An Impossible Choice: The KMT’s China Policy

This is part three of a three part series. Part 1 can be found here: The Race Is On: The Next Chairman of the KMT and Part 2 can be found here: Save the Sinking Ship: Can the KMT Reform?

On Saturday, January 18 former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) dropped this bombshell, as reported in the Taipei Times:

“Both Taiwan and the Mainland have agreed to the consensus — otherwise, there would be no consensus. I think everyone misunderstands the consensus. It is, of necessity, a Taiwanese consensus and also one across the Taiwan Strait — only then would it have any effect,” Ma said yesterday.

The “consensus” benefits Taiwan by offering it flexibility and echoing the “one China” principle as stated by the Republic of China (ROC) Constitution — both of which enable cross-strait interaction, Ma added.

“I think the Mainland has to take certain responsibility for the misunderstanding, as it has placed too much emphasis on ‘one China’ and forgets there is the component ‘each side having its own interpretation,’” Ma said, adding that not clearing up the matter would make cross-strait relations increasingly difficult.

Many obsess on the fact that the “1992 Consensus” is something former Mainland Affairs Council chairman Su Chi (蘇起) made up in 2000 (he admitted to this in 2006), referring to a so-called consensus that never actually happened during meetings between representatives of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT)-led government in 1992.

The “1992 Consensus” has been a useful fiction created for the KMT to interact with the PRC, with both sides parroting it like a magical mantra. Initially used by the KMT to create bridges to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the PRC, it reached its greatest fruition during Ma’s presidency, culminating in the meeting between Ma and Chairman Xi Jinping (習近平) of the CCP in Singapore in 2015.

But neither side agreed what the consensus itself was. To the KMT, it was “one China, each side with their own interpretation.” To the CCP it was “one China”, meaning Taiwan was part of the PRC. What makes Ma’s comments such a bombshell is finally acknowledging something that he–and anyone paying attention–knew long ago. Indeed, it was much discussed at the time of the Ma-Xi meeting in the press. That Ma is finally ending his public denial is telling, but what is also telling is what he left off: on January 2 last year Xi Jinping explicitly tied the “1992 Consensus” to the “One Country Two Systems” formula used in Hong Kong and that the PRC intends to implement on Taiwan.

Following their second disastrous election defeat in national elections this January, many in the KMT have begun to acknowledge that their historical adherence to eventual unification with China, advocating closer ties to the PRC and the 1992 Consensus are all deeply unpopular and out of the mainstream of public opinion.

One of the strongest condemnations came from KMT Youth League head Hsiao Ching-yan (蕭敬嚴) on Friday, January 15. As reported in the Taipei Times:

Taiwanese have “achieved consensus in refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of the 1992 consensus,” Hsiao said in an interview with the China Review News Agency, adding that the party should find a new consensus, one that is anti-unification.

While acknowledging that his view was similar to the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP), Hsiao said that, based on his observations, any variation of the “1992 consensus” — as long as it contained the same “one China with separate interpretations” spirit — would likely be rejected by Taiwanese.

Hsiao added that his observations showed that Taiwanese agree with three concepts: “the ROC is in Taiwan,” “independent sovereignty should not be violated” and “unification should be adamantly opposed.”

Given this, Hsiao urged the party to base its cross-strait discourse on these three concepts.

Some have gone further, advocating dropping the “Chinese” part of the name “Chinese Nationalist Party.” Others reportedly looked into forming a “Taiwanese Nationalist Party” back in December, only to discover that the name was already taken.

As of this writing, the two frontrunners in the race for KMT chair have acknowledged some discussion of China policy and the 1992 Consensus needs to take place, though neither has taken any firm stance. Lawmaker Johnny Chiang (江啟臣)’s comments were reported in Focus Taiwan:

Attributing the election loss to the party’s stance on matters related to cross-Taiwan Strait links, Chiang said that however the KMT adjusts its policy toward China, it must uphold one position — that “it is a fact that the Republic of China exists.”

The “1992 Consensus,” which the KMT has used as a basis for interaction with China, was born in a certain era and enabled there to be dialogue and peaceful interaction between Taiwan and China, Chiang said.

With the consensus called into question, however, it should be reviewed and adjusted to reflect the broadest possible consensus within the party and also be aligned with Taiwan’s mainstream public opinion, he said.

Focus Taiwan quoted former Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin (郝龍斌)’s comments this way:

Hau said the KMT must “chart a new course that is in line with the current international situation and public opinion, especially in terms of cross-strait relations.”

The KMT’s new position on relations across the Taiwan Strait must be the result of dialogue, discussion and debate within the party, Hau said, and it should get citizens to move away from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party’s independence rhetoric as well as the Communist Party’s unification threats.

While neither of these frontrunners sounds as radical as KMT Youth League head Hsiao, by historical standards of the party, even putting up cross-strait relations and the “1992 Consensus” up for discussion and change is a huge shift.

Forget the 1992 Consensus (?)

After the general public turned against the KMT on the 1992 Consensus, the party finally is acknowledging it has become toxic electorally. But what can they do about it?

The KMT traces its origins to revolutionary societies in China that overthrew the Manchurian Qing court and established the Republic of China in 1912. At the time, Taiwan was part of the Japanese Empire. After World War II, Taiwan became an Allied protectorate administered by the ROC, while the United States administered Japan proper. After the ROC government lost the Chinese civil war, it fled to Taiwan and established a government-in-exile in Taipei.

The KMT has long been dominated by those Chinese KMT exiles and their descendents. Traditionally those party elites have identified as wholly or in part as Chinese, though the latest generation is moving away from that. The population in Taiwan prior to the KMT’s arrival, and their descendants, identify far more strongly as simply Taiwanese. While virtually no KMT members today think the ROC will reclaim China, their ties–emotionally, politically, personally and financially–are far stronger to China than the public at large. These ties will make radical change hard to achieve in the party as many will push back hard.

But the new incoming chair will have to face the reality that the public is firmly against the 1992 Consensus, has absolutely no interest in unification with the PRC, and is wary of closer ties. A political party with an ideology so far out of the mainstream simply can’t get elected to the presidency and will struggle in the legislature. Reform will have to happen, or the party faces marginalization.

Meanwhile, the PRC seems determined to make the KMT’s reform efforts near impossible. Right after Taiwan’s election, the spokesman for the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council Ma Xiaoguang threw down the gauntlet to would-be reformers in the KMT by describing the 1992 consensus as the “unshakeable foundation” of peaceful cross-strait ties. In short, no “1992 consensus”, no cross-strait dialogue, and no hope of peace. The PRC has not renounced the use of force, and has been increasing talk of war in CCP mouthpieces. Ma Xiaoguang’s comments went on, as reported in CCP mouthpiece Global Times:

“The future of Taiwan lies in national reunification and the wellbeing of the people in Taiwan hinges on the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” the spokesman said. “Taiwan is the Taiwan of all Chinese people, including Taiwan compatriots, and Taiwan’s future is jointly decided by all Chinese people,” he added.

When asked to comment on Tsai’s remarks regarding “one country, two systems,” Ma said “peaceful reunification” and “one country, two systems” have remained the mainland’s fundamental principles toward Taiwan over the past 40 years.

The PRC has dropped any pretense that the 1992 Consensus is anything other than a path to annex Taiwan and impose “one country, two system” rule like in Hong Kong. This is totally unacceptable to the Taiwanese public.

KMT’s future

If the incoming chair jettisons the 1992 Consensus, that could very well mean pushback within the party and a fierce response from the PRC. It also means something else for the party: in the short term the only way the KMT in its current form (as opposed to founding a new political party) can possibly handle their massive financial liabilities is to get support from the Taiwanese business community in China. Many companies, such as the Want Want Group, receive huge subsidies in the PRC for their various subsidiaries, and the group owns media outlets that heavily support the KMT and receive instructions from minders in the PRC. Other companies in the PRC with heavy investments there are big donors to the party.

It is entirely possible that if the KMT dumps the 1992 Consensus, much of their funding from this business community will dry up, even possibly on the orders of the CCP. Conversely, if they double down on the 1992 Consensus, and move their position in the direction the CCP desires, much needed funding will flow their way–but at the cost of further political marginalization.

The most likely path the future chair, especially if it is Hau Lung-bin, will take is to attempt to create a new “1992 Consensus” under a new name that is ambiguous enough to be acceptable to the voting public, the traditionalists in the party, and to the PRC. The first step would be to float trial balloons and see how they are received. Likely they will be convoluted, along the lines of “both sides of the Taiwan strait are family,” or “the dream of the ethnic Chinese peoples” (without specifying what this is, but referencing Xi Jinping’s “Chinese dream”).

Whatever it is will almost certainly not satisfy one side or the other. The PRC will accept nothing less than “one China” at the very minimum, and may press further for an explicit declaration of working towards “reunification.” The Taiwanese voting public won’t accept anything that gives away Taiwan’s sovereignty, under either “Taiwan” or the “Republic of China.”

Another path is radical reform, going all in on moving the party’s thinking toward the political center. To solve their financial difficulties they may be forced to reform as a party under a different name with a clean financial slate, perhaps dropping the “Chinese” and simply becoming the “Nationalist Party.” That, however, would mean losing the government subsidies for bigger parties in the short term. It may also split the party into two, a rump of hardcore KMT supporters refusing to leave and taking over that entity (or joining the New Party, or forming a new similar pro-China unification party), with a bulk of the politicians concerned with electibility moving over to a new party entity.

There is a final option outside of radical reform or moving closer to the CCP’s line: Do neither. And disappear for good.