One 1992 Consensus, Different Interpretations

This is a translation from the original 一個九二共識，各自表述 by Hu Po-yian (胡博硯), who is an Associate Professor of Law at Soo-chow University. Originally published by Voicettank. Translation by Tim Smith.

***

Last month Chinese president Xi Jinping spoke about cross-Strait ties during the “40th anniversary of the Declaration to Our Taiwan Compatriots,” where his insistence on the “1992 consensus” became the focal point of ensuing controversy.

Xi Jinping said: “both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one China, and we shall work together to unify the country via the 1992 Consensus.” Afterwards he again brought up peaceful unification, under the guise of “One Country, Two Systems.” Lastly, he offered five goals, none of which was the “1992 consensus” but instead included “exploring the two systems case for Taiwan as the way to realize peaceful unification, and ‘One Country, Two Systems’ as the best method for unifying the country.”  

“Different interpretations” has no practical meaning

The 1992 Consensus, which had been the core accomplishment for the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), is now stripped of any ambiguity. Setting aside the question of whether there was any consensus actually forged in Hong Kong back in 1992 (though much of the documentation shows no textual agreement was reached), the “1992 Consensus” became the basis for interaction and negotiation between Taiwan and China during the KMT administrations that followed, as if merely uttering the words “1992” and “Consensus” acts as a passcode to open the door.

But what are the actual contents of this supposed consensus? From many documents as well as recorded speeches of KMT leaders, the 1992 Consensus had been defined as “One China with different interpretations,” or more specifically, “both sides [Taiwan and the Mainland] belong to a singular state called China, but the definition of ‘China’ is up for interpretation by both sides.”

But China, for its part, has never accepted the “different interpretations” piece. When Beijing brings up the consensus, it stresses the “One China” piece but never admits to “different interpretations.” In other words, Beijing equates the 1992 consensus with its “One China Principle” — that Taiwan must first agree that it belongs to China before any more details can be negotiated.

In any case, “different interpretations” has very little practical meaning. Each side can “interpret” the consensus however it likes to its own people, but that is merely political spin.

Reality of the situation

Beijing would tolerate the strategic ambiguity of “agreeing to disagree” only as long as it had to. As China believes it has the upper hand over Taiwan, the strategic ambiguity no longer has any reason to exist. Both governments need to come face to face with the actual reality of the situation.

Former president Ma Ying-jeou believes that the “different interpretations” piece is coded into the text of the Republic of China constitution currently in force in Taiwan (since the constitution, promulgated in 1947 in China, has never explicitly forfeited the territories now controlled by the People’s Republic of China). But the constitution has been amended seven times, all of which were amended by representatives of the people of Taiwan and only Taiwan. In other words, these amendments reflect the will of the people of a small Pacific island, not the will of the people on the Asian mainland. Amending the constitution is itself an expression of sovereignty.

The constitution also provides that “rights and obligations between the people of the Chinese mainland area and those of the free area [Taiwan], and the disposition of other related affairs may be specified by law” (Article 11 of the Additional Articles). This could be read textually as treating the “mainland” as if it’s governed under the Republic of China, but in 1999, the year before Article 11 was added, then-president Lee Teng-hui had opined that Taiwan and China are in a “special state-to-state” kind of relationship. This view is similar to the basic understanding between West and East Germany in the 1970s, where both states recognized each other as part of an aspirational, unified Germany but also recognized each other as sovereign states under international law. Both German states became members of the UN, and developed a workable set of interactions. It wasn’t without controversy, but it at least provides for one model for reference.

When President Lee Teng-hui was interviewed by Deutsche Welle in 1999, he stated that since the ROC constitution was first amended in 1991, the government has in practice limited the boundaries of the country to Taiwan, Penghu, and other outlying islands within its actual control, and all leadership and representative positions are elected only by the people in Taiwan. It further agreed to the legality of the PRC regime in China. In short, the relationship between Taiwan and China is that of a special state to state relationship, and not between a legitimate government versus a rebellious organization, nor between a central versus local government.

China, unsurprisingly, vehemently opposed Lee’s statement. The Taiwan Affairs Office heavily criticized Lee as “distorting the cross-Strait relationship to satisfy his agenda of splitting China’s territorial integrity.” But under the existing text of the ROC Constitution, this is the most accurate interpretation of the reality on the ground, that there are two sovereign entities governing each China and Taiwan. Otherwise, are we really to interpret the ROC Constitution as to treat the PRC as a local government of the ROC?

As far-fetched as that sounds, that’s how the PRC treats Taiwan. China denies the ROC of any sovereignty. So what room is there for “different interpretations?” China treats Taiwan as a local subservient government, and it’s One China will never be your Republic of China.

We shall see how the future fares for this outdated and outmoded “1992 Consensus.” At the present, there are too many conflicting definitions which renders it pretty much meaningless.

(Feature photo by Theirry Erhmann)