Inconsistencies Within China’s Arctic Policy

When researchers and policy makers analyze the People’s Republic of China (PRC’s) foreign policy, they tend to overlook or underestimate the significance of the Arctic. While the discussion on the Arctic as an arena of competing scientific, economic, and military interests is often under-reported, the Arctic has slowly become a priority in the PRC’s geo-strategic interests. 

Perhaps the best manifestation of such interests is that, in response to the opening of the northeast passage, northwest passage, and the central Arctic Ocean route due to melting ice caps, China is constructing its “Polar Silk Road.” 

Melting ice has both economic and strategic implications. Economically, melting ice means a reduction of cost of shipping in these routes compared to China’s traditional route (through the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal). Strategically, melting ice means China could ensure that its line of supplies does not get cut off in a crisis. China could potentially adopt one of the three routes instead of the traditional route, which, presently, can be strongly leveraged by the US. 

The United States must be more proactive in challenging China’s “near-Arctic state” status by identifying three areas of inconsistencies between the PRC’s Arctic Policy Paper and the PRC’s own actions. They include China’s lack of legitimate geographical appeal; China’s inconsistencies between its self-claimed scientific research versus China’s dual-use purpose; and China’s commitment to practice good fishing behavior versus the fact that China is being ranked the worst in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU). By comparison, Taiwan proves itself to be a strong advocate of international norms. 

“Near Arctic” status is not a status

The PRC adopts primarily both geographical and historical arguments to assert its legitimacy of the self-claimed “Near-Arctic State” status. Published in January 2018 by the PRC’s State Council Information Office, the Arctic Policy Paper outlines China’s legitimacy to participate in the Arctic, its strategic interests in the Arctic, and its contributions to the Arctic. 

According to the Arctic Policy Paper, China is “one of the continental States that are closest to the Arctic Circle… [where] natural conditions of the Arctic…have a direct impact on China’s climate system…[impacting its] agriculture, forestry, fishery, marine industry, and other sectors.” 

The historical appeal to the “Near-Arctic State” status occurs when China discusses its past contributions to the Arctic. China began to be involved in Arctic affairs in 1925 by signing the Spitsbergen Treaty, when in fact it was technically the Republic of China (Taiwan) that joined the Treaty. Then, the Policy Paper cites examples of how the PRC’s scientific expenditures contributed the world’s knowledge about the Arctic. For instance, the PRC built the Arctic Yellow River Station in Ny Alesund in the Spitsbergen Archipelagos in 2004; the PRC has carried out eight scientific expeditions in the Arctic Ocean; the PRC has 14 years of research experience at the Yellow River Station by 2017. The Paper claims that these efforts are made “to understand, protect, develop and participate in the governance of the Arctic” in order “to safeguard the common interests of all countries and the international community in the Arctic.” Yet, interestingly, this Policy paper never mentions China’s willingness to share its data with the United States nor China’s potential dual-use of data for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). 

Out of the entire text in the Arctic Policy Paper, these are the only two foundations on which China justifies its behavior in the Arctic.

Chinese claims should be challenged

The first reason why the U.S. must challenge China’s status as a “near-Arctic state” is because, for the most obvious reason, China does not have a legitimate geographical claim to call itself as a “near-Arctic state.” As Secretary Pompeo pointed out during the Arctic Council ministerial in Finland on May 6, 2019, “the shortest distance between China and the Arctic is 900 miles (1450 kilometers).” Therefore, China’s claim to be a “near-Arctic state” is unreasonable. More importantly, throughout the history of the Arctic Council, the Arctic Council has never created the term “near-Arctic state.” China should not be entitled to access to the Arctic just by a title that does not exist nor recognized by the Arctic Council. 

The second reason why the U.S. must challenge China’s status as a “near-Arctic state” is because China has consistently demonstrated a possibility to militarize in the Arctic in the name of scientific research, potentially violating China’s status as an observer. (Note: An important standard for observers to maintain their status, as stated by the Arctic Council in the section Criteria For Admitting Observers, is that observer states must “recognize Arctic States’ sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic.”) Published in June 2019, the Department of Defense’s (DoD) Arctic Strategy points out potential likelihood of dual-use. For instance, while the DoD noted that China’s military activity is relatively limited compared to that of Russia, the DoD noted that the civilian research efforts such as the Ukrainian-built icebreaking research vessel Xuelong and the domestically-built icebreaking research vessel Xuelong 2, complement the PLA. In another instance, the research data obtained from China’s research stations in Iceland and Norway, coupled with the PRC’s joint energy development and infrastructure projects with Russia (such as the Yamal liquefied natural gas project) can also be used for the PLA. 

Similarly, according to the Danish Defence Intelligence Service Chief Lars Findsen, China’s research expeditions are of “dual-purpose,” namely, for scientific and military interests. He noted that the PLA has gradually become more involved in scientific research and that collaboration between the PLA and Chinese scientists in the Arctic is a new norm for Chinese conduct in the Arctic. A combination of civilian and military actors likely has, and will continue to, contribute immensely to China’s geostrategic interests. 

The third reason why the U.S. must challenge China’s status as a “near-Arctic state” is because, despite China’s claims on its commitment to “carry out appropriate exploratory fishing” as stated in the China’s white paper on the Arctic Policy, China ranks the worst in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU). China is unlikely to adhere to the Ottawa Declaration of 1996, which provides for  the “protection of the Arctic environment, including the health of Arctic ecosystems, maintenance of biodiversity in the Arctic region and conservation and sustainable use of natural resources.” The IUU report notes that China acts “as a rogue flag state [that exploits] global fisheries without regard for international frameworks.” Given the aforementioned assessments of China’s poor performance in environmental regulations, China can hardly defend itself as a responsible stakeholder in the Arctic. As such, the violation of the Ottawa Declaration should undermine China’s observer status in the Arctic Council. 

Conclusion

In short, the US must continue to challenge China’s self-fabricated status as a “near-Arctic state” on three grounds. First, China does not have a legitimate geo-political reason seen as it is 900 miles away from the Arctic. Second, China has demonstrated signs of using scientific tools for military purposes. Third, China exhibits poor behavior in managing global fisheries, which is in contrast to the spirit of the Ottawa declaration. In the future, as China integrates the Polar Silk Road into its global strategy, the US must see China as a strategic competitor that ambitiously seeks to gain influence in the Arctic and counter its influence as much as possible.

(Feature photo of Xuelong by Bahnfrend, CC BY-SA 4.0)