This is a translation from the original 為什麼兩岸和平協議是個假議題? by Lai I-chung (賴怡忠), who heads international affairs and cross straits affairs at Taiwan Thinktank. Originally published by Voicettank. Translation by Tim Smith.
***
Chinese National Party (KMT) Chairman Wu Den-yi stated that “should the KMT regain power, a KMT government will have the right to negotiate and sign a peace agreement with the mainland in accordance with the Law Governing Peoples Across the Cross-Strait [Taiwan’s basic legal framework for China affairs].”
The KMT drafted the idea of a peace agreement into its national policy platform as early as August of 2016, and on September 9th of the same year approved the platform unanimously at its national convention. However, even though Chairman Wu Den-yi is simply restating a KMT party policy, if this so-called “peace agreement” is signed as the KMT would have it, it could bring Taiwan down a road of ruination.
As first glance, wouldn’t signing a “peace agreement” with China, especially if the agreement were to be negotiated according to the laws of Taiwan as Wu claims, guarantee the establishment of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait?
But if Chinese president Xi Jinping isn’t going to abandon the use of force against Taiwan, what’s the purpose behind Wu Den-yi and other KMT presidential hopefuls bringing this idea up to the Taiwanese public right now?
Responsibility for peace lies solely with China
The problem isn’t that Taiwan is threatening to declare war on China, but the exact opposite: China is threatening to use military means to settle their issues with Taiwan. In other words, China is unilaterally using the threat of military action against Taiwan, as well as a constant belligerent attitude and quasi-military operations to destabilize Taiwan.
As long as China gives up the use of force to “deal with” Taiwan, there will be peace; why do they need to negotiate an agreement? After all, it is China who wants to strike Taiwan and not the other way around. If we want peace, the Chinese side ought to put down their butcher’s hatchet first. Yet from Xi Jinping’s January 2nd address, aimed towards “Taiwanese Compatriots,” he never promised to take the use of force off the table.
When the oppressed proposes to negotiate with the oppressor, it legitimizes the oppression, and allows the acts of oppression to be used as bargaining leverage. Taiwan, as the oppressed, not only needs to grapple with the threat of being attacked, it now has to turn around and consider what to concede to China in exchange for its own safety. That’s like saying if you get mugged, that instead of calling the cops or trying to defend yourself, that you will offer up more stuff so you don’t get mugged again.
It all started with China’s violent behavior, and now we’re turning China into a negotiating partner, as well as taking on liability for our end of a bargain. What’s the point for Taiwan?
Talks may even lead to war
Only when both parties are still at war would a “peace agreement” make sense. From Beijing’s perspective, Taiwan and the mainland both still remain a part of the same country called China, but the ROC government in Taipei is a rebel group that is still in a civil war with the legitimate government in Beijing. The two sides are practically separate but belong to the same sovereign state. This view underlies China’s Anti-Secession Law from 14 years ago.
The KMT would have to also accept this view for their agreement to make sense, and for China to agree to come to the table.
In other words, proposing this agreement means that the KMT agrees that Taiwan is a “renegade province” of a unified China? That it concedes that its government is still in a civil war with China?
This is tantamount to Taiwan’s 23 million citizens inheriting a “civil war” that they’ve never even participated in; pulling modern, peaceful, and democratic Taiwan back 70 years to a time that doesn’t reflect the current reality. The multi-party democracy, economy, and social security that Taiwanese citizens have painstakingly established for themselves over 70 years would be rendered meaningless.
Some people have asserted that as long as we open up peace agreement negotiations with China, it means China acknowledges Taiwan’s sovereignty. But China will certainly make an issue about Taiwan’s status, demanding Taipei first acknowledge that Taiwan is a part of China, etc. After all, Beijing’s always insisted on this “principle” as the precondition to any negotiations. Taiwan’s sovereignty would be up for grabs.
Furthermore, if Taiwan stalls in the talks over its sovereignty, China could claim that Taiwan is being “unreasonable” and sabotaging the negotiations. Internationally, China could twist the narrative to blame Taiwan for not seeking peace, giving China even more legitimacy to initiate some kind of unilateral action. It is not only naive to believe that opening up talks with Beijing would force China to acknowledge Taiwan’s sovereignty; the ramifications could force Taiwan into an even more disadvantageous position still.
If we look at history, a peace treaty that doesn’t solve anything almost always leads to war. After all, wouldn’t an inconclusive peace treaty mean that the difference between the two parties cannot be resolved “peacefully”? This is why fourteen years ago, former US President Bill Clinton was not keen on the idea for cross-strait peace talks. Unless China intends to recognize the existence of Taiwan and commits to coexisting peacefully with Taiwan, the one-sided fantasy of any “peace agreement” is only likely to bring more bullying and even the possibility of the loss of our country.
For cross-strait peace to happen, all that’s required is for China to give up the use of force against Taiwan. Asking China to the negotiating table is to hand China the opportunity to use its threats as bargaining chips, and to brand itself as a reasonable negotiating partner instead of the bully that it really is. In addition, an agreement would nullify any attempt at providing for Taiwan’s defense. This kind of “peace agreement” that ignores reality is a brain-dead proposal, and it’s time we reject it.
(Feature photo by Xiangjiao on Wikicommons)
- Trump 2.0’s Strong Comeback and Taiwan’s Strategic Options – Part III - November 27, 2024
- Trump 2.0’s Strong Comeback and Taiwan’s Strategic Options – Part II - November 27, 2024
- Trump 2.0’s Strong Comeback and Taiwan’s Strategic Options – Part I - November 25, 2024