Where Are the DPP’s Party Factions Now?

This article is based on a Taiwan Report podcast, Taiwan Report News Brief–DPP Factions, prepared for Ketagalan Media by the author. 

Recently, while working on an entry in an upcoming book, the Encyclopedia of Taiwan Politics, I did a deep dive into Taichung’s local political factions.

Local political factions are almost all affiliated with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and are a relic of the KMT’s divide-and-rule strategy during martial law, though some defected to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) after Taiwan democratized. 

This got me thinking about the current state of the DPP factions. 

A history of DPP factions

DPP factions are national alliances and networks of people that traditionally vie for positions of power in the party, and when in power, for positions in government. The factions have been with the party since it formed out of the Tangwai (黨外, meaning “outside of the party”, or anyone outside of the one-party state dominated KMT) movement in 1986. In the beginning there was even a faction led by pro-democracy mainlanders who were against formal Taiwan independence. During the Tangwai era, pretty much everyone against KMT one-party rule was willing to work together to achieve the common aim of establishing democracy. By the early 90s, however, many were purged, or left willingly as the DPP became dominated by Holo (Taiwanese) speakers and moved to a strong pro-Taiwan stance, including taking an official stance advocating independence.

In the early days, the factions were often associated with particular ideas and issues, and had names like Welfare State (福利國連線), Formosa (美麗島系) and Justice (正義連線). Only one of those early factions still remains today: New Tide (新潮流系). New Tide initially was like the others in carving out an ideological space, but over the years has become more pragmatically oriented, more about power and getting things done. Over time, New Tide became the biggest faction, and was famous for its discipline and ability to cultivate new talent.

Factional infighting grew fierce during the Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) presidency, as they finally had some serious national level spoils to fight over. Frustrated with all the news coverage of their bickering, the party officially disbanded factions in 2006. It didn’t do the slightest bit of good, they kept on going anyway. 

By the early 2010s, aside from New Tide, most of the factions with the idealistic names fell by the wayside, replaced by factions centered around former Chen-era premiers Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌), You Si-kun (游錫堃) and Frank Hsieh (謝長廷). There were also often references to a Chen Chu (陳菊) faction arising from her powerful base built as long-standing mayor of Kaohsiung, though in reality it was a sub-faction of New Tide. 

As the 2010s rolled on there was, and continues to be, talk of a Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) faction. The transformative DPP chair, and later president, denies any such thing exists, but in reality there are many key politicians not affiliated with other factions that she often relies on. The “Ing Faction” (英派) may be considered at the very least a reasonably tight-knit network of people. 

One named faction that did survive is the, roughly translated, the Green Fellowship Association (綠色友誼連線), which is in part descended from the old Formosa Faction (美麗島系). This faction was nicknamed the Sunny Bank faction, as the then head of Sunny Bank brought them together in 2004. 

Another that started in 2010 is the One Side One Country Association (一邊一國連線), which stresses China and Taiwan are separate countries. Curiously, this isn’t a traditional faction, as it includes members from other factions, and even independents and members of the Taiwan Solidarity Union and People’s First Party–it’s more a grouping of people with similar stances on certain issues. 

After the mid-2010s, You Si-kun and Frank Hsieh both began to lose influence after having had no real power for quite some time, though Su Tseng-chang managed to hold on to his faction. The You faction was largely re-branded as the Taiwan Normal Country Promotion Association (TNCPA, 正常國家促進會), with then Taichung Mayor Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) as its head. 

Frank Hsieh’s faction was similarly re-branded Taiwan Forward (湧言會), and is associated with a think tank of the same name. Taiwan Forward also is commonly referred to as the Ocean faction (海派), which is a play on the name of its founder, SET TV chair Lin Kun-hai (林崑海)–the ‘hai’ in his name meaning ocean. Su Tseng-chang’s faction also has a think tank associated with it, the Taiwan Brain Trust. Lastly, Taiwan NextGen Foundation was founded by someone in Tsai Ing-wen’s close orbit, so there is at least something of a factional connection. (Editor’s note: Ketagalan Media publishes content from Taiwan NextGen Foundation.) 

In 2019, a new cross-party grouping of young politicians appeared called the Frontline Alliance (前線聯盟). Enoch Wu (吳怡農) and Lai Pin-yu (賴品妤) of the DPP joined, along with independents Freddy Lim (林昶佐) and Hung Tzu-yung (洪慈庸), and Chen Po-wei (aka 3Q, 陳柏惟) of the Taiwan Statebuilding Party. Their focus is largely on being the frontline against China’s United Front, being strongly pro-Taiwan. 

State of DPP factions today

Interestingly, no one seems to know for sure how factions are faring in the DPP today. Even political scientists I reached out to, both Taiwanese and foreign, were unsure. One noted that he had asked a DPP oldtimer about it, who apparently gave a long pause, and said they were still going–but not quite the force they once were. 

That being said, they definitely still do exist. The press continues to cover them. Most importantly, the president carefully balances them in her appointments. Currently, New Tide holds about 30 to 40 percent of the seats in various bodies, and holds the vice presidency in the form of William Lai (賴清德). Frank Hsieh’s Ocean faction holds almost exactly 10 percent and the head of the Ministry of the Interior Hsu Kuo-yung (徐國勇). 

The Taiwan Normal Country Promotion Association holds about 20 percent of the pickings, the speaker of the legislature is the association’s leader You Si-kun, and had the transportation ministry until Lin Chia-lung stepped down to take responsibility for a string of disasters. Su Tseng-chang’s faction also holds about 10 percent, and Su is the premier. Tsai Ing-wen’s faction is also credited with getting about 10 percent, and of course, the presidency.The Sunny Bank folks also get about 10 percent, but I’m unaware of any particularly big jobs held by them. 

During her tenure as both party chair and president, Tsai has kept the percentages of the spoils doled out to the various factions very stable, with only minor changes each time. 

Frequently the press will refer to New-Su-Association (新蘇連) as one entity or alliance, and refers to New Tide, Su and the Sunny Bank factions, which suggests they frequently work together. Then there are references to a Tseng Wen-tsan (鄭文燦) faction, which appears to be forming around the popular Taoyuan mayor, but like Chen Chu’s faction, it is a sub-faction of New Tide. 

The factions’ powers 

Unlike during the Chen era, there is almost no talk of infighting…or the factions doing much of anything at all. Outside of some local factional infighting in the Kaohsiung City Council, they really seem to have gone silent. 

It’s even doubtful that New Tide’s famous discipline continues to have much of a hold. When William Lai launched his primary challenge to be DPP presidential nominee in 2019, I made a point of looking into the reactions of top New Tide figures. They appeared to be as caught off guard as anyone else–Lai clearly hadn’t informed New Tide of his move. 

Some New Tide members supported him, some supported Tsai, some tried to broker a deal in the name of party unity…and others ran for the hills to avoid getting involved. I didn’t see any signs of the other factions having any clear stance on this either. In short, the factions simply weren’t a factor in the biggest internal fight in the party in years. In the past they would have been front-and-center in a fight like this.

So, what happened? Why are these mighty factions now largely non-existent on the political stage? Probably because Tsai Ing-wen has rendered them largely useless. The primary function of the factions is to fight for a share of the spoils of political and party offices. By apportioning these out at almost exactly the same proportions every time, Tsai has taken away their primary function–battling over them. Now their primary function is to simply continue to exist and ensure they have members to be appointed to these posts. 

I don’t expect that to hold, however. 

Sometime in 2022 or 2023, as Tsai approaches being a lame-duck both as president and presumably as party chair (though that’s not certain), the knives will come out. Everything will be up for grabs, and the scramble for power that the factions were originally created for will come to the fore again. 

Something to watch for is whether the factions splinter and realign into different groupings under the stress like they did in the period following the Chen presidency. It is a possibility, but not a foregone conclusion. After all, the Chen presidency ended in scandal and the party was an utter mess at the time. It’s hard to say how much that contributed to destabilizing the factions then, or if the simple act of having to start battling each other all over again as a new era approached was enough to trigger that. Definitely worth keeping an eye on. 

(Feature photo from Taiwan Presidential Office, CC BY 2.0)