Toward a US-Taiwan “Stable Marriage:” Triangular Analysis of the US-Taiwan-China Relationship

The US-Taiwan relationship is now stronger than it has been over the past four decades, while both are growing concerned with China. To draw lessons from history, when the United States broke off formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan on January 1, 1979, it was commonly understood to be in a triangular context based on considerations of US-China, US-Soviet, and China-Soviet relations. In essence, much of the United States decision making toward Taiwan had little to do with Taiwan; and in this biggest political shift in Taiwan’s entire post World War II history, there was little Taiwan could do about it.

At the height of the Cold War, the United States and China both drew closer to one another as they each faced the same Soviet threat, as if the “enemy of my enemy is my friend.” This US-China-USSR Cold War triangle is what Professor Lowell Dittmer calls the “Great Strategic Triangle” in his new book China’s Asia. Beyond these major powers, Dittmer extended his analysis to include Taiwan a decade ago in his Bush, China, Taiwan: A Triangular Analysis. With this triangular framework in mind, how do triangular dynamics explain Taiwan’s strong relations with the United States and Taiwan’s frosty relations with China today, and impact Taiwan in ways that are possibly completely outside of Taiwan’s control?

Strategic triangles

To better explain both US-China Cold War rapprochement and US-Taiwan dynamics today in light of the aforementioned trends, I combine Dittmer’s political science theory with the psychology concept of a balanced triangle:

1. A friend of my friend tends to become my friend
2. An enemy of a friend tends to become my enemy
3. A friend of my enemy tends to become my enemy
4. An enemy of my enemy tends to become my friend

The fourth option explains US-China rapprochement in 1971, since both were wary of the USSR. China was in the midst of the Sino-Soviet split at the time. The United States competed against the USSR by proxy in the Cuban Missile Crisis, in Eastern Europe, and in broader terms with NATO versus Warsaw Pact states. Both the United States and China recognized each other to be the “enemy of my enemy is my friend,” and therefore they became valued partners.

In a similar way, Taiwan plays the role of the third corner of the US-Taiwan-China triangle today. The first option, “a friend of my friend tends to become my friend,” best explains US-Taiwan-China relations during the previous period under leaders Barack Obama, Ma Ying-jeou, and Hu Jintao. At the time, the official US policy toward China was to seek positive relations across the board.

However, the three relationships shifted under the current leaders Trump, Tsai and Xi toward improved US-Taiwan relations in the context of degenerating US-China and cross-Strait relations, which moves the triangle back toward option four–enemy of my enemy tends to become my friend–essentially explaining stronger US-Taiwan ties today. Therefore, this triangle conception reveals that the US-China-Taiwan relationship is transitioning away from what Professor Lowell Dittmer calls a “menage a trois” (positive US-China-Taiwan relations all around) of the recent past, toward a “stable marriage” between the United States and Taiwan as they both grow increasingly distant from China.

US cozying to Taiwan, but increasingly guarded toward China

Since the end of the Cold War, the overall trend in the US relationship with Taiwan is that both have gradually become closer partners, despite fluctuations. The recent trend over the past several years is that the United States is becoming more supportive of Taiwan, in symbolic as well as substantive ways. The Obama Administration continually upheld its commitment to Taiwan, to include approving several transfers of defense equipment to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan relations Act. Notable developments under the Trump Administration include the first phone call between between President-elect Trump and President Tsai soon after the US election, which had not happened at such a senior level in decades.

The top three recent and prominent US-Taiwan issues happen to be positive developments, showing how their friendly relations are strengthening. On March 17, President Trump signed the Taiwan Travel Act as a pledge to deepen the US-Taiwan partnership by allowing high level visits between United States and Taiwan government officials. The United States is considering cooperating with Taiwan through new air and naval military exercises, along with the prospect of US naval port visits to Taiwan are all outlined in the recent US National Defense Authorization Act of 2018 (NDAA). There have been continued US arms sales to Taiwan under the Trump Administration. To be fair, there are other areas where Taiwan and the United States are not aligned, such as Taiwan’s trade barriers limiting imports of beef and pork, but they are not among the key headline issues in the relationship today. As a whole, the history of the United States’ strong ties with Taiwan and becoming stronger.

In contrast, the US-China relationship is shifting from friendly toward openly antagonistic. The Obama Administration’s policy toward China was “positive, cooperative, comprehensive” and its interactions with China generally reflected its policy. However, recent prominent developments have escalated in a negative direction under the Trump Administration. China’s continued island building in the South China Sea, and US’ freedom of navigation operations (FON) in response set up both sides for local confrontations. US deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system to the Korean peninsula in response to North Korea’s provocative nuclear and missile tests also exacerbates the US-China relationship. China also responds and takes diplomatic efforts to push back against the US’ Taiwan Travel Act, US arms sales to Taiwan, and the prospects of US naval port visits to Taiwan. In this view, US-China relations are surely far from “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive.”

Cross-Strait freeze

As with US-China relations, the China-Taiwan cross-Strait situation is also deteriorating and not because for lack of trying by President Tsai. Beijing is suspending official cross Strait contacts with Taipei, decreasing PRC tourists to the island and taking other measures that it claims is based on Taiwan President Tsai’s refusal to accept the so-called 1992 Consensus, which refers to a tacit agreement for both sides to uphold the One China Principle but have each their own interpretations of what “one China” means.

In this context, President Tsai has continually extended olive branches of peace and cooperation across the Taiwan Strait, though short of agreeing with China’s interpretation of “One China.” Ambassador Stephen Young, former director of the American Institute in Taiwan put it simply: “Beijing has made a mistake by not trying to reach out to Taiwan, and its attempts to bully Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen demonstrate a lack of foresight.” In addition, my recent Global Taiwan Brief article explained the many reasons for why it is actually in Beijing’s interests to resume cross Strait relations rather than continue a cross Strait freeze.

This cross Strait political freeze has many detrimental diplomatic and economic effects. PRC official dialogues with Taiwan government, particularly the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) – Association Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) diplomatic channel between the two have been postponed indefinitely. China is actively excluding Taiwan from participation in international organizations such as the World Health Assembly (WHA), international police (INTERPOL), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and even the Kimberley Process to prevent trade in blood diamonds. Taiwan’s active participation in each of these would not only benefit Taiwan, but also benefit the safety and security of the rest of the world. The number of PRC tourists to Taiwan have also drastically declined, which corresponds with decreased overall cross-Strait economic cooperation. These reverse the many gains both sides made under previous leaders over the earlier decade.

Building on a strategic triangle concept and implications for Taiwan

The question of symmetry matters when we consider Taiwan in relation with the United States and China. The United States and China relationship is what I consider symmetrical, whereas US-Taiwan and China-Taiwan is asymmetrical because Taiwan is less than ten fold of either the other two in economic and military terms. This means that we would expect Taiwan to have less influence on the others in the strategic triangle, while the other two have a great influence on their relations with Taiwan. In practice, this means improved US-China relations would drive improvements in China-Taiwan cross-Strait relations away from the new “stable marriage” back toward the old “menage a trois.” The opposite is less likely to be true–which is the idea that improved cross-Strait relations would drive a better US-China relationship. Taiwan is far less powerful militarily and economically compared to either the United States and China, so a minor power would have a difficult time shifting relations among such major powers.

It can be difficult to tell which bilateral effects arise from triangular causes. If the empirical track record shows that the United States is strengthening ties with Taiwan, does it do so because of Taiwan–it’s strategic position in the middle of the West Pacific, strong personal ties between leaders from both sides, Taiwan’s attractive soft power, and that it is a vibrant democracy–or because strained relations with China create a context for stronger US-Taiwan ties, or both? It’s important to consider whether the a third party matters because triangular dynamics I mentioned above depends on that third country to play an essential part in the relations between the two other countries. If one country’s relations with another country is not influenced by a third country, then triangular politics is not at work.

In sum, the recent trends are that the United States is becoming more guarded toward China, while the United States is cozying up to Taiwan. US-Taiwan ties have already been strong, and they are becoming even stronger. It could be coincidence, but strategic triangle dynamics appears to explain this phenomena well. Applying UC Berkeley Professor Lowell Dittmer’s theory of strategic triangles leads to the conclusion that United States and Taiwan are entering into what he conceived as a “stable marriage,” where relations are positive with each other, but both have rocky relationships with China.

Not only can Dittmer’s conception of strategic triangles potentially explain the status quo, but importing the psychological theory of “cognitive balance” and combining it with strategic triangles in international affairs can lead to new predictions that if the US-China relationship was to improve, that it would actually drive the China-Taiwan cross-Strait relationship to improve as well; though the corollary is not true, since improving cross-Strait relations are unlikely to shift US-China relations due to Taiwan’s middle power asymmetries in comparison to these other major powers. However, there is still a need for more research to determine under what conditions triangular dynamics explain outcomes. Nonetheless, strategic triangular analysis can potentially be a powerful tool to explain the past, the present, and may predict the future of US-China-Taiwan relations.