The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has a demographic dilemma, which is intimately tied to an ideological dilemma.
Its primary goal of ‘reunification’ with China, which the KMT considers the “Mainland,” is increasingly seen by the Taiwanese mainstream society as the agenda of an older generation of waishengren (people who fled from China to Taiwan after 1945), as opposed to a priority of today’s democratic Taiwan. This is especially challenging as younger generations have progressed towards a “Taiwanese only” identity.
These developments, coupled with the People’s Republic of China’s acts of hostility towards Taiwan and the popular will of its people, have put the KMT in an increasingly awkward position. The KMT’s efforts to reframe its priorities in economic terms have made them seem out of touch with the concerns of the Taiwanese society. Moreover, Beijing’s dismantling of Hong Kong’s “One Country, Two Systems” apparatus, which was meant to be a model for when Taiwan is annexed to China, now stands as a warning.
The KMT’s younger supporters are attempting to shift the party’s priorities towards protecting democracy — for all “Chinese peoples” — but they face resistance from the party’s older generation, who are reluctant to embrace any position that complicates their ability to strengthen ties with the “Mainland”. This situation does not bode well for the party’s future. If the KMT wishes to have a viable future in Taiwanese politics, it must heed the advice of its younger members to inject new ideas and mentalities into the party.
The KMT missed Taiwan shifting away from China
The antipathy of Taiwanese people towards China stems from a long history of having their interests and identities relegated under the agenda of the “Mainland”. After World War II, the KMT brought a dictatorial regime to Taiwan as they retreated from China. The KMT established martial law in 1949 in an effort to gain more effective control of Taiwan, and for the next four decades tried to suppress its people’s culture and language in favor of waishengren hegemony. As a result of the KMT’s long history of suppression, many Taiwanese people associate the KMT — and by extension, China — with authoritarian rule.
After martial law was lifted in 1987, President Lee Teng-hui became the steward for Taiwan’s democratization. Despite being both the President of the Republic of China and the Chairman of the Chinese Nationalist Party, Lee gradually shifted the focus of the regime towards Taiwan itself. In doing so, he broke from his party’s long-standing tradition of prioritizing their ambitions in China over the best interests of the Taiwanese that they ruled over.
Additionally, Lee was well aware of China’s ambitions for Taiwan, and subsequently enacted laws and policies to protect its sovereignty and its people. Despite pioneering a path for the KMT to transition itself to Taiwan’s emerging democracy, Lee unironically was expelled from the party in 2001 when its officials accused him of being too “pro-Taiwan”. Lee’s prioritizing Taiwan was an anathema to his KMT colleagues, a problem that lies at the root of their current situation.
Concurrent to these developments, China continued to move in a different direction. The bloody clampdown in response to the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in 1989, and Beijing’s military threats during Taiwan’s first democratic presidential election in 1996, showed a clear divergence between China’s and Taiwan’s respective paths. This shift was lost upon the KMT, who was still primarily focused on their version of the “China Dream” rather than protecting Taiwan’s fledgling democracy. As such, the KMT coined the term “1992 Consensus,’ which agreed with Beijing that Taiwan was part of China (the KMT claims that “China” meant the Republic of China government in Taipei, something Beijing never overtly agreed to).
The KMT underestimated democratization as an identity anchor amongst Taiwanese—especially for the generation born after martial law ended in 1986. The KMT believed that its patronage networks, forty years of indoctrination, and economic realities would maintain their influential position within Taiwanese politics. As a consequence, this misplaced optimism sowed the seeds of a growing gap between themselves and emerging trends among younger Taiwanese.
The KMT tries to attract the youth
This strategy also hampered the KMT’s efforts to try and minimize that gap. The KMT formed its Youth League in 2006 to promote its vision of a Chinese Taiwan to young voters. The KMT hoped to capitalize on their passion for politics and their desire to contribute to Taiwanese society, and in turn recruit a new generation of party members. The formation of the Youth League was a significant step toward the KMT acknowledging that the cause of “reunification” needed support beyond increasingly elderly waishengren.
Unfortunately, the creation of the Youth League did not garner the support the KMT hoped and needed. Chen Po-han of the KMT Youth League said last year, “overall, the young voter support for the KMT has not increased significantly.” The priorities of most young Taiwanese lay with enhancing their democracy and protecting their unique identity. The KMT’s dreams of closer ties with China resonated less and less with this demographic. As a result, the KMT attempted a different and seemingly more successful approach: The KMT began to emphasize the economic benefits of strengthening relations with China. Indeed, economic concerns didn’t disappear under political and identitarian ones. Stagnant wages and unemployment remained an important concern for many Taiwanese young and not-so-young voters. However, this approach did not acknowledge the fact that the Taiwanese are unwilling to surrender their sovereignty for a financial agreement with China.
The Sunflower Movement in 2014, spearheaded by students, underscored many Taiwanese’s unwillingness to be overly economically dependent on China. The Sunflower Movement began as a sit-in to protest the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) promoted by then-President Ma Ying-jeou, which people feared would undermine Taiwanese democracy and independence. Ma aggressively promoted the improvement of ties between Taiwan and China, with the CSSTA being one important component. As Ma himself explained, “we wanted to use this opportunity to further reduce hostilities between the two sides and to broaden and deepen the cross-strait contacts”
Unfortunately for the KMT, they overplayed their hand. Students, in alliance with other concerned civic groups, staged major protests against the KMT’s intention to link Taiwan’s economy even further to China. Many saw this as giving China even greater leverage over the country. Above all, the Sunflower Movement demonstrated that many Taiwanese, especially younger ones, were not enticed by the “Chinese Dream”. It showed just how important democracy, social justice, and local identity were to younger Taiwanese. Economic issues, important as they were — and continue to be — simply could not undo all of the progress made since the 1990s.
2016 and 2020 elections
The sweeping ideals of the Sunflower Movement were cemented in the Taiwanese elections of 2016 and 2020, in which voters repudiated candidates who had advocated for closer political and economic ties with China. The Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong only amplified the concerns that the Taiwanese people had about the threat to their freedoms posed by the Chinese government. Moreover, the 2016 election was the second time in Taiwan history that the KMT lost its hold on the presidency, as Tsai Ing-wen, who rejected the “1992 Consensus,” came to power. This victory was not just a temporary by-product of the Sunflower Movement; it was an accurate reflection of the continued salience of these issues for many Taiwanese. Indeed, despite ongoing concerns about the DPP’s handling of the economy, Tsai Ing-wen won by an even greater margin in the 2020 election.
Tsai Ing-wen’s landslide win may have come as a surprise given her opponent’s strong results in early polls. The KMT candidate for the 2020 presidential election, Han Kuo-yu, held a 30-point lead over President Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP in the beginning of the race. His support can be attributed to a focus on socio-economic inequality, and his appeal to the working-class population — a demographic that historically tended to vote for the DPP.
However, Han Kuo-yu’s support for the “1992 Consensus” was viewed suspiciously by the Taiwanese population, particularly in light of the massive protests in Hong Kong in 2019 to protect their own rights against Beijing’s encroachments. This support struck many people as tone-deaf. Unfortunately for the party, the KMT misinterpreted economic dissatisfaction with the DPP — which had resulted in Han Kuo-yu’s surprise victory in “Deep Green” Kaohsiung the 2018 mayoral elections, along with other KMT candidates winning a number of mayorships — as a signal for a repackaging of the CSSTA in 2020. This brought political disaster for both Han Kuo-yu personally and the KMT generally.
Another weak point for the KMT is Taiwan’s voter demographics. Voters under the age of 50 make up approximately 53% of the vote, a slight majority in Taiwan’s voting demographic. However, it is important to note that anyone who was 30 in the first democratic presidential elections of 1996 would have been 54 in the 2020 voting cycle, meaning that the 50-59 demographic arguably could be grouped with the younger generations that grew up under democracy. This places about 72% of the vote in the hands of a generation that has lived with democracy most of their adult lives.
The KMT has suffered politically because it has underestimated drastically the link between this demographic shift and the political ideals of its population. Furthermore, Pew Research Polls have shown that the KMT’s support among young adults (aged 20-29) is at 10 percent — a warning sign for any political party. This is consistent with an increasing “Taiwanese only” identifying generation. The same polls have found that 66% of respondents identify as Taiwanese, 28% Taiwanese and Chinese, and 4% Chinese.
Recognizing the cratering of their support among younger voters, the KMT nominated City Councilor Jane Lee to succeed Han Kuo-yu as mayor of Kaohsiung. According to KMT’s Secretary-General Lee Chien-lung, Lee was selected from about 10 potential candidates because of her ability to attract independent and young voters, as well as her support from people with different educational backgrounds. If Lee was supposed to appeal to these voter demographics, they didn’t get the memo: her DPP adversary Chen Chi-mai handily won the mayoral by-election with 70% of the vote.
KMT needs a clear new message
To initiate the fundamental political shift it so desperately needs, the KMT should promote a clear message that will resonate with members within the party and attract new voters, especially young ones who are increasingly active in the Taiwanese political sphere. Alfred Lin, a former head of the KMT Youth League, suggests that the “KMT must convey a very clear position that it is anti-Communist, and will defend the interests and lifestyle of the Taiwanese people.” Taking a strong stance on the Chinese Communist Party would assuage the Taiwanese people’s concerns about the KMT’s efforts to maintain strong connections with China.
Lin also notes that “the KMT mainstream is also anti-Communist and also believes that the Chinese people should be separated from the Communist government.” Lin states that if the KMT were to “defend democratic Taiwan and pursue a free China,” the KMT would be more appealing to the general population in Taiwan. Adding “defending Hong Kongers” to their platform would show their commitment to democratic ideals.
In addition to updating its views on China, the KMT must advertise its founding principles to the younger generation—after all, the KMT was the party that oversaw the transition to democracy in Taiwan. In other words, this may not be an existential issue, but simply a branding problem.
As Lin explains, “the structure and image of the entire party used to be mature, stable and experienced, but now it has become old-fashioned and outdated.” The KMT needs to target the younger population and rebrand itself. Sean Fen, a young man in his twenties from a pro-KMT family, suggests that the KMT should invest in large-scale advertisements and propaganda to highlight KMT’s history and dedication to democracy. Fen and Lin believe that by using music videos, social media, and other new media sources that appeal to the youth the KMT party can begin to gain support, legitimacy, and build a revolutionary spirit from separating from authoritarian rule.
Despite its best efforts to appeal to young voters by transforming its image and ideals, the KMT’s longstanding ties to China will always dominate political discourse. From the 1940s to the present day, the KMT’s message has focused on highlighting Taiwan’s Chinese heritage and promoting the island’s connections to China. This stance has left them politically unfavorable and marginalized. The KMT would essentially need a complete overhaul in order to appeal to the younger generation and to mainstream Taiwanese people in order to see any significant political shifts in popularity.
The KMT’s long-standing dominance in Taiwanese politics has spanned over decades. Over that time, Taiwan and China have grown apart, forcing political parties to evolve and reflect the modern needs of the Taiwanese people. Unfortunately, the KMT has failed to adapt to the Taiwanese people’s desire to forge their own path and underestimated their unwavering commitment to democracy. If the KMT does not reform its policies and identity, it will only continue to be perceived as archaic and tone-deaf to the modern needs of Taiwan. Furthermore, the KMT needs to make radical shifts, not superficial policy changes. The party could start with officially abandoning the 1992 Consensus and producing a clear message of the future that does not include a Chinese influence. The KMT will continue to lack popularity and politics if it does not make these changes and their efforts will be made in vain.
The author would like to thank Dr. Gerald Blaney for his assistance with this article.
(Feature photo from KMT Youth Corp’s Facebook Page)
- The KMT’s Demographic and Ideological Dilemma - May 19, 2021