To run a successful democracy, a country’s citizens need to be included and engaged. The people decide what is important to them, and their government should reflect those wishes.

Often the difficulty in a democratic system is not maintaining the status quo, but rather the expansion of its frontiers. Those who represent both the present and the future — the youth of a nation — are usually at the forefront of this expansion and drive society forwards by pushing for inclusivity and justice. This phenomenon can be seen all over the world, and Taiwan represents one of the most significant and successful cases. Young people in Taiwan have been increasingly unsatisfied with the two dominant political parties — the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) — and have been demanding more from their politicians. While the DPP has been the traditional home of young activists, its moderation on key social justice issues have led to a gradual sense of frustration with the party since the mid-2000s. Consequently, these young Taiwanese have started to support new political parties, leading to the election of “Third Force” candidates such as Freddy Lim of the New Power Party (NPP) in the 2016 elections.

Youth activism: a tradition in Taiwan

Not all states start off as a democracy, and a democratic culture has to be developed by ordinary, civic-minded citizens. In Taiwan, we can see such activism under the period of martial law under the KMT. Hopeful that Taiwan finally would be able to move forward after the death of the dictator Chiang Kai-shek, young activists began to push for grass-roots change in how their lives are managed. University students saw a direct parallel between their situation and the changing tides rippling through the broader political system. In 1985, students at National Taiwan University (NTU) marched in protest clamoring for direct school elections, where all the students had proper representation instead of a process by which university officials were able vet candidates for their “desirability”. Although not a direct protest against the government, it showcased that the young adults of Taiwan were beginning to find their voice.

Such sentiments would only grow as time passed, encouraged by the lifting of martial law in 1987. Not wanting to leave Taiwan’s first steps towards democracy in the less-than-trustworthy hands of the KMT, NTU students and other activists initiated what was been popularly referred to as the Wild Lily Movement to demand that a true democracy emerged from the process. Undeterred by the bloody fate of their Chinese counterparts in Tiananmen Square the previous year, a sit-in was organized by NTU students on March 19, 1990, and quickly gained popular support. Around 15,000 people — 5,000 to 6,000 of them students — occupied Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Square (now Liberty Square) to demand that the KMT-dominated National Assembly be abolished, that the extraordinary legislation promulgated in the late 1940s to limit public freedoms become nullified, that a broad consultation process was undertaken to determine constitutional changes, and that the President, Lee Teng-hui, establish a political timetable for the reform process. They were able to come to agreement with President Lee Teng-hui peacefully, and the sit-in ended on March 21, 1990.

The continual push for greater democratization of Taiwan in the decade that followed appeared to have culminated with the election of Chen Shui-bian of the opposition DPP as president in 2000. Yet, disillusionment with the DPP started almost as soon as they won power. Chen campaigned in favor of Taiwanese identity and independence — these being seen as synonymous with democracy — saying, “we should insist on Taiwan’s independent sovereignty.” But four years into his presidency, the reputation of the DPP had declined as the Chen administration appeared to moderate and vacillate on its promises. In 2004, some people began criticizing the Wild Lilies “for having degenerated or having been hijacked by the DPP”, and there was a growing sense among some that the big dreams of the movement were being suffocated under the politics-as-usual approach of the DPP. This was a perception that only grew as corruption scandals surrounding Chen began to emerge.

Sensing this shift in mood, the KMT sought to exploit the situation. Indeed, as the 2008 election approached, a poll found that 53 percent of people between the ages of 20 and 29 would vote for Ma Ying-jeou, the KMT’s candidate. The same poll found that only 38 percent would vote for Frank Hsieh, the DPP’s candidate. Nonetheless, Ma knew that just relying on the wounded reputation of the DPP would not be enough to win the election, much less build a popular base for the future, so he created the Young KMT. According to Lee Je Hwa, the executive officer of the Young KMT, “Chairman Ma aims to establish change in the party with youth participation.” Recognizing the priorities of many young Taiwanese, Ma ran on a platform that promised economic development and increased employment opportunities — an area that the Chen administration failed to make much headway. This promise of prosperity — a tactic that would serve the KMT again ten years later — was attractive enough for a wary public to give the KMT another chance.

That bargain, however, did not pay off. It quickly became obvious that a KMT government meant pro-China policies, mindset, and behaviors — all of which were seen as a fundamental threat to Taiwan’s blossoming democratic society. The Wild Strawberry Movement arose in response to this threat. The massive police presence and marginalization of the symbols of Taiwanese identity during the visit of Chen Yunlin — the head of China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits — provided damning proof that the KMT was attempting to halt progress in Taiwan’s democracy, if not take it a step backwards. About 400 students occupied the Liberty Square for a month to protest the visit of Chen Yunlin, and their cause quickly spread to other Taiwanese cities. This event would reignite the youth activism that had been in decline during the eight years of DPP rule, and form the foundations of movements soon to come.

Yet, this new wave of activism had moved beyond the goals of their predecessors. Having grown up in an age of relative freedom (compared to their parents), they saw a need to fight for people in Taiwan that were still denied rights — those marginalized groups who were left behind in the grand struggle for political democracy and independence from China. This younger generation was nicknamed the Strawberry Generation because they were viewed by their elders as being easily offended and lazy. To their parents, some of whom were of the Wild Lily era, the main priorities were maintaining political democracy and the rights for the majority of the population. But the meaning of democracy for their children had evolved beyond these basic goals. This new generation has made it their objective to extend their hard-earned democratic rights and privileges to marginalized groups. Marriage equality, indigenous rights, and government transparency are just a few of the newer priorities for this generation.

However, even with this new shift, the 2012 elections saw Ma Ying-jeou win his second election. But even though the KMT won, they only won by six percent, a much slimmer win than the 17 percent win in 2008. The DPP was still reeling from the abysmal state the Chen administration had left it in. Tsai Ing-wen worked hard to rebrand the DPP as the progressive counterpart. The DPP’s campaign slogan was “fairness and justice”. However, it can be reasonably inferred that Ma won his second term because Tsai represented uncertainty. There is always a bit of risk when choosing to trust in a new person — particularly when that candidate was female, with a senior member of her own party stating that a “skirt-wearer was unfit” to lead — and combined with the relatively good economic stability, enough people chose to go with familiarity.

The shift in the political landscape made itself explicitly clear during and in the aftermath of the 2014 student-led Sunflower Movement. The Sunflower Movement started out as a sit-in at the Legislative Yuan in protest of the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA). Echoing the Chen Yunlin incident six years earlier, he CSSTA was seen as a backdoor way of undermining Taiwan’s democracy and de facto independence through promises of greater trade with China. Moreover, the Ma administration tried to get the agreement passed through an expedited process with lessened scrutiny, arguing it was not technically an agreement with a foreign state. Outraged Taiwanese youth protested with slogans such as “Save Democracy, Don’t Sell Our Country.” during their occupation of the parliament.

The Sunflower Movement and its aftermath

The Sunflower Movement shared many similarities with its Wild Lily and Wild Strawberry predecessors. All three were student-initiated responses reflecting their dissatisfaction with their government and garnered more public support than anticipated. However, what sets the Sunflower Movement apart from previous movements was the determination to not allow their momentum to fizzle out or their movement to be absorbed into the broader system. The students were successful in preventing the passing of the CSSTA and instead of retreating back into silence, the youth remained a prominent force in politics. They started vocalizing their progressive stance on marriage equality, labor reform, economic development, indigenous rights, and other social justice issues that Taiwan had yet to fully address — and they did so more loudly and unapologetically.

One benefactor of this shift was the DPP. As mentioned earlier, in 2012, Tsai began the process of rebranding the DPP as being progressive in more than just name, and to be more than just the “pro-Taiwan” party. Indeed, indicative of the changed public mood in the wake of the Sunflower Movement, Tsai’s gender and unmarried status now became an asset. Her mixed heritage — having both Hakka and Austronesian indigenous elements in her ancestry — only added to the progressive image of change. The DPP said that they would focus on environmental reform, educational reform, judicial reform, and economic reform. Tsai said that her administration would work hard to “address the issues concerning indigenous peoples”. Moreover, she publicly came out in support of marriage equality, posting a video on Facebook in the lead-up to the 2015 LGBT Pride Parade stating that everyone is equal before love.

All of the above inspired many who supported the Sunflower Movement. Data conducted by Taiwan Thinktank showed that “when she was sworn in, 76 percent of those aged 20 and 24 said they supported her.” For many people, this version of the DPP ignited feelings of hope. They hoped that this new DPP would finally be able to take the steps needed to ensure that their democracy not only was safe from China’s encroachments, but also capable of expanding it to address social justice issues.

Tsai Ing-wen’s inaugural address perfectly demonstrates the shift in the DPP’s priorities, reflecting the rising influence of their younger constituencies:

[T]he new government will continue to work with civil society to align its policies with the values of diversity, equality, openness, transparency, and human rights, so as to deepen and evolve Taiwan’s democratic institutions.

Her speech appeared to justify the various campaigns of activists who attempted to effect political change through protests, walkouts, and marches. This was not the same scandal-ridden DPP the youth knew from eight years ago.

While many young voters threw their support behind a more progressive-sounding DPP under Tsai Ing-wen, not everyone felt that protests were sufficient to achieve their goals. They wanted political parties that unambiguously and stridently reflected their values. Parties that advocated for the kind of democracy that the Sunflower Movement represented. Furthermore, there was concern amongst some that the DPP in power would move back to the center, as they did in 2000-2008. This belief, coupled with the demand of a party that stood by their ideals led to the rise of so-called “Third Force” parties that collaborated with the establishment on shared objectives, but still remained anti-establishment at their core.

Two such parties that were poised to benefit from this demand were the Taiwan Green Party and the Social Democratic Party. The Taiwan Green Party, founded in 1996 by several civic groups, mainly focuses on domestic issues. Their core values are sustainability, non-violence between countries, societies, and peoples, respect for diversity, social justice, and a participatory democracy for all citizens. They also recognize that environmental and social justice issues can’t be dealt with separately.

The Social Democratic Party was founded in 2015 by Fan Yun. Fan Yun has a history of student activism, as she was one of the few female leaders during the Wild Lily Movement. As a former student activist involved in a student led movement, she understands the importance youth movements, and she strongly feels that the older generation now has the responsibility to help the young generation of today stand on their shoulders and lead the way for the future direction of Taiwan. The SDP focuses on three main areas: the economy, politics, and society. They advocate for a new economy where industries are encouraged to take up more social responsibility and invest in talent cultivation and innovation. Politically, they advocate for a multi-party political system. They support Taiwan independence and are dedicated to actively promoting Taiwan’s international recognition and participation. Societally, they believe that there should be equitable educational opportunities that focus on the cultivation of innovative thinking and they strive for a society where all Taiwanese are free from prejudice and discrimination.

Perhaps the most well known and publicized Third Force party is the New Power Party (NPP). Similar to the Green Party Taiwan and the Social Democratic Party, the NPP supports marriage equality, environmental protection, transparency, as well as being a beacon of safety for sexual assault victims. What sets the NPP apart from the other two parties is the unconventionality of one of its most prominent founders and members, Freddy Lim. Before becoming involved with the NPP, Freddy Lim was the frontman of the Death Metal band Chthonic. He wasn’t afraid of expressing his political beliefs, and his causes went beyond Taiwan’s shores. Reflecting the internationalism of Taiwan’s younger generations, Lim would support related causes such as self-determination for Tibetans, going so far as waving a Tibetan flag at one of his concerts. He also has a long history of activism, including his tenure as chairman of Amnesty International’s branch in Taiwan from 2010 to 2014. However, as much as society viewed him as unique and unconventional, “in many ways, his music ­communicated an anger that was very much present in the hearts of many young Taiwanese.” Inspired and energized by the Sunflower Movement, Freddy Lim help found the NPP.

Freddy Lim’s unapologetic attitude has set the tone of the NPP. Other leading members of the party also have some kind of connection to the Sunflower Movement, or at least to activism and advocacy. Wu Cheng, Lai Pin-yu, and Huang Kuo-chang had all participated and reached some sort of prominence in the movement. Wang Cheng-chung is the only one who does not have a direct relationship with the Sunflower Movement. However, Wang was the former chairman of the Goa-Seng-Lang Association for Taiwan Independence. They understand on a personal and deep level what the Sunflower Movement meant and represents. Consequently, the NPP has made it clear that just because they have entered the political world, that they “would not pay lip service to justice and fairness.” Combined with Freddy Lim’s unconventionality and the NPP’s Sunflower Movement origins, progressive voters see the NPP as the party that best represents their wishes.

Just a year after it was formed, the NPP won five seats in the legislature in the 2016 elections, the only Third Force party to win any seats. This is a notable success because Taiwanese politics is dominated by the two mainstream parties, with the KMT and DPP having ample funding and with extensive networks. Nonetheless, while the SDP and Green Party formed an alliance for the same election, they only garnered 2.49% of the vote.

Struggle of the third force parties

While Third Force parties are advocating for greater, more radical reforms, the DPP seems to be falling back into the familiar pattern of post-election moderation. One significant issue that the current administration advocated for was the legalization of same-sex marriage. In May of 2017, the Judicial Yuan declared that refusing same sex couples the right to marriage was unconstitutional. They gave Tsai’s administration two years to change existing or create new legislation that complied with it’s ruling. Many hoped that with a female president, Taiwan would become more “gender-friendly”. However, as the writer Fan Ganghao commented in Womany — an online platform that encourages dialogue between and around gender issues — “having more women in government is not a guarantee of more progressive policies.” Indeed, in 2016, the DPP created a list of what bills they would prioritize. Marriage equality was not one of those bills. LGBTQ activists were infuriated, prompting Ding Ning, a prominent actress and advocate, to write on her Facebook wall “Don’t go disappointing us right from the beginning.”

Another important issue the administration promised to focus on was addressing indigenous issues. Initially, indigenous activists felt a sense of hope that their grievances would be addressed properly and promptly as Tsai herself has indigenous ancestry. Just months after taking office, she issued an official apology to the indigenous Taiwanese people for “four centuries of pain and mistreatment.” Kolas Yotaka, a member of the Amis people and a DPP legislator, proposed an act that would give indigenous people “the legal right not only to speak and be heard but also to read and write in their mother tongues in schools and at government agencies.” The Indigenous Languages Development Act was signed into law on June 14, 2017 by President Tsai. Kolas has since become the Executive Yuan’s spokesperson.

Despite this hopeful beginning, the push to address indigenous issues appears to have stalled. Tsai has failed to act upon her promise to give back stolen lands, a notably harder issue to tackle than giving an official apology. The DPP says it has already designated 800,000 hectares of land as traditional indigenous lands and given indigenous groups certain rights to those lands, critics say another 1 million hectares of privately held land are still owed to the indigenous people. As a result, the Indigenous Youth Front and their allies held a demonstration in front of the Presidential Office Building in March 2017. Indeed, indicative of public support for this issue, politicians from both the DPP and the KMT have criticized the reforms. Kawlo Iyun Pacidal, a member of the Amis people and a NPP legislator has been a leading voice in calling out the shortcomings of the government’s policies as it deprives aboriginal peoples the ability to resolve their own issues affecting their ancestral lands.

A third key issue was the hope that the Tsai administration would pursue progressively-minded policies to improve the economy, particularly the employment challenges that many young Taiwanese faced. The Tsai administration at first made changes in December 2016 to guarantee more off time for laborers, but after pushback from business groups the government enacted a second round of changes to the Labor Standards Act that gave businesses more control over vacation days In response, around 10,000 people came out to voice their anger at these reforms, one of the largest demonstrations since the Sunflower Movement, as “labor issues are a core issue for post-Sunflower Movement youth activists.”

The frustrations of the NPP and its constituents with the DPP has created friction between their respective legislators. In December 2016, the Majority leader, DPP representative Ker Chien-Ming, was accused of having secretive cross-caucus negotiations with the KMT. Backdoor dealmaking was exactly the kind of politics that ignited the Sunflower Movement, and seemed to suggest — at least to the NPP and their supporters — that the DPP is not all that different from the KMT after all, and revived bad memories of the scandals which plagued the Chen administration. To make matters worse, Ker was a leading figure responsible for the backsliding of the DPP in regards to marriage equality. Ker also aggressively lashed out against the NPP with conspiratorial accusations that the NPP was conspiring against the DPP by organizing labor protests from the shadows.  

The DPP’s popularity has decreased as more people realize that the DPP has not been able to quickly deliver results on many of the major social issues facing Taiwan. Polls conducted by Taiwan Thinktank showed that “when she was sworn in, 76 percent of those aged 20 and 24 said they supported her, but her support among the younger group has since fallen to 50 percent.” However, it is important to acknowledge that President Tsai is constrained by elements within her own party and its members; regardless of her own position on a given issue. Perhaps this is unavoidable in a party as large and as diverse as the DPP. It is easier for the generally smaller Third Force parties, with a narrower constituency base, to mobilize around key issues and push for more radical positions. Yet, as the NPP grows, it finds that it too can struggle to maintain unity.

Nonetheless, continued frustration with the status quo and the desire to see their politicians broaden and deepen Taiwan’s democracy has led to greater success for Third Force parties. The NPP won 16 seats in the 2018 local elections, and made history with the election of Lin Ying-meng — a NPP candidate for independent city councilor in the Daan-Wenshan area of Taipei — as one of the first openly lesbian city councilors (the other open lesbian is SDP’s Miao Poya). Moreover, the seats that they won are very evenly spread throughout northern, central, and southern Taiwan — as opposed to being limited to relatively more liberal Taipei. Furthermore, the NPP weren’t the only Third Force party to win seats in the year of the so-called “Blue Wave”: the SDP won one council seat and the Green Party won three seats. While many have interpreted the 2018 elections as a defeat for progressive civil society, we shouldn’t overlook the gains made by these Third Force parties.

Conclusion

The youth of Taiwan today are undoubtedly fighting hard for the changes they want to see. But perhaps it’s important and necessary to remember that their parents and grandparents were also young once, and they fought hard for democracy and Taiwanese independence too. Although the older generation might not agree with everything the youth are doing, there are issues both the younger and the older generation can agree on. Pressure from China to unify is growing more intense, and it will take more than any one single generation to prevent that from happening. After all, if Taiwan isn’t able to stay sovereign, the work done by multiple generations of Taiwanese would very well become undone.

The author would like to thank Dr. Gerald Blaney for his guidance, advice, and assistance in editing this article.

(Feature photo of Freddy Lim in 2016, by Chieh-Ting Yeh)

Marina Rosen-Cappellazzo is currently a senior at the Ethical Culture Fieldston School. She is passionate about social justice and student activism. As an Asian-American, she is especially passionate about studying issues affecting Asia. She hopes to major in Asian Studies and Psychology in college.
Marina Rosen-Cappellazzo
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