1992 Consensus Replaced By Multilateralism in the Taiwan Strait

This is a translation is a part of the original 台海安全的典範轉移與台灣邱吉爾們的時代填答 by Lai I-chong (賴怡忠), Executive Director of The Prospect Foundation. Originally published by Voice Tank. Translation by Tim Smith.

The Taiwan Strait issue is becoming a regional, multilateral, and international issue, and no longer relevant to just Taiwan and China. In fact, since 2016 the tension in the Taiwan Strait is not caused by Taiwan, but rather it is China that is changing the status quo. China’s increasing aggressiveness in the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Indian border, as well as using its technological and economic power to change the regional balance and existing order, has led the US to become more proactively involved and made the Taiwan Straits issue relevant to the entire region. 

The cottage industry of people playing word games to define the Taiwan Strait through a lens of “Taiwan vs. China” should go out of business soon. In the future, rather than what happens between Taiwan and China, it is how China acts with other countries that will influence the Taiwan Strait situation more.    

An impact of this paradigm shift is that the so-called “1992 Consensus” has ceased to have any bearing on the Taiwan Strait. We will not beat the dead horse over whether this consensus exists or what it actually says; the focus is on Beijing’s insisting that “recognizing the 1992 Consensus is a precondition to any dialogue.” But now, China’s posturing towards Taiwan will be affected by factors outside of Taiwan and China, and so will the preconditions for dialogue shift as well. China may pile on more demands on Taiwan that are outside of Taiwan’s ability to comply. 

This is exactly why Chinese leader Xi Jinping unilaterally redefined the 1992 Consensus in his speech on January 2nd, 2019, to include agreeing to One Country Two Systems. This led to increased skepticism and clearer support for Taiwan from the international community, which then enraged China, leading to increased Chinese military maneuvers and the fast escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait.        

The multilateralization of the Taiwan Strait is the natural evolution of this trend. It is the American response to China’s unilateral, provocative change in the status quo. During the Trump Administration, the Quad Alliance (Japan, India, Australia and the US) have already been discussing Taiwan behind the scenes, and now the Biden Administration is now making Taiwan public in multilateral organizations and bilateral summits. Now that the cat is out of the bag, the Taiwan Strait can no longer be managed by the same framework from the 1990s, but in the context of regional and multilateral considerations. 

In reality, Taiwan Strait security isn’t just a Taiwan-China issue, it’s neither just a Taiwan-China-US issue. Ironically, since last year China has tried its utmost to tell the world that the Taiwan Strait status quo is no longer dictated by the United States. China tried to cast the US as an arrogant power whose rules of the game China now rejects. Certainly the US is no longer the only power that has a say–Japan, Australia, India, and even Great Britain, France, and the EU all now have a say too, further countering China.  

The Churchills of Taiwan 

China of course knows well enough about this development, unless China drank its own Kool-Aid and believes it is about to overtake the US and that the East is rising and the West is declining. Yes, China is rising and getting closer to the US, but other nations in the Indo-Pacific, including Taiwan, are also rising and closing in on China.   

Or perhaps China does see the problem clearly, but cannot yet do much about it, other than yell louder and act tougher. Except, this kind of behavior will only cause everyone else to push China further away in self protection.

In any case, the future will become increasingly rocky for Taiwan. All sorts of united front political warfare and military provocations will come one after another. Taiwan needs to be prepared for the worst. But we have reason to be optimistic too: the worst case scenario will not happen when Taiwan is at our weakest, but when China is at its weakest. China is resorting to crude threats of violence, precisely because China is at its weakest and has run out of better options. The greatest test of our era is waiting for the Churchills of Taiwan.