This is a translation from the original 賴神參選震撼彈!?從中看民進黨未來路線之爭 by Ho Ming-hsiu (何明修), a professor of sociology at National Taiwan University. Originally published by Voicettank. Translation by Chieh-Ting Yeh.
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The biggest political bombshell to land in Taiwan right on the eve of the 5th anniversary of the Sunflower Movement is former premier William Lai’s announcement to run against President Tsai Ing-wen in the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) presidential primaries.
Lai said that he needed to step up at this crucial juncture in Taiwan’s future, since Chinese president Xi Jinping declared a hard line against any room for compromise with Taiwan in January, while the opposition Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) candidates up their appeasement and speak of a “peace treaty” with China, taking Taiwan down a road similar to Tibet in the 1950s.
Since Lai has publicly said he was a “Taiwan independence advocate,” it is no surprise his announcement focused on Taiwan-China relations, and therefore the media is claiming the 2020 presidential race to be a showdown for Taiwan’s sovereignty.
In comparison, Tsai’s campaign strategy both in 2012 and 2016 was to avoid talking about cross-strait relations but focus on domestic reforms. In 2012 she coined the concept “Taiwan Consensus” as a response to President Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT’s 1992 Consensus, but she couldn’t explain the concept clearly enough and, with industry leaders supporting Ma, lost the election with a bigger margin than expected. In 2016, she stated directly that she is for “maintaining the status quo,” which turned out to be such a centrist and rather dull position that her opponents couldn’t find much to complain about.
On domestic reforms, in 2012 Tsai’s “10 Year Platform” focused on social justice and in 2016 she came out in support of marriage equality, standardizing two off-days per week, phasing out nuclear power by 2025, and recognizing traditional homelands for the indigenous people.
The competition between Tsai and Lai is really a question about the DPP’s focus: progressive issues or Taiwan sovereignty issues.
The DPP since the Sunflower Movement
During the Sunflower Movement five years ago, there were many justifiable grievances to the Cross-Straits Services and Trade Agreement (CSSTA). Those include opposition to free trade as it predominantly favors large corporations, and opening the country to Chinese workers would impact Taiwan’s labor market, both reasons for progressives to fight the CSSTA. On the other hand, the agreement would have also accelerated integration of Taiwan into China and threaten Taiwan’s sovereignty over its own affairs, sending Taiwan into China’s economic trap for unification, reasons for pro-independence supporters. Both progressives and independence supporters were able to come together and mount the biggest political movement of the decade, and the DPP gladly benefited from the overwhelming disapproval of the KMT administration.
But once the DPP came to power and controlled both the executive and legislative branches of government, it had to shoulder all the blame for poor governance. When it was in the opposition, the DPP can call the KMT’s foreign policy as appeasement to China and make fun of President Ma to be “as soft as a jellyfish.” But the DPP was also not able to do anything when allies switched diplomatic recognition to China, or when China heavy-handedly forced airlines around the world to label Taiwan as a part of China. Furthermore, when marriage equality was opposed by the Presbyterian Church of Taiwan (a long time DPP supporter), or when standardizing weekly off days was opposed by business owners, the DPP chose to compromise instead of standing firm on their campaign promises.
To be fair the DPP administration did make advances on reforming the terribly skewed pension system, energy policy, and transitional justice from the KMT one-party state era, but the DPP’s supporters seem to be unsatisfied still, whether on the progressive or the sovereignty front.
William Lai
William Lai, former premier and former Tainan mayor, is clearer on his pro-Taiwan sovereignty stance. He has said publicly during a trip to China that “Taiwan independence is an overwhelming consensus of the Taiwanese people,” and also the first premier to public support Taiwan independence.
With regards to progressive politics, his position has been on the conservative side; as Tainan mayor he went ahead with a railroad project despite protests from local residents and land rights activists. As premier, he overturned his predecessor Lin Chuan’s pro-labor amendments to the Labor Standards Act, and even given more leeway to employers on vacation days and working hours. Premier Lai also prioritized building a coal plant in New Taipei City, even importing the term “clean coal” to promote what is in reality retro-fitting a defunct plant. The plan was finally shelved, likely to boost DPP’s mayoral election prospects there in November 2018 (the DPP lost).
Social reforms are fundamentally about value judgments. Economic development and environmental protection. Efficiency in governing and procedural fairness. Convenience for the majority and the rights of the minority. It’s hard to know Lai’s own personal preferences, but so far his policy decisions do lean away from progressive ideals.
Of course, it is equally impossible to know for sure just how President Tsai thinks. Her 2016 DPP at-large legislator slate and cabinet picks, however, has included a substantial number of former social activists, and she still enjoys support from Sunflower Movement participants.
The DPP has faced many grand debates over its direction in the past. But this particular presidential primary puts the question of DPP’s central focus in question. But no matter whom the DPP selects as its presidential candidate, he or she will need the support of both progressives and pro-Taiwan forces, as well as obtain the approval of centrist voters, in order to win in 2020. Alienating either one group of people will spell the defeat for the DPP.
(Feature photo from Presidential Office of Taiwan, CC BY 2.0)
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