Discussion surrounding the passage of Hong Kong’s National Security Bill generally revolves around the rhetoric of how China’s unprecedented move to enact Article 23 of the Basic Law erodes Hong Kong’s long history of Western-style freedom and democracy. This erosion of freedom is reflected in the arrest of several individuals and activists since the bill came into force; arrests have been made for people that held banners, wore T-shirts and published tweets that were perceived to be advocating for Hong Kong independence. Twelve pro-democracy candidates were barred from participating in legislative elections (which were postponed by a year); and assertions were made by the Chinese government about their right to prosecute critics overseas. Perhaps the most high-profile arrest made under the security law was for pro-democracy media tycoon Jimmy Lai—founder of newspaper Apple Daily.

While the understanding of China’s measures as “draconian” is certainly true to most Taiwanese who honor and uphold the integrity of their own democratic institutions, one must delve into this matter with a more systematic thinking to understand why a complete Sinicization of Hong Kong is critical to Beijing’s interests.

This systematic thinking involves the following layers. In the most outer layer, Beijing sees foreign influence as its top foreign policy challenge. In the second layer, Beijing has rapidly expanded its foreign influence activities to improve its global image and to compete against Western media on discourse power (話語權). Ultimately, Beijing’s goal is to “tell China’s story well (講好中國故事).” In the third layer, Beijing is most fearful of the US and the West’s division through westernization (西化、分化) in territories where Beijing has control. The third layer is core to understanding Beijing’s willingness to fundamentally alter Hong Kong’s long history of Western-style freedom and democracy.

To be clear, this article uses the term Western-style freedom and democracy to differentiate China’s perception of freedom, a term that is used specifically to criticize the US in terms of its gun control, healthcare, and crime rates.

How Beijing feels challenged 

The outer layer of Beijing’s foreign policy challenge identifies foreign interference as Beijing’s top concern. This foreign policy challenge is especially true when the US and the West affect Beijing’s “First Ring” territories. The “First Ring” is defined as territories to which Beijing claims, regardless of actual control. In other words, Beijing is primarily concerned with Hong Kong and Taiwan because they have long enjoyed mature, democratic political institutions and decent human rights standards.

In the case of Taiwan, what worries Beijing is that Taiwan (which Beijing views as part of its territory) has developed a mature democracy, and military strength that ranks 26 out of 138 countries (according to the Global Firepower), deterring military action from China. Similarly, since the Umbrella Revolution in 2014, Hong Kongers saw Beijing’s move as anti-democratic and have risked their lives to protest even until this moment. These two cases send the same signal to Beijing–that Taiwan and Hong Kong choose to embrace Western values and to abandon their “Chinese roots.” As such, Beijing’s top foreign enemy is the US, and Beijing has been trying to increase the costs of US interference through Beijing’s economic statecraft (ig. dialogues, market access, trade agreements, activities of SOEs, tourists, and students).

The second layer focuses on Beijing’s competition against the West on discourse power.  Dominance in discourse power means Beijing can successfully sell its narrative to the world. This explains why expanding its foreign influence activities is so crucial: if China can rapidly boost its image, its actions will be recognized and supported by the world. This “Brand China” revolves around a peaceful China that seeks to create a community of common destiny. Talking points include respecting other countries’ political systems, searching for and maximizing common ground among differences (求同存異), and adopting a win-win mentality. From Beijing’s perspective, the rest of the world would allow Beijing to maximize its interests, as long as China can sell its brand to countries. Hence, Beijing will do everything it can to falsely portray the Hong Kongers as violent usurpers against a majority that wants stability.

China’s fear of division through westernization 

The third layer examines division through westernization (西化、分化). As much as Beijing wants to “tell China’s story well,” Beijing has always believed itself as vulnerable to division through westernization (西化、分化) in Hong Kong and Taiwan for three reasons:

First, the US and others continue to view authoritarian China with an innate distrust. Enhanced by the differences in political systems, this distrust has led the US  not only to question China’s motives for helping relatively poorer countries, but to speculate China as the cause of the coronavirus pandemic. Similarly, Hong Kong and Taiwan, which operate very differently from China, also do not trust China for this reason. The proliferation of Chinese-based tech companies, such as WeChat and TikTok, reinforces this distrust towards Beijing.

In retaliation to the perceived threat that Beijing poses to US national security, the Trump administration has recently issued an executive order to ban TikTok, arguing that American user data could be compromised and transferred to the Chinese government. Experts have cited the theoretical possibility of this risk, but there is no evidence as of yet to suggest that it has actually occurred. Likewise, earlier in April, Taiwan’s government imposed an official ban on the use of Zoom in formal business settings and educational institutions; the ban was grounded in cybersecurity concerns, given the revelation of how certain user traffic was being routed through Chinese data centers. In an ever-evolving tit-for-tat dynamic between Beijing and its counterparts, distrust between the actors have become more apparent to international observers.

Second, Beijing fails to sell its narrative because its state-media cannot compete with Western media. In terms of numbers of followers, People’s Daily has 50 million social media followers, while China Daily has a total of 45 million readers in print and online. These numbers are in no match with that of Western media. For example, in terms of numbers of subscribers, mainstream media such as CNN is viewed by approximately 90 million households in the US and 388 million households worldwide; BBC News has 394 million viewers; Bloomberg Media has 62 million readers. These figures, which are higher than Chinese state-media, are problematic to Beijing because these Western media outlets criticize China’s values and inform the audience in a manner that puts China at a disadvantage.

Third, from Beijing’s perspective, the US has repeatedly pulled Taiwan and Hong Kong into its sphere of influence. US-Taiwan ties have arguably become closer than ever before. The US Congress passed the S.1838 – Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019; the US Secretary of State Pompeo called Hong Kong “[no longer] maintains a high degree of autonomy from China.” Knowing that Beijing has a reason to prevent external powers to affect its “First Ring” territories is essential to understanding Beijing’s overall strategic objectives.

Conclusion

To outside observers, China’s increasing stranglehold on Hong Kong’s autonomy, as well as its belligerence towards Taiwan, may seem like the arbitrary exercises of power by an authoritarian power, or a gauntlet thrown at the United States as a challenge for global dominance. But the truth is probably closer to Beijing’s perceived threat from the West. To Beijing, it is merely trying to curb foreign influence, fight off Western media’s narrative about itself, and stop the country from potentially being divided from within. While this article does not discuss the origin or the validity of these perceived threats, it does seek to offer a systematic framework for understanding, and managing, China’s actions going forward.

(Feature photo by Robert Bye on Unsplash)

Willis Wang is a rising senior who studies International Politics at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. He previously interned at The Project 2049 Institute for roughly 10 months. He is passionate about U.S.-China-Taiwan relations and has a working knowledge of Taiwan’s combat readiness and C4ISR. He is proficient in Mandarin and English and has learned Japanese for two years.
Willis Wang