Should Taiwan Resist China or Stay Silent? A Response to Chou Hsi-wei

On July 19, Deutsche Welle interviewed Chou Hsi-wei (周錫瑋), the former Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) mayor of Taipei County (now known as New Taipei City). In the interview, aired on the talk show “Conflict Zone,” Chou expressed his belief that the only way to resolve the antagonism between China and Taiwan is through “talk and love.”

Taiwanese need to “be their friends, be their brothers, and change them,” said Chou. Faced with the threats from China, he said that “as long as you don’t support separation from China, they will not attack you,” and that China’s threats of military annexation are “not so serious.”

Chou’s strategies are not solid and can hardly be effective. First of all, based on Beijing’s present-day Taiwan policies, it is extremely difficult to hold a conversation between the two sides on anything resembling equal footing. Since the inauguration of President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), Beijing has significantly pressured Taiwan economically and politically because the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government does not recognize the 1992 Consensus, an alleged agreement in which both sides agree they are part of one China. Beijing deems recognition of the consensus as a prerequisite to holding any form of cross-strait dialogue. Therefore, relations between China and Taiwan have cooled since Tsai’s election in 2016. China limits the number of tourists to Taiwan, performs military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, and pressures Taiwan’s allies to terminate diplomatic relations with Taipei.

The DPP government does not acknowledge the 1992 Consensus because it does not consider Taiwan as part of China’s territory. The KMT claims the 1992 Consensus allows for “different interpretations” of what “one China” means, allowing it to interpret that China as the Republic of China (ROC). Beijing, meanwhile, has always considered “one China” to mean the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and has publicly allowed no “different interpretations” of the supposed agreement.

In January, Chinese leader Xi Jinping defined the 1992 Consensus as meaning “the two sides of the Strait belong to one China and will work together to seek national unification.” Xi also seeks to explore how to implement “one china, two systems” with political parties in Taiwan. Xi’s speech confirmed that Beijing’s vision of the 1992 Consensus does not allow for “different interpretations” and made it more difficult for the KMT to convince the public, or other countries, that their version of the consensus is valid. If Taipei acknowledges the 1992 Consensus as a pretext to dialogue with Beijing, it may be deemed internationally that Taiwan has acknowledged its sovereignty belongs to China, as Beijing has clearly stated it considers a “one country, two systems” framework as the only feasible endgame for Taiwan.

Even if the top leaders of China and Taiwan resume communication, it is unrealistic to expect that Beijing’s ambition to annex Taiwan would soften. China has shifted to a capitalist market economy, meaning the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) finds it more difficult to claim the exclusive right to lead the PRC based on its current constitution.  As inequality widens and dissatisfaction with the government among citizens rises, the CCP must legitimize its exclusive political rights via mobilizing people with nationalism and promising citizens a wealthy and strong country that Chinese people can be proud of. Annexation of Taiwan would serve as a symbol of national rejuvenation and therefore, as long as the PRC is not democratized, it is unlikely that the CCP would abandon this agenda.

It can be argued that when the KMT was in power from 2008 to 2016, cross-strait relations were more stable and there were constant economic interactions between the two sides, indicating that dialogues between the governments could work. However, Beijing’s goal was to integrate Taiwan’s economy into its own, making Taiwan rely on China’s market and therefore giving Beijing more leverage in future political negotiations, leaving Taiwan little room to decide its own status.

Beijing has also started to use its economic power to manipulate Taiwan’s media. For instance, after the Taiwanese food industry giant Want Want Holdings acquired China Times Group in 2008, its new media entities have increasingly promoted pro-Beijing news and, according to a recent Financial Times report, have received direction from China’s Taiwan Affairs Office. Want Want, a snack food and beverage giant, does vast amounts of business in China’s domestic market, and Beijing has been using its leverage to control the agenda of Taiwanese media outlets when possible while spreading its rhetoric to Taiwan’s audience with the ultimate goal of peacefully unifying Taiwan.

Chou argued to Deutsche Welle that Beijing has shown improvement in the recent Hong Kong demonstrations. According to Chou, Beijing has made compromises and has not forcefully suppressed the protests, showing that Chinese government can change via dialogues. Nevertheless, not using force to quell protests is an extremely low standard to qualify a government with a passing grade. In fact, Beijing has lost the trust of Hong Kong citizens after a series of demonstrations and incidents including the Umbrella Movement and Causeway Bay Books disappearances. In 2017, the Chinese Foreign Ministry even declared that the Sino-British Joint Declaration is “a historical document that no longer has any realistic meaning” and “does not have any binding power on how the Chinese central government administers Hong Kong.” These all indicate that the “one country, two systems” model of governance is completely broken.

Even though Beijing has not used military force to suppress the demonstrations, Beijing said the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) can be deployed if needed, and gangsters violently attacked protesters at the alleged whim of pro-Beijing forces in Hong Kong.

In addition to Hong Kong, China has also increased its repression in Xinjiang and Tibet, indicating that the regime has not improved in its respect for human rights, ethnicity, self-identity, culture and even legal agreements.

Lastly, Chou’s argument that as long as Taipei does not support separation from China and does not say the “wrong things,” both sides can remain peaceful, is a completely mistaken policy proposal for Taiwan’s self-defense. Even though China’s PLA is not able to annex Taiwan with force now, Beijing has been investing heavily to achieve this goal, especially as the United States has signaled its clear intention to sell American arms to Taipei. If Taiwan does not say the “wrong things” to reject China’s coercion, it is difficult to convince Taiwan’s allies to support Taiwan once a war breaks out because the international community might believe Taiwan has silently acknowledged China’s statements.

Meanwhile, more Taiwanese citizens are self-identifying as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. Most support Taiwan’s independence, provided it does not lead to an invasion by China. Should Taiwan not deny Beijing’s statements that intend to compromise its autonomy, it would make other countries far less likely to stand up for Taiwan should it declare independence—or should Beijing become more aggressive in pursuing unification.

Due to Beijing’s disturbances to Asia-Pacific regional security, disputes over intellectual property and trade, and ongoing human rights issues, Western democratic countries have clearly formed an alliance to confront China, led by the United States government.

As Beijing’s coercion of Taiwan also reaches its peak, Taiwan should increase economic interactions with democratic allies, reduce its economic reliance on China, and leverage the support of Western countries to defy Beijing’s coercion and maintain de facto independence. This is the way for Taiwan to stay autonomous—not by staying silent.

(Feature photo by Kremlin.ru on Wikicommons, CC BY 4.0)