Multilateralization of the Taiwan Strait: US-Korea Summit

This is a translation is a part of the original 台海安全的典範轉移與台灣邱吉爾們的時代填答 by Lai I-chong (賴怡忠), Executive Director of The Prospect Foundation. Originally published by Voice Tank. Translation by Tim Smith.

The joint statement from the May 21 US-South Korea summit declares “President Biden and President Moon emphasize the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.” 

In the days before the summit, the media was speculating whether the Taiwan Strait would be mentioned; after all, the Taiwan Strait had never made it to the final communique of previous US-Korea summits. In addition, South Korea is still targeted by Chinese sanctions over its decision to implement the US’s THAAD missile defense system, so most commentators were not expecting the summit to touch on Taiwan.

And yet the May 21st summit shattered their doubts. For Taiwan, this summit is clear on two things: the priority of security in the Taiwan Strait for the US, as well as the US formally linking security in the Taiwan Strait and security on the Korean Peninsula together. The future of the Taiwan Strait is a part of the US comprehensive Indo-Pacific strategy, rather than a stand-alone issue between the US, China, and Taiwan alone. This is a clear paradigm shift. 

“Multilateralizing” the Taiwan Strait 

Since the US-Japan summit on April 16 and the G7 foreign ministers’ meeting on May 5th, this is the third instance where the US has used the phrasing “emphasize maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait” during international discussions [Note: the G7 Summit on June 13 and NATO Summit on June 14 also used similar language]. The US clearly recognizes the dangers of a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, and that Chinese leader Xi Jinping is indeed taking a more aggressive military posture and raising tensions in the foreseeable future. 

These events are all happening while Taiwan has not changed the status quo, and even the Chinese themselves are certain Taiwan will not declare de jure independence. As such, a conflict in the Taiwan Strait would not be from Taiwan’s provocation, but rather China acting based on various internal and external factors and deciding to use sharp measures to alter the balance in the Taiwan Strait. Therefore the US is signaling to China its determination to keep Taiwan secure, as well as raising the awareness of the international community.

On the other hand, the US is also pressing forward on making the Taiwan Strait a regional, multilateral, and international issue. To make things even clearer to China, the US is not only increasing its military presence around the Taiwan Strait, it is also actively mobilizing its allies. As more like minded states join with the US on Taiwan, when China forces change to Taiwan’s status quo it will not only conflict with American core interests, but the interests of other countries in the region as well. 

With this strategic thinking, the US began stressing the importance of the Taiwan Strait at an early-March security meeting between Quad member states (US, Japan, India, and Australia). Afterwards, it brought up the subject at the US-Japan foreign and defense ministers’ meeting in mid-March, the US-Japan Summit in April, and the G7 ministers’ meeting at the beginning of May [and the G7 Summit and NATO in June]. The US successfully brought along other key democratic states to make public statements on the Taiwan Strait issue. Now this trend has also extended to the US-Korea Summit, which had always been silent on Taiwan.

It looks like the US will continue this strategy. It remains to be seen whether the US-Australia or other summits will mention Taiwan, but so far the US is indeed taking a different approach to the Taiwan issue than in the past. This will have profound repercussions for the stakeholders in the Taiwan Strait. 

Taiwan in further US-Korean discussions?

Because South Korea was invited to attend as an observer at the G7, South Korea is also standing with the G7 joint communique’s position on the Taiwan Strait to a certain extent. Therefore there is already a kind of precedent for a public statement on Taiwan for the US-Korea summit. Nonetheless Taiwan had not been in previous talks between South Korea and the US, so this year’s summit is quite a rare development.

Some say that since South Korean president Moon Jae-In will step down from the presidency due to term limits next year, it’s uncertain how sustainable this joint statement is; there are others who say that Moon is simply playing word games by using “Taiwan Strait” instead of saying “Taiwan” directly, to pay lip service to the US.  

Although President Moon will be replaced in 2022, the joint statement is a verifiable, written statement from the US-Korea Summit. As long as the US position remains the same, should the next Korean president want to take out the reference to Taiwan, he or she would have to renegotiate with the US and give the US something in return.      

As for whether the “Taiwan Strait” phrasing was lip service, can the US and South Korea ignore Taiwan simply by replacing “Taiwan” with “Taiwan Strait?” Not mentioning “Taiwan” outright gives South Korea a bit more cover in Korea-China relations. There’s nothing China can really do about US-Korea relations, but South Korea could use some kind of excuse with China to manage that relationship.  

Some interpret the phrasing to be lip service to the US; others believe that it’s a tool the US gave to South Korea to manage its own relations with China. These two different readings reflect analysts’ difference on whether Seoul values its relations with the US or China more. 

Even if we can’t exactly expect South Korea to assist Taiwan militarily should a war arise in the Taiwan Strait, as long as the US is still highly concerned with China’s behavior, the issue of Taiwan Strait security will continue to appear in the future statements of US-Korea summits.

If US-Korea summits continue to reference the Taiwan Strait, on some level the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula issues are now formally linked together (although this kind of “coupling” has already been in practice for a long time). We are not talking so much about some kind of grand bargain between the US and China, such as the US withdrawing support for Taiwan in exchange for China to intervene in North Korea’s nuclear missile proliferation. Instead, the Taiwan Strait issue is now considered, along with North Korea’s nuclear proliferation and China’s encroachment in the South China Sea, as components of a comprehensive Indo-Pacific regional discussion.

This would allow the Taiwan Strait issue to become a regional concern. To indulge in imagination for a minute, if Korea, Japan, and the US were to cooperate, peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait could be a common thread for all three countries. (Would Taiwan have to consider taking a stance on North Korea then?)

US on North Korea 

All daydreaming aside, to get South Korea to break its silence on Taiwan, the US must have offered something in return. Putting aside other topics such as climate change, 5G and 6G networks, and COVID-19 related issues, Moon has obtained the Biden Administration’s nod on his North Korean policy, including the Inter-Korean Summit in April 2018, and Trump’s 2018 meeting with Kim Jong-Un in Singapore of the same year. 

This represents the Biden Administration’s endorsement of Moon’s policy of reconciliation between the two Koreas, as well as continuation of the direction from Trump’s meeting with Kim Jung-Un. Moon will keep playing mediator between the US and North Korea, making South Korea an intermediary in the North Korean nuclear issue. 

However, the South Korean by-elections in early April showed an all-out victory for the opposition party. Observers think that Moon will quickly become a lame-duck for the rest of his year-long tenure. And yet, as a lame-duck president, Moon may be more concerned with his legacy of inter-Korean reconciliation. Therefore, it was important for Moon to have US support for his policy direction. Under this scenario, it makes sense for Moon to agree with the US on Taiwan in exchange for the US to agree on North Korea. Certainly, Seoul is still mindful of China’s attitude, but North Korea comes first. As long as the US-North Korea relations remain stable, South Korea would be happy to play mediator and worry less about China.

(To be continued)