Taiwan’s presidential and legislative campaign season is putting TV political dramas to shame. It features twists and turns, unexpected alliances and starling betrayals, and more wild speculation and rumors than you can shake a stick at. TV news channels are full of breathless anticipation of tie-ups between political power players at a pace so dizzying, it’s hard for even the pros to keep up.Fear not, readers: We’re here to help you make sense of Taiwan’s political spectacle with a handy guide to the major power players who are “in play” and could disrupt this election in a big way—if they haven’t already.
Off the board—for now
Incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and Kaohsiung mayor Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜), the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate, are firmly set in their paths for the near term, so their places on the chessboard are safe—for now. Watch for a possible move to oust Han later in the game, possibly engineered by one of the KMT’s great power brokers: Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) or Wang Jin-pyng (王金平).
Not on the list yet—but worth keeping an eye on—is New Taipei mayor Hou You-yi (侯友宜). He’s in charge of the nation’s biggest city and is perhaps the KMT’s most popular politician, but he was a curious no-show at the KMTs’s recent official anointing of Han Kuo-yu as the party’s candidate—an event held in New Taipei’s Banqiao District, where Hou’s office is located. He followed that up by turning down the largely ceremonial post of head of the Han campaign in New Taipei City, saying he was too busy as a newly elected mayor—a blunt jab at Han, himself the newly elected mayor of Kaohsiung. Chances are high that a “dump Han, recruit Hou” movement will rise up, and while Hou seems genuinely dedicated to his current job, that could change with enough pressure. After all, Han claimed to be committed to Kaohsiung just this spring.
Some may be surprised that People First Party chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) isn’t on the list. He’s run for president and lost twice, and run for vice president once and also lost. It’s unlikely he’s going to run again, so the only question is which candidate will he back. The answer is almost certainly Terry Gou, if he runs, barring the unlikely possibility that Han offers something particularly desirable. Soong and Gou have a similar worldview outside of the KMT.
Terry Gou (郭台銘)
Terry Gou, who is mulling a run for the presidency, is Taiwan’s richest man, with estimates of his fortune in the US$6-8 billion range. He is the founder of Foxconn (known within Taiwan as Hon Hai), an electronics contract manufacturer that makes–among many, many other things for many companies—Apple’s iPhones. Starting with a small loan of NT$100,000—at around US$3,250 at current rates, this was a significant amount of cash in Taiwan circa 1974—he built a business empire with factories and investments all over the world. But his biggest investments, and the bulk of his empire, are in China. Gou was one of the pioneers of moving manufacturing out of Taiwan. The son of a police officer who came over with the Republic of China (ROC) government-in-exile in 1949, he retains close ties to his ancestral village in Shanxi Province in China.
Gou, a long time supporter of the KMT, told Taiwan earlier this year the sea goddess Matsu had told him to run for president and join the KMT primary. During the primary he visited the United States and met with Donald Trump to talk over investment in Wisconsin, all while wearing a ROC-themed baseball cap. This made him the first Taiwanese presidential candidate to meet with a sitting U.S. president since diplomatic ties were severed in 1979. His campaign was based around ROC nationalism, his business acumen and around building a prosperous future for the young. He lost in the primary, but came in a strong second. His first wife passed away, and his second wife is considerably younger. He likes to compare himself to Genghis Khan.
Powers: Great, heaping gobs of cash: Gou can afford to do pretty much whatever he likes. His business success is a source of inspiration for many, and he inspires hope that he could bring Taiwan’s economy back to the kind of growth seen during the boom years. He is a blunt outsider, which in the current political environment is an advantage. According to him, he has a direct line to the goddess Matsu.
Weaknesses: Gou can be thin-skinned, prone to anger and sometimes makes controversial comments. He is used to being the boss, and it shows—which is off-putting to some. His huge investments in China are a major concern to many; no business person in China can succeed on the scale that he has without an excellent relationship with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and there are fears that they could have leverage over him. Some hints of scandal are in his past, mostly centered around his past habits of hanging around fashion models.
What does he want? As far as we know, just the presidency.
The Speculation: The speculation is that Gou may make an independent run for the presidency, and ally with Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), Wang Jin-pyng, or both.
Quick Analysis: Signs seem to be pointing to him making a run, though he hasn’t formally announced. At his age, and with his ambitious personality, it is likely he views this election as his one and only realistic chance to serve one or two terms as president. It is unclear, however, if his desire to win will overcome the common wealthy businessman habit of handing out money sparingly—Gou will need to spend big if he wants to run, especially if he wants to win over Wang Jin-pyng.
He has met with Wang Jin-pyng, has been in touch with Ko Wen-je and the three have appeared together at a public event. A Gou-Ko-Wang alliance would make for a powerful combination, but working out something acceptable to all three may prove difficult.
Ko has already stated he would like Gou to be president, so there’s no conflict over who gets top billing. Ko, however, also suggested that Gou sell all his holdings in China to reduce people’s worries on that front, which Gou might not go for. The two would make a good pair, with an image of two practical outsiders, and polls show a Ko-supported Gou run would do better than Gou alone or with Wang. Gou has not joined Ko’s newly launched political party, the Taiwan People’s Party, but he did send flowers with a message and his own name embedded in it,which was displayed prominently at the party launch event. It is unclear if the two could work together well, however, as both their personalities and political opinions could easily clash. Ko has also stated that he isn’t interested in being vice president, noting that mayor of Taipei is a more powerful position.
Wang Jin-pyng could bring a ground game of experienced political operatives and politicians, which could open the possibility of bringing in not just votes, but also lawmakers to his side. This existing infrastructure would be a big boon to getting not only Gou’s campaign up and running on all cylinders fast, it could potentially mean starting with a power block if he’s elected. The hard part will be providing Wang big enough enticements. (More on that later.)
Ko Wen-je (柯文哲)
Of humble, local origins, the Taipei mayor also known as “Ko-P” originally gained fame as an accomplished doctor and surgeon. He has a history of helping DPP candidates in a KMT-leaning city, but in 2014 he decided to make an independent run for the mayorship of Taipei—traditionally a jump-off position to president—and ran with the support and involvement of people across the political spectrum. Ko quickly became the darling of the “pox on both your houses” voters fed up with the traditional parties and rode to a stunning victory with the tacit support of the DPP. Relations with the DPP soured, however, and the DPP ran a candidate against him in the 2018 mayoral election. Ko ultimately prevailed, narrowly beating out the KMT candidate.
Powers: His no-nonsense, logical and driven style gets things done. His humor and complete lack of polish, style or at times even basic manners or self-awareness give him an authenticity lacking in other politicians. He’s intelligent, and has a knack for taking approaches that make sense to a lot of people, and completely bypass the divide between Taiwan’s pan-Green and pan-Blue camps. He’s widely popular with political independent, and has an especially passionate following among younger demographics. He just founded a political party (Taiwan People’s Party, TPP) that promises to try and break through the divides separating the two big parties.
Weaknesses: His no-nonsense, logical and driven style makes political enemies and lacks diplomatic awareness. His humor and complete lack of polish, style or at times even basic manners or self-awareness make him a veritable gaffe machine; he has a penchant for offensive comments that at times seem especially denigrating toward women. He has a knack for taking approaches that anger partisans on both sides. His attempts at carving out an independent path on relations with China may appear centrist in Taipei, but come across as closer to the KMT in the rest of the country. His recent habit of surrounding himself with pan-Blue figures—while possibly having a lot to do with them being out of work after the 2016 DPP wave—mean that suspicions are on the rise from those with sympathies that lean pan-Green. He just founded a political party that, to many, comes across as an ego-driven project without support from any other major politicians.
What does he want? Power. Mayor of Taipei is probably the third most powerful position in the country. To have more power, he would need to be either premier or president.
The Speculation: That he hopes his newly founded political party, the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), will serve as a good vehicle for his ambitions to change Taiwan’s politics—and that could mean partnering with Terry Gou, Wang Jin-pyng and/or New Power Party (NPP) Legislator Huang Kuo-chang.
Quick Analysis: Ko has openly stated that he hasn’t made up his mind to make a run for the presidency or not, but that he would like to see Gou as president. This suggests that if Gou doesn’t run, Ko will, and vice versa. Unlike Gou and Wang, however, he’s young enough that he could be viable for a few more election cycles, so he’s less likely to be in a hurry. He also seems reluctant to give up his position as mayor of Taipei, and he has made it clear that the less powerful position of vice president holds no appeal to him. There are two more powerful positions, however, that may entice him: president or premier. If Gou decides to run, campaigning on making Ko the premier would make considerable political sense, and Ko would likely be a good pick for the position.
The opposite arrangement could happen as well, with Ko running for president on a platform of appointing Gou the premier, but this is less likely. Gou’s biological clock is ticking and his ambition is on fire.
Ko almost certainly would like to see Gou put some of his considerable financial assets behind his new political party. As things stand, the party is little more than a political vehicle for Ko. The stated ideals essentially boil down to “good government,” which shows all the political courage of stating the party likes moms and bubble tea. Ko’s previous attempts to campaign with independents to give them a boost have largely failed. There are, however, a fair number of independent lawmakers at various levels of government who could possibly be enticed to join, especially if there are significant financial resources in the offing. Political parties that meet minimum requirements are eligible for some perks, like government subsidies and party list seats in the legislature. So far, however, most of the politicians interested in joining his party are washed up, out-of-office has-beens mostly from the pan-Blue end of the political spectrum. He will need to win over fresher faces to really juice up the party. Huang Kuo-chang (黃國昌) or former NPP Legislator Freddy Lim (林昶佐) would be advantageous for the new party, but neither so far shows any interest, and Lim has already ruled it out.
Without the backing of Gou’s money, it is unlikely that Wang Jin-pyng will partner with Ko—unless he thinks Ko has a very strong chance of winning.
Wang Jin-pyng (王金平)
Wang Jin-pyng is the sphinx of the legislature. He’s a giant politically, the ultimate wheeler-dealer and the master at seemingly saying nothing while delivering a passive aggressive gut punch. The Legislative Yuan’s president, or speaker, for 17 years straight, he is neither widely loved or hated due his diplomatic and evasive way of refusing to be pinned down on any issue when he can possibly avoid it. He is, however, hated by a small group of very powerful KMT elite “mainlanders,” led by ex-President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), who tried and failed to get him jailed and kicked out of the party. Wang is native Taiwanese and has long been considered part of the “localization” wing of the party—those that want the Chinese Nationalist Party to be more Taiwanese in its nationalism. This, in part, explains that while his overall approval ratings national are only fair to middling, his support is higher among DPP supporters than with supporters of his own party, the KMT. He is also considered the most prominent and powerful of politicians to have come out of the patronage factions, which are essentially local political machines manipulating the levers of power and institutions like agricultural associations for their own benefit.
Wang’s reputation for having a sleazy background is somewhat mitigated by many of the good things he’s done, including refusing to allow the police to interfere with the student occupation of the legislature during the 2014 Sunflower Movement, a choice which allowed the standoff to end peacefully. His ability to mobilize the political patronage factions played abig role in the last election, helping to build a wave of support for Han Kuo-yu’s Kaohsiung mayoral run and the KMT’s landslide victories across the nation in local offices. Following the election he was in a powerful position and began his long dreamed of run for the presidency, but clever maneuvering by current party chairman Wu Den-yih (the protege and former vice president of Ma Ying-jeou) managed to bring Han Kuo-yu—previously Wang’s protege—over to his side, and got Han to run against Wang in the primary. As Wu got the rules changed repeatedly to entice Han to enter the race, Wang Jin-pyng finally exited the primary when Han formally entered the race. Curiously, Wang Jin-pyng is still running for president. He says he plans to remain a party member, but didn’t participate in the primary and is not the nominee. “I will run [for president] to the end, although it is difficult to explain how I will do that,” he said, quoted in the Taipei Times. He has also said he is looking to the heavens to find him a path to the presidency.
Powers: Strong relationships and favors owed from a long, long history in politics. He’s the most prominent and powerful of the patronage faction leaders. Though the factions are slowly fading from the scene, they retain some power across the country, mostly in rural areas. The factions have money and manpower, and can pull together a strong ground game if needed. They also have plenty of elected officials at many levels of government. He is a shrewd tactician and a master of diplomacy. He knows how to retain the best possible relationships with as many people as possible. His only prominent enemies are the old mainlander elites in the KMT, which boosts his popularity in some quarters. He’s soft spoken, a native Taiwanese and hard to dislike.
Weaknesses: Long years in politics means a lot has happened, and there is possibly a lot to dredge up. The patronage factions are sleazy to the core, though Wang has done a good job of keeping clear of the sleaze publicly—so far. Though he is hard to dislike, he’s also hard to pin down, which makes him hard to get very excited about, meaning his favorability and unfavorability rankings are kind of tepid. Those old mainlander elites that hate him still retain considerable power within the KMT.
What does he want? The presidency, and he is claiming he is in the running to the end. However, in the past, he has wanted the position of KMT party chair (he tried in 2005, but lost to Ma Ying-jeou)—which is an excellent patronage position and a traditional stepping stone to the presidency. He’s been the speaker of the legislature already and has stated he has no interest in being vice president, but that potentially could leave open the position of premier as an enticement.
The Speculation: Will he partner with Gou, Ko or both? Will he return to the KMT fold in the end and support Han Kuo-yu?
Quick Analysis: Currently, virtually no one thinks his current do-it-alone run for the presidency has even the slightest hope: He just simply doesn’t have the public or party support to pull it off. He’s going to have to do something to change the equation.
It is important in any analysis of Wang to remember that much of his support is from the patronage factions. They clearly like and trust him, but at the end of the day he has to deliver patronage in the form of money or power if he truly wants to keep them in his corner. In the last election it appears he was able to appeal to their sense of self preservation in the face of a hostile DPP environment to pull off the previously almost unimaginable act of unifying opposing factions across the nation. That helped bring friendly KMT figures into office, and with it plum positions in government. If the factions are going to follow Wang into battle once again, the question will be: What has he got to offer them? Because of who he is, probably no one is going to be more carefully welcomed and listened to—but there has to be something to the deal. Already the “Red” and “Black” political patronage factions in Taichung have united and reiterated their support for Han, which doesn’t bode well for Wang—though of course there is still plenty of time to find the proper enticements to get them to change their minds. Patronage factions are, after all, all about having patronage in the form of money and power.
That makes it unlikely he will partner with Ko alone. Ko doesn’t have the money, and it is unlikely his new political party will have the power—or the interest—to give the factions what they want. They’re not terribly loyal to the KMT (many have bolted parties in the past), but they know what they’re getting by staying with the party. If Wang partners with Ko, he’ll be doing it largely on his own—and what is the incentive to do that? Other than a quixotic bit of revenge against Wu Den-yih, not much. Indeed, there are some indications that Wang doesn’t want Ko in the mix, making comments to the effect of he is ready to talk to Gou at any time, but doesn’t have anything to discuss with Ko. However, will polls showing Ko giving Gou a bump, he may be stuck with Ko as part of a package deal.
Terry Gou is in position to offer a lot. Gou’s money means he can afford patronage, which means support for Wang. The formulation is simple: Gou gives Wang heaping gobs of cash, and Wang gives Gou a political ground game and elected officials already in office and in the legislature. Ko brings supporters from the young demographic, which Wang barely registers with.
However, partnering with Gou leaves open the question of who would be the presidential candidate. Gou is used to being the top dog, and what’s his incentive to splash out cash on Wang if he isn’t the presidential candidate? To make this work, Gou most likely would be the presidential candidate—but he’d have to have something to offer Wang. The patronage for his supporters would no doubt be nice, and getting revenge on Wu Den-yih and Han Kuo-yu would no doubt be sweet—but these two things alone seem too weak for such a smart political operator.
Could Wang be enticed by the job of premier? Maybe, though Ko might be in competition with him for that. Premier is a plum position to hand out positions of power and patronage, so this could certainly be a possibility.
There is one other, much craftier possibility: A reverse take-over of the KMT. How would that even be possible, with Wu Den-yih eligible to stay in office until 2021? In this scenario, Wang would obtain his KMT membership (which he says he intends to do), but would also all-but-openly work for Gou’s campaign, possibly also backed by Ko and his party. Gou’s money would buy the patronage factions support, effectively splitting the KMT. Wu would no doubt try to get Wang kicked out of the party, but that would be easier said than done. This would cause Han Kuo-yu’s support on the ground to crumble, making it a virtual impossibility to get elected. The tricky part is that Gou’s campaign would have to be doing well, with a strong possibility of being successful. If it is, then either in the runup to the election itself, or if Gou is elected, the KMT will be facing a disastrous defeat. Wang and his supporters would launch an internal revolt to draft Gou back into the party. The price? Wang becomes the party chair. Given a choice between a humiliating defeat and getting rid of Wu and having a chance at victory and power under a President Gou and chairman Wang, what would the party do? The reverse takeover of the KMT would be a risky and tough road to take, but if anyone would want to do it, and has the political skills, capital and connections to pull it off, it would be Wang Jin-pyng.
Any reverse takeover would have to overcome KMT chair Wu Den-yih, who probably is hoping to be the natural choice should a “dump Han” movement grows too big to ignore—and there’s always a chance that this has been his plan all along. The party chair has historically been the presidential candidate. However, there is another threat that could upset any schemes by Wang or Wu: a “dump Han, draft Hou You-yi” movement. Hou is far more popular than either.
But would Wang consider creating or joining a new political party if that didn’t look feasible? A few years ago the very idea would have seemed highly unlikely, but now isn’t inconceivable. Once widely touted as the “world’s richest political party,” the ill-gotten party assets law passed has stripped the KMT of most of the riches they appropriated during the martial law era. Now the party is saddled with too much staff, huge pension liabilities and a culture not at all geared for modern political party fundraising. Worse for the KMT, their biggest financial supporter—the one who saved them from collapse—was none other than Terry Gou. While a new party would lack a brand, Wang could use his extensive contacts to fill it with experienced political operatives, including from the DPP, and Gou could fund it. Wang has a long history with the KMT, so it would likely be difficult emotionally, but a new party would—at least from a financial perspective—be a big advantage over the KMT, so it can’t be ruled out.
The September Shakeout
Filing deadlines for running for president, and for the required submission of signatures, are coming up in mid-September. By early September, in order to fulfill those requirements, decisions will need to be made as to who is in the running, and who isn’t. The next few weeks are going to be very, very interesting.
(Cover photo via Flickr and Wikicommons (Gou, Ko, Wang), CC BY 2.0 & CC BY-SA 2.0)
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