Vestiges of Authoritarianism: The KMT’s Patronage Network (Part 2)

In a changing geopolitical climate, then KMT President Chiang Ching-kuo began implementing reforms in 1986, which included political reform, more freedom of press, and the lifting of bans on political parties and protests. The DPP formed on September 28, 1986, before martial law ended in 1987. Interestingly, in the mid 1980s as the anti-KMT forces moved towards forming an official opposition party, corruption was highlighted as an issue, but it was not regarded as a central issue until as late as 1991.

Democratization certainly opened the door for the potential to change the political system of Taiwan, but it didn’t in and of itself bring the push to create a cleaner political system. What led to Tsai Ing-wen becoming president in 2016 and bringing efforts towards transitional justice were a combination of media liberalization and a slew of civil protest movements.

Ultimately, liberalization of the media had to happen before corruption could effectively be attacked. By the end of the 1980s, the government ban on new newspapers had been eradicated, as well as the ban of electronic media. Radio station restrictions were loosened and underground stations had become increasingly popular; political talk shows where debates were broadcast to the public also grew in popularity. Media advertising restrictions were lowered as well, and a 1989 campaign led to advertisements being allowed in newspapers, in addition to free market advertisements on television in the mid-1990s. The freeing up of the media, however, did not inherently mean that they would report on corruption; there needed to be social pressure, which is where the civil movements came in.

When martial law was lifted, Chiang Ching-kuo did so with the notion that the KMT was creating their own closed system, and that the power balance would not change; the 1990 “Month of March/Wild White Lily” student movement challenged that idea and pushed for a true democratic political system, including the liberalization of the media. Coming just three years after the end of martial law, many issues that originated during that period had yet to be publicly acknowledged.

In March 1990 students protested on the streets of Taipei, and had sit-down demonstrations and hunger strikes in front of Chiang-Kai-shek Memorial Hall. Lee Teng-hui, the president at the time, who was also the first Taiwanese born president, eventually met with the leaders of the movement and agreed to two of their four demands; producing a time-table for political reform, and organizing a conference to talk about reform. Demand for better policies surrounding elections and other democratic changes were starting to come to the surface, but at the time of the movement, student participants were deemed “decadent youth” and “professional students,” who should have been in class instead. Eventually, the system began to change, and public opinion started to favor progressive democratization in a way it hadn’t before. The end of the 1990s brought the first direct presidential election in March 1996, and the DPP took power for the first time in 2000.

Later, in the 2000s, similar trends were present in the 2008 Wild Strawberry Movement. Concerned about KMT power, the Wild Strawberry activists acted after the KMT’s handling of Chinese representative Chen Yunlin’s visit in November 2008. Symbols of Taiwanese national identity were hidden, and students led sit-in protests. They called for the end of the Assembly and Parades Act, which had historically been used to extinguish protests. When the protests had finished, it informally continued with new activists who were born from the movement.

The Anti-Media Monopoly Campaign in 2012 was filled with Wild Strawberry activists, but the movement gained wider traction. The Campaign’s platform contained three main points: anti-media monopoly, anti-Chinese interference (in business), and further freedom of the press. It expanded to include bolstering public service broadcasting and labor unions in the media industry. The campaign came in response to attempts from the Want Want China Times Media Group, a media giant with interests in China and a pro-China bias, to acquire control of the Next Media group and Apple Daily. The Anti-Media Monopoly Campaign ultimately prevented the purchase.

Political scientist John Mearsheimer wrote “Say Goodbye to Taiwan” in the March-April 2014 issue of The National Interest. China was on the rise, the United States wasn’t as supportive, and Chinese annexation was predicted. A few days after the article came out, protests started on March 18. The 2014 Sunflower Movement addressed KMT backroom deals, and concerns over sacrificing Taiwanese sovereignty to China for economic benefit. The KMT backed out of a deal with the DPP for a piece-by-piece review of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA). Without protests, the KMT majority legislature would have almost certainly passed the bill. In response, hundreds of students, including those from the organization “Black Island Nation Youth” took over Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan by barricading themselves inside. They proceeded to stay inside for twenty-four days. Public opinion demanded the CSSTA be brought back for review.

Through all the aforementioned civil movements, social consciousness was being built up, and its rise created a political will that in turn impacted the reforms that was a large part of Tsai Ing Wen’s platform in 2016. Years of growing public opinion sparked a political push for transitional justice. Post-2008, outside of obvious difference with their relationships with China, when it came to issues of government corruption, the DPP needed something to distinguish themselves, because the two parties were really not that different. Previously, if the light had been shined too brightly under Chen Shui-bian, it would have illuminated corruption on both sides, so it simply wasn’t a main focus.

Taking a page from the  left-wing of the DPP, Tsai’s platform of transitional justice and economic reform now enjoyed popular backing due to the Sunflower Movement, and aided in efforts to break the DPP’s own connections with corruption. After winning in 2016, Tsai came under pressure to follow through on her campaign promises. The media played a large role in applying that pressure. It came from progressive sectors, as well as from KMT fed news outlets with ties to China who wanted to criticize Tsai. Both resulted in transitional justice actions from the government.

Current transitional justice efforts from the DPP are not investigating current KMT activities and trying to malign the competition. The focus has been on KMT actions between 1945 and 1992. In her inaugural address, Tsai addressed the topic, stating,

For the new democratic system to move forward, we must first find a way to face the past together. I will first establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission inside the Presidential Office, to address the historical past in the most sincere and cautious manner. The goal of transitional justice is to pursue true social reconciliation, so that all Taiwanese can take to hear the mistakes of that era.

However, the KMT has resisted this, mainly for two reasons: first, it’s simply bad optics for the party. Even though the government is not focusing on current KMT actions, illuminating the practices that have been ingrained in the party for decades still has the power to influence public opinion. Second, the KMT’s networks are their mechanism for maintaining power, and they need them. They don’t want the networks put under a microscope.

Since Tsai’s inauguration, the Executive Yuan has produced the Act Governing the Handling of Ill-Gotten Properties by Political Parties and Their Affiliate Organizations in July 2016, and the Act on Promoting Transitional Justice in December 2017, which then led to the creation of the Ill-Gotten Party Assets Settlement Committee (CIPAS) and the Transitional Justice Commission (TJC) in August 2016 and May 2018, respectively.

CIPAS has since worked to uncover party assets that they determine to be, “ill-gotten,” and attempt to return them to their rightful owner. Article 2 of the law states, “CIPAS shall . . . conduct the investigation, restitution, forfeiture of restoration of rights of ill-gotten assets acquired by the political parties, their affiliated organizations and trustees, restoration of rights, and other matters.” Ill-gotten assets is a fairly broad characterization, but covers a number of areas. Included is property squatting, in which the KMT would illegally occupy public property and then sell it for profit. An example was a piece of land in Taipei’s Zhongshan District that the KMT seized and sold. Other illegitimate assets are forced “donations,” “seed capital,” and improper taxes. Legitimate assets include membership fees, election subsidies, political contributions, and donation of campaign funds. TJC’s purpose is more broadly focused on the authoritarian era. They act through attempting to open archives, and provide public access; remove authoritarian symbols and preserve sites where unjust acts were committed; and exonerate political victims.

The KMT’s reaction to actions by CIPAS and TJC has been to strategically use the media to attempt to gain political influence and reclaim legitimacy. On multiple occasions they’ve criticized Commission Chairwoman Yang Tsui for solely being out for revenge, and for what they claim is running a commission that is unconstitutional by not following due process. The KMT has framed transitional justice as an issue that crosses party lines and one that is necessary for the growth of the country; the KMT’s Alex Fai stated, “the KMT cannot bear to see the nation being torn apart by the constant political strife and neglect of economic development.” They want the commission repealed and power taken away from the DPP, but claim to still want to amend the transitional justice act and compensate victims of abuses of power, disregarding a clear conflict of interest. This type of crocodile tears response is a play to retain a powerful presence and present as being on level with the current socio-political climate.

Even in current Taiwanese politics, the same KMT practices that were used during the authoritarian era can be seen with recent KMT candidate Han Kuo-yu. He adopted a populist message, was less educated than other candidates, and went against party establishment, but was still able to take control of the party even when disliked by most in it. He built a base not only on his populist message, but on political patronage; his marriage to the daughter of a powerful local faction boss in Hualien gave him a local power base. Han had been in the news after it was uncovered that he and his wife, Lee Chia-fen, own a number of properties in Taiwan that Kao Mei-lan, secretary general of Kaohsiung’s tourism bureau, was responsible for purchasing for them. Han has also been accused of putting pressure on a construction company to grant a loan for an apartment, in addition to other similar questionable business actions.

It’s possible that his recent defeat could signify the end of old style KMT politics. The survival strategy for the KMT has been their local networks, but what does a loss mean for them? In an increasingly democratic and independent state, the KMT’s primary issue is their link to China. Those ties have been somewhat offset by their local networks, because at the end of the day, people need jobs and economic security, and the KMT has been able to compete because of that. As strong transitional justice attempts continue from the DPP, regardless of their political motivations, the KMT’s influence and ability to perpetuate pork barrel politics have the potential to be severely inhibited.

We’re even beginning to see what might lead to a complete restructuring of the party. The KMT leadership may take this opportunity to get in front of corruption and try to grant themselves their own institutional authority by pursuing anti-corruption, similar to the strategy adopted by Xi Jinping in China. Just one day after defeat, KMT Chairman Wu Den-yih declared that he will be resigning. Other high-up figures in the party’s leadership are following suit. Wu Den-yih himself said that it’s time for the party to “destroy and rebuild,” because “it’s the only way to have a chance of standing up again from the ruins.”

The author would like to express his sincere appreciation to Dr. Gerald Blaney for the invaluable guidance and assistance he provided in editing this paper.

(Feature photo from Hao Chen-tai on Wikicommons, CC BY-SA 3.0)