China-Taiwan Relations and China’s Post-Election Taiwan Strategy

This is a translation of the original 台灣大選後的兩岸情勢及中共對台策略  by Li-Wen Tung (董立文), CEO of Foundation on Asia-Pacific Peace Studies (APS). Originally published by Voice Tank. Translation by Chieh-Ting Yeh.

Introduction

The January 2024 Taiwan elections resulted in Lai Ching-te and Bikhim Hsiao of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) winning the presidency and vice-presidency, and made history as the first time a political party maintained its rule for a third term in Taiwan. The election, of course, also has new ramifications for China-Taiwan relations. China will likely set new goals for its Taiwan policy to respond to this new reality.

Fundamentally, judging from China’s actions since the election, China seems set on two long term goals to pressure the new government: to defeat the DPP in the local “Nine In One” elections in 2026 and discredit the Lai Administration, as well as increase election manipulation efforts in the 2028 national elections so the DPP loses its power.

Assuming these goals, Beijing will probably not expect any novel gestures of goodwill from Lai in his May 20th inaugural speech (even if there are few voices within China that hopes to see something different on May 20th). Even though the same party continues to rule, there is still a transition of power between different governments. As a new leader, Lai’s authority will be relatively weak. A whole host of challenges are waiting for him and his team; they can forget about any kind of honeymoon period.

Taiwan must be even more vigilant of China’s aggressions. Even before the new government is inaugurated, China will not ease up on its operations against Taiwan, including ratcheting up all sorts of military and diplomatic harassment. The time to test the Lai Administration is during the transition; China can observe how the new government would react to increased pressures.

In other words, Beijing’s focus will not be on the inaugural address itself, but on challening the DPP’s resilience. Taiwan must think about China-Taiwan relations going forward in terms of the next four years, and how to continue the policies of the past eight years.

China’s “Two Red Lines”

China-Taiwan relations post-election depends on China’s actual actions to put on pressure. To understand China’s Taiwan policy and strategic mentality, one must look at two red lines.

China’s first red line with regards to Taiwan is “refrain from starting the war rashly.” Even before the January elections, China’s leader Xi Jinping agreed at the Biden-Xi Summit in November in San Francisco to resume high level military-to-military talks (including the US-China Defense Policy Coordination Talks and the US-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement meetings). The message is clear: “China will not act rashly.”

China’s second red line is that it “will not unilaterally end the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with Taiwan.” China is also unlikely to conduct a large-scale economic retaliations against Taiwan. That said, China will still resort to targeted, purpose-driven economic measures, such as goods that rely heavily on the Chinese market. But Beijing will probably not cut off all economic ties with Taiwan, because it is neither helpful to its own economy, nor will it have a positive effect on drawing Taiwan closer.

Within these two red lines, China will continue to pressure Taiwan with all the tools at its disposable: political, economic, military, diplomatic, and even legal means.

Two Forces Cultivated by China in Taiwan

After the election, Xi wrote in the CCP’s publication Quishi: “Strengthen Taiwan’s pro-unification patriotism, oppose Taiwan separatism, and work towards the complete unification of the motherland.” The emphasis is on the “patriotism” for China within Taiwan; this will be China’s important tactic in influencing Taiwan’s 2026 and 2028 elections.

There are two important partners for China. First, the Chinese Nationalist Party (the KMT) will continue to be a tool for China. After the losses this January, there will likely be some soul searching. There will be a debate whether the party should maintain its China-friendly stance, or switch to a US-friendly stance against increasing Chinese encroachment. From Xi’s directive to strengthen “Chinese patriotism” in Taiwan, we can expect Beijing to support the pro-China factions within the KMT against the pro-US side.

Second, China will proactively cultivate new targets for United Front work, especially the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). Not only has the TPP become a critical third party within a few years of its founding, the TPP has the support of the youngest voters today. China is desperate to manipulate Taiwan’s youth, especially the generation now that has grown up “naturally pro-Taiwan.”

We can imagine Beijing, going through the TPP, implementing some kind of “cross-strait youth grand coalition,” actively inviting young TPP members to China, and absorbing them as new political assets friendly to Beijing. This will be a big win for China’s “Chinese patriotism” cultivation in Taiwan.

Conclusion

Looking at the overall picture, China’s international propaganda has shifted from “anti-US” to “US and China co-managing Taiwan.” China’s strategy is still being readjusted. One question is, will Beijing take advantage of the US during its own election season to act belligerently, not just in the Taiwan Strait, but on US-China relations?

The chances of that happening is not high, because both Democrats and Republicans in the US see China as a rival. China’s actions will only give cause to American politicians to denounce China in a very visible manner for election gains.

In conclusion, although China will unlikely to enact any drastic measures against Taiwan in the near future, but China will still steadily drip pressure on Taiwan over the next four years that, on the whole, will be very overwhelming. China no longer hides its United Front schemes, and it does not hold any punches. Under continued DPP rule, China will only lean harder against Taiwan. After all, Xi has to satisfy internal demands at home, and make an example of Taiwan abroad.

The next four years will see China try to sow disunity in Taiwan, tighten its grip on the KMT, and entice the TPP into its hands. Internationally, it will create an illusion of peace by claiming that the US and China can manage Taiwan together. Lai has his work cut out for him, and he faces a fractured legislature at home. Before May 20th, China will prod the incoming Lai Administration to find weaknesses. How to respond to China’s onslaught of pressures is a question to which the government must have an answer, carefully, but quickly.

(Feature photo from Office of President Republic of China)