This is a translation from the original 為什麼你應該關心居住證問題 by Song Cheng-en (宋承恩), a doctoral candidate in International Law at Oxford University in the United Kingdom. Originally published by Voicettank. Translation by Tim Smith.***
On August 16, 2018, the People’s Republic of China announced plans for a special “Residence Card” for residents of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, as a domestic identification document within China. Any Taiwanese citizen who resides in China for over half a year and have stable, legal employment or those engaged in continuous study, will able to apply. Holders of this permit is reported to enjoy the same employment, social insurance, and housing stipends as Chinese nationals, as well as access to public services and other conveniences.
According to Taiwan’s CTS News, within three days of the September 1, tens of thousands of Taiwanese citizens have applied, mainly in Fujian, Guangdong and other coastal metropolitan areas.
The Taiwanese government did not react much to this new policy. The first response from President Tsai Ing-wen was “the residence permit is just a card. It’s just something that gives Taiwanese citizens in China a few more conveniences, and has nothing to do with national identity;” and that ” even if some Taiwanese citizens reside in China for work, study, or for other reasons, I believe they will still identify primarily with freedom and democracy.”
But civil groups have continued to warn the dangers of the new policy, putting pressure on the government to respond. At first, the government acknowledged the risks of being surveilled by the Chinese authorities and losing personal privacy, as well as assets outside of China being potentially taxed; however the government still mostly sees the residence cards as a personal choice for each individual citizen.
On August 30, Chiu Chui-cheng, a vice minister of the Mainland Affairs Council, stated that since the residence card does not require establishing a citizenship in the PRC, having the card does not involve revoking one’s Taiwanese citizenship according to Taiwanese law, but existing laws may be amended to protect national security. Then on September 2, in response to intensifying media promotion by China, the Mainland Affairs Council said that it will look into creating a registration system in Taiwan for Chinese residence cards in order to track public services payouts and eligibility in voting or running in elections.
Frankly speaking, these responses still focus mainly on the technical level. There are three fundamental problem of Chinese residence cards for Taiwanese citizens: Chinese jurisdiction over Taiwanese citizens, blurring the line between Chinese and Taiwanese national identities, and Chinese encroachnent in Taiwan through these residents.
Chinese jurisdiction and dual citizenship
There is no question that the residence permit cards for Taiwanese citizens are in reality a marker of subjecting to Chinese jurisdiction.
Unlike residence permits for Chinese citizens, the residence cards for Taiwanese citizens acts as official citizenship registration in everything but name: the ID number fits part of China’s national ID numbering scheme and can be used as such; it has the legal force of a national ID card; and law enforcement and government surveillance can keep data on each residence card ID number. The applicant must provide an address, and the card is good for five years.
Even on the card itself, there is the official seal of the People’s Republic of China, and the back even looks much more like China’s national ID. The office receiving applications has a sign that clearly says “National ID Registration.”
According to the regulations governing Taiwanese citizens’ residence cards, the cards are available to “Chinese citizens who are Taiwan residents but does not have mainland hukou.” This allows residence card applications to skirt around the law in Taiwan that revokes Taiwanese citizenship when someone applies for PRC residence. In other words, the residence card operates allows applicants to in practice enjoy dual citizenship.
In this case, China is not recognizing dual citizenship; instead it is claiming “Taiwanese people are simply citizens of China and nothing else.” In other words, residence cards is physical evidence that Taiwan is not a country.
China has increasingly treated Taiwanese citizens as Chinese subjects. When Taiwanese tourists were hurt in Kenya, the Chinese embassy provided assistance. When Taiwanese citizens are subject to criminal prosecution abroad, they are somehow extradited to China. Even Lee Ming-che, a Taiwanese citizen, is imprisoned in China as a criminal for his actions that took place mostly in Taiwan.
When Taiwan did not respond seriously to these actions, China took the next step to give Taiwanese residents citizenship status in China. As Taiwanese people voluntarily obtain Chinese residency (in effect citizenship), it lends more legitimacy to China’s claim that Taiwan is ruled by China.
When Taiwanese people naively accept China’s residence cards, we accept China’s jurisdiction.
China entwined into Taiwan’s democratic process
Article 9, Section 1 of Taiwan’s Cross Straits Regulations states that those with Chinese citizenship cannot participate in elections, recalls, initiatives, referendums or hold public office. It goes without saying that this involves loyalty to the Taiwanese state and the integrity of democratic procedures in Taiwan.
Taiwan ultimately exists separately from China because of its democracy. However, democracy is messy and vulnerable to manipulation. As Taiwanese citizens subject themselves to Chinese jurisdiction, they are also assuming legal duties under Chinese law. According to China’s “Anti-Secession Law,” Taiwan “compatriots” have a duty to “complete the great task of unification.” When card holders act in a way that “may cause harm to the sovereignty, security, honor, and interests of the country,” the governing body issuing these cards can rescind the card.
The question is, should Taiwan allow citizens who subject themselves voluntarily to these laws, which make it a legal duty to undermine the Taiwanese state, to participate in its democratic process?
The example of Crimea
Ultimately, giving Taiwanese citizens residence cards poses a bigger risk: China using these “residents” as an excuse for aggression. What happened to Crimea in Ukraine provides the best illustration.
Crimea’s residents are an ethnic-Russian majority, but Crimea has a long time recognized as a part of Ukraine. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 90’s, Ukraine gained its independence from Russia, but relations between the two deteriorated in the years that followed and Russia unilaterally gave out Russian citizenship and passports to Crimean residents.
Eventually, as political crises plagued Ukraine, Russia took advantage of the situation and had the Crimeans hold a referendum to declared independence, and then immediately sign an agreement with Moscow to merge into Russia. During this process, Russian forces were deployed to Crimea, under the excuse of “protecting the rights of Russian citizens in Crimea.”
The Crimea example is eerily similar to Taiwan’s situation. In Taiwan, pro-unification advocates have demonstrated that they do not see the DPP controlled government as their own, whether it was protest groups issuing their own “reporters” vests as if they themselves existed as a separate government, or outright flying Chinese flags.
As the people legally submit to China’s jurisdiction through obtaining Chinese residence cards, China will have much more of a stake in Taiwan’s internal business through these people, or even use them as an excuse to eventually invade Taiwan, just like what happened in Crimea.
Current trends seem to point toward China ramping up efforts to extend its influence into Taiwan’s society at an individual level. China’s granting nationality and citizenship on a large scale is something we absolutely must be wary of.
(Feature photo taken from Pixabay)
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