Reclaiming Narratives of Protest Against Contentious Parliament Reforms

This is a translation of the original 我們需要新世代的台灣民主論述 by Yu-fen Huang (黃毓芬), a political worker and a participant of the 2014 Sunflower Movement. Originally published by Voice Tank. Translation by Stacy Tang and Jasmine Lee.

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On the night of May 22, an article by Yuan Hongbing, a Professor of law and Chinese dissident, has been going viral on social media. Originally published in early February, the article details the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) plans to control the Legislative Yuan and influence the progression of Taiwanese society. Several YouTubers have quickly produced videos discussing this topic. Although the article went largely unnoticed upon its initial release, it has now gained significant traction. Its claims have been gradually validated in real life over the past few months, which is indeed spine-chilling.

After reading the article and watching the videos, it’s hard not to conclude that the current events in Taiwan and the Legislative Yuan were orchestrated by China to fulfill its agenda. This realization stirs anger, unease, and a strong desire to thwart this conspiracy immediately. While my voice may be small, I urge everyone to think carefully. It’s possible that the sudden surge of anti-China sentiment is also part of China’s intended outcome.

The protest narratives unfamiliar to the Chinese Communist Party: The essence of Taiwanese

The civil society movements around the Legislative Yuan on May 17th and May 21st, along with the narratives emerging from these movements, present a narrative that is entirely unfamiliar to the CCP. This narrative focuses on the essence of Taiwanese democracy and the vision for what Taiwan’s democracy should embody. Conversely, what the CCP is familiar with are the long-established narratives and frameworks, including the China-related factors extensively discussed since the Sunflower Movement in 2014, as well as the recent rhetoric of “resisting China to protect Taiwan.”

We must consider the possibility: Has the CCP been studying how Taiwanese society discusses China-related factors and practices the “resisting China to protect Taiwan” rhetoric for the past decade? Could the CCP have been exploring how to frame these issues, evoke resonance, and understand the constraints and limitations? If that’s the case, returning to familiar narratives frameworks and letting civil movements revert to past battlegrounds would allow CCP to dissipate social forces using previously effective responses that the CCP is familiar with. Having already tested and validated these methods, the CCP’s influence is apparent in the current composition of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan and local governments. Meanwhile, the Kuomintang and Taiwan People’s Party are also adapting and evolving their responses to the “China-related factors” within Taiwanese society.

Questionable responses from the Kuomintang and Taiwan People’s Party: Shifting the movement to inter-party conflicts

The most notable example occurred on May 23, when China announced its military exercises around Taiwan. In response, the Kuomintang issued a morning statement calling for “restraint from both sides of the strait, cessation of unnecessary actions to avoid conflicts in the Taiwan Strait, and cherishing the achievements of peaceful cross-strait development.” Simultaneously, the Taiwan People’s Party released a statement expressing “strong condemnation, as military harassment threatens stability in the Taiwan Strait and only serves to widen the gap between the two sides.”

However, looking back to 2022, when US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan and China conducted four days of military exercises around Taiwan, Taiwan People’s Party Chairperson Ko Wen-je urged the Tsai Ing-wen government to “reduce conflicts through dialogue.” Meanwhile, the Kuomintang announced a delegation led by Vice Chairman Andrew Hsia to visit China. Why did the Kuomintang and the Taiwan People’s Party undergo such a sudden change in attitude in just two years? Have they already communicated and reached agreements with each other, ensuring they wouldn’t be misunderstood and only needing to manage the battleground of Taiwan’s internal public opinion?

If the distinctions in attitudes toward China among the three major parties become increasingly blurred, a reassessment of past framing and narratives on these issues will be necessary. Otherwise, the evolving Kuomintang and Taiwan People’s Party could exploit these ambiguities to attack the ruling party, manipulating opposition and misinterpreting civil social movements as mere inter-party conflicts.

This is exactly what the CCP wants to see, as they already know how to respond and operate accordingly.

The true battleground: Shaping narratives and agendas at the heart of Taiwan’s democracy

We must remain vigilant about China’s influence and understand the importance of resisting it to protect Taiwan. However, we should not let this divide the valuable emerging social movements, nor should we use it to exclude others or dismiss new possibilities. This division is precisely what China aims to achieve.

We must acknowledge that Taiwan has undergone significant changes over the past decade. Today’s youth have their own unique perspectives on shaping and understanding the world. The energy from the Taiwan’s civil society are unfamiliar to China, and that are what China fears the most and what it most seeks to suppress.

The battlefield now lies in setting the agenda. We need fresh narratives to exemplify Taiwan’s democracy, to elucidate the essence of democracy itself. This stands as the most potent weapon of democratic societies against authoritarian regimes.