The EU’s ‘Upgrade’ on Taiwan is Already Happening

In the past year, Taiwan has moved up on the European Union’s (EU) agenda at a speed few expected. Brussels now sees Taipei as a “partner” in its Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific released in September. Considering that the Chinese leadership has ensured Taiwan remains a “sensitive” issue in its relations with Brussels, and that up until September 2021 the EU as a whole had not embraced the Indo-Pacific as a political concept, this is unexpected.   

Naturally, these developments have led to expectations in Taipei that Brussels would soon match the rhetoric with action, and ‘upgrade’ its approach to Taiwan. Yet, Brussels never defined the contours of an ‘upgrade’. It has repeatedly reiterated that its engagement with Taiwan would continue to be guided by the EU’s One China Policy.  

Nonetheless, the contours of a Taiwan-friendly narrative have emerged in Brussels, as its discourse on China has turned increasingly assertive. The European Parliament (EP) and some member states, namely Lithuania, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland in Central Eastern Europe largely shaped this process, leading to questions on how and when the EU would translate its narrative into concrete measures. In order to ground expectations in reality, it is useful to have a conversation on the EU’s capacity to act as a coherent global actor. 

With member states retaining their sovereignty in external affairs, the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) remains limited to intergovernmental cooperation, where all measures have to be approved unanimously, while the European Parliament’s reports, as  significant as they are, remain legally non-binding. This requirement comes with a political price; CFSP decisions are often based on the lowest common denominator. This is the reality of EU policy-making vis-à-vis China and Taiwan, and the context in which the EU’s capacity to act should be assessed. 

Looming perceptions

While member states have jointly agreed to label China a “systemic rival”, the EU struggles to articulate a united message on its strategic priorities towards China. With member states still acting cautiously concerning Taiwan, there is a looming perception among observers that Brussels is not ready for an ‘upgrade’; given China’s economic weight, the EU’s fragmentation and reluctance to act, the EU’s tougher stance on China has not convinced everyone.

The Commission’s last-minute cancellation of its plans to announce a new strategic format for relations with Taiwan on trade reinforced concerns that the more things change, the more they stay the same. Meaning, the Commission will remain reticent and member states divided, both ignoring the EP’s growing, albeit legally not binding support, and the friendship some Central Eastern European member states have nourished vis-à-vis Taiwan.

A new stage

Yet, in the past year much has in fact happened. In April 2020, with EU member states struggling to contain the pandemic and Brussels unable to access additional supplies of critical personal protective equipment, in an unprecedented move President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen thanked Taiwan for its donation of 5.6 million masks, tweeting that the two sides are #StrongerTogether.

The pandemic has helped the EU, at the highest level, to recognize Taiwan’s relevance to Europe’s post-pandemic recovery, including as “an important partner to achieve goals of the European Chips Act”, the plan announced by the Commission to help Europe ensure the security of its supply of semiconductors and reduce its vulnerabilities. The pandemic also made Europe realize that China’s behaviour, including its display of force in the Taiwan Strait, “may have a direct impact on European security and prosperity”. This language is without precedent. 

In September 2020, at the first EU-Taiwan Investment Forum, Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen said the event marked a new chapter in bilateral trade and investment partnership. 

In December, at the Second Taiwan-EU Dialogue on Digital Economy, effectively a ministerial level exchange on digital economy, the two sides recognized the Dialogue could serve as a platform to strengthen cooperation.

At the  Second EU-Taiwan Investment Forum in October this year, this time with the EU’s top trade official Sabine Weyand of the Commission’s Directorate General for Trade, the European side described Taiwan as “one of the EU’s closest partners”. In the same month, the EP adopted its first stand-alone report on Taiwan urging Brussels to pursue an “enhanced partnership under the guidance of the EU’s One China Policy”. 

A few days later, a delegation of Members of the European Parliament personally delivered a message to Taiwan in their meeting with President Tsai in Taipei: “You are not alone”. The EP clearly indicated the path it wants member states to take: give the Commission a mandate to start negotiations on a Bilateral Investment Agreement (BIA) with Taiwan. 

What does all this mean?

Taiwan is unquestionably now moving up on Brussels’ agenda. A separate, positive Taiwan narrative has emerged in Brussels, standing in sharp contrast to its increasingly negative China discourse. The space where EU institutions now discuss Taiwan as a “partner” has widened, including among more senior level EU-officials.  

Shaping a positive narrative on Taiwan is a significant stage in a long-term process, one that needs time to develop. This process requires the EU to reconcile two elements: one, adherence to its One China Policy and two, a BIA with Taiwan. The way Brussels, Taipei and Beijing perceive the relationship between these two elements is where the biggest challenge lies. 

While Taipei sees them as mutually inclusive, for Beijing they are mutually exclusive. For EU institutions at the heart of a fragmented EU, reconciling this divergence with its own positions will be most difficult; the EP sees eye to eye with Taipei, but member states are divided and the Commission cannot act without a clear mandate from member states. For Brussels, taking one step forward on this path is therefore often perceived as taking two steps back. 

The Presidents of the Commission and Council asserting the right of member states to “further develop relations and cooperation with Taiwan” and vowing to push back against threats, is a step forward. But the Commission claiming “there is no economic interest in having an investment agreement with Taiwan” without having conducted an impact assessment, is two steps back; a political statement detached from reality. 

With its semiconductor industry and robust democracy, Taiwan already plays an important role in the EU’s reflections on its own role in the Indo-Pacific, as it struggles for a more resilient future. This has reinforced their already ongoing structured dialogue and bilateral consultations on trade and investment, which includes several Working Groups. 

But, with no willingness in member states to give the Commission a mandate to start negotiations for a BIA, a sentiment of disappointment may quickly emerge. This could well hinder appreciating that an ‘upgrade’ in the EU’s approach to Taiwan is already underway. 

The priority for Taipei and Brussels should now be to show that to continue reinforcing ties is the “normal” thing to do. In this process, it is vital to adjust expectations to reality, so that they can work together for democracy and against authoritarian threats.