemies of the Taiwanese people.” (Fleischauer, 2007)
The common experience of this trauma shared by Taiwanese was compounded by what followed – suspension of the constitution and 40 years of martial law known as the “White Terror” period. During this era, the state apparatus was entirely controlled by Mainlanders loyal to Chiang Kai-Shek. Historically there was good reason for this as Article 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of China explicitly calls for “complete equality among the various ethnic groups” – precisely the kind of sentiment that seeks to reinforce a sense of political nationalism among citizens (ROC Constitution, 1946). While equality under the law may have extended to those who fled China to take refuge in Taiwan, there was certainly a very real divide between rulers and ruled. This era widened the rupture that the 228 Incident opened between the Chinese and long-term inhabitants of the island, leading to the creation of an emerging identity – Taiwanese.
The divide between the two groups can be seen in many aspects of life in Taiwan. For example, Taiwanese language media was banned and Mandarin Chinese was established as the official language of the State. Ultimately, the aspirations for a democratic state based on the constitution were set aside in favor of the effort to reunify Taiwan and the Chinese mainland. The futility of this exercise, along with the shared experience of oppression manifested itself forcefully as the KMT dictatorship began to loosen its grip on power in the late 1980s.
Taiwanization: The Driving Force of Democratization
As Chiang Ching-kuo received the reins of power shortly following his father’s death in 1975, he also gradually saw the implementation of a series of democratic reforms. He made three momentous policy changes in quick succession – the first was deciding not to crack down on the Democratic Progressive Party upon its founding on September 28th, 1986. This was swiftly followed by the decision to end of martial law on July 15th, 1987. Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, was the Taiwanization of Chiang’s own KMT by placing bensheng ren (本省人, which can be translated as “local province person” as opposed to 外省人, waisheng ren) which can be translated as “outside province person.” in politically powerful positions. In choosing native born Lee Teng-hui as his vice president, Chiang had selected a man who had lived through almost every dramatic turn of Taiwan’s modern history.
Born of Hakka heritage under Japanese colonial rule, Lee briefly joined the Taiwan Communist Party in his youth, but after the Nationalist takeover he became a civil servant within the KMT bureaucracy. If one needed to define what the modern Taiwanese experience entailed, they need not look further than Lee’s biography. This background made him the subject of natural suspicion from the old guard of the party, who suspected him to be something of a reformist, or even worse, a closet activist for Taiwanese independence. They wouldn’t have to wait long for him to reveal his true colors.
After Chiang Ching-kuo’s death in January 1988, Lee became the first Taiwan-born president in the history of the Republic of China. At the time, the president was elected by the Mainlander-dominated National Assembly. In 1990, the student-led Wild Lily movement demanded the dissolution of this Assembly and a timetable for future political reforms among other changes (Taiwan Communique, 1990). Lee provided his support for the students’ demands and undertook a series of changes that culminated in his re-election to the presidency in Taiwan’s first direct multi-party election in 1996.
Harboring similar suspicions to Lee’s opponents within the KMT, the Communist Party in Beijing reacted forcefully to the prospect of a native Taiwanese becoming president through a democratic vote. As such, China launched a series of missile tests into Taiwanese waters in hopes of swaying the election away from Lee. However, the outcome of this strategy had just the opposite effect as Lee won 54% of the vote despite the looming military threats posed by China. Once again, an external security threat provided the catalyst to an outburst of Taiwanese nationalism, as the people decided to elect a man that believes “Taiwan culture is not a branch of Chinese culture.” (Rose & Teo, 2013)
This trend of separating Taiwanese and Chinese cultural and historical spheres continues to unfold in domestic politics today. In the 2000 election, Chen Shui-bian of the pro-independence DPP won the presidency after a split vote, marking the first time that a party other than the KMT had their candidate elected as president. Chen began a process of desinicization (and correspondingly Taiwanization) through a name rectification campaign where he vowed to rename state-owned industries bearing a Chinese moniker to give them a more Taiwanese identity (Hille, 2004).
In recent years, young people who can’t remember Taiwan before it was a democracy have become increasingly assertive in expressing their demands that their country remain free of Chinese influence. When students stormed and occupied the Legislative Yuan to prevent the signing of a trade and services deal with China in the spring of 2014, a new generation of political activism had bloomed alongside what is known as the Sunflower Movement. The reverberations of this event are just beginning to be felt, as Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP won the presidency in 2016 riding this wave of youth support.
Clearly, Taiwanese identity has fully formed in the consciousness of today’s generation. Whether or not the international community is prepared to formally recognize this identity remains a question to be resolved by time.
References:
- Chen, Rou-Lan. “Beyond National Identity in Taiwan: A Multidimensional and Evolutionary Conceptualization.” Asian Survey. University of California Press Journals, 01 Oct. 2012. Web. 25 July 2017.
- Brown, Melissa J. “What’s in a Name? Culture, Identity, and the “Taiwan Problem”.” Is Taiwan Chinese?: The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities. Berkeley: U of California, 2008. 22. Print.
- “Treaty of Shimonoseki.” Letter. 17 Apr. 1895. Treaty of Shimonoseki. N.p., n.d. Web. 25 July 2017.
- Davidson, James Wheeler. The Island of Formosa, past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions. Memphis, TN: General, 2010. Print.
- Katz, Paul R. “Governmentality and Its Consequences in Colonial Taiwan: A Case Study of the Ta-pa-ni Incident of 1915.” The Journal of Asian Studies 64.02 (2005): 387-424. Web.
- Fleischauer, Stefan. “The 228 Incident and the Taiwan Independence Movement’s Construction of a Taiwanese Identity.” China Information. N.p., 1 Nov. 2007. Web. 25 July 2017.
- “The Constitution of the Republic of China.” The Constitution of the Republic of China. N.p., 25 Dec. 1946. Web. 25 July 2017.
- “Taiwan Communique 44.” Taiwan Communique (1990): n. pag. International Committee for Human Rights in Taiwan. Web.
- Rose, Caroline, and Victor Teo. The United States between China and Japan. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars, 2013. 312. Print.
- Hille, Kathrin. “Chen Vows to Rename Taiwan’s State-owned Enterprises.” Financial Times. N.p., 6 Dec. 2004. Web. 25 July 2017.
