A Tale of Two Taiwans: Discourse Gaps on Taiwan Affairs between DC and Taipei – Part II

This is Part two of a three-part series, “A Tale of Two Taiwans.” In Part one, the author identifies the existing discourse gaps. In this part, the author continues to explore the drivers behind the “Taiwan discourse drift.”

***

There are many institutions, actors, and trends that are collectively driving Taiwan discourse in DC and Taipei, such as governments and think tanks, new and traditional forms of media, and domestic politics and elections. Three drivers that this author will highlight in brief are: agenda-setting authority, language barriers, and governmental structures. 

Agenda-setters: specialists or generalists?

Understanding Taiwan discourse drift between Washington and Taipei requires some attention to understanding the actors and institutions that are collectively setting the agenda on Taiwan affairs. In this author’s view, agenda-setting regarding Taiwan in Washington is oftentimes a contest between the Taiwan-specialist community that has specific and longstanding professional or academic interests in Taiwan – who usually also advocate for basing policy U.S. policy towards Taiwan on its own merits – and the region-agnostic community whose interests in Taiwan are expressed insofar as it intersects with other broader interests, such as U.S.-China relations, national defense, or geoeconomics. 

In this author’s view, there are not enough Taiwan specialists in organizational leadership positions setting the Taiwan discourse agenda; instead, Taiwan policy is still broadly led by generalists or by organizations that structurally de-center Taiwan from policy debates. While there are research organizations committing substantial expertise specifically on Taiwan affairs, such as the Global Taiwan Institute, these organizations still may not have as much influence on agenda-setting as other organizations. Taiwanese voices are also often left out of Taiwan discourse planning. “Agenda-setting is imagined or decided by Americans themselves, and local stakeholders are often left out of policy conversations,” notes Chiayo Kuo. “Taiwanese voices are very hard to be heard.” Even though there is an increasing number of U.S.-Taiwan scholarly and professional exchanges(1), such as fellowships at U.S. think tanks(2) for Taiwan scholars and the Taiwan Fellowship Program for U.S. government staff, these positions have limited authority in agenda-setting. If Taiwan specialists and Taiwanese voices are not able to assume positions of high visibility or programming authority, Taiwan discourse will continue to be driven by those with limited understanding of Taiwan affairs. 

Barriers in communication: language and industry

Related to agenda-setting, language barriers also drive Taiwan discourse drift. From her vantage point at CAPRI, the first Taipei-based international think tank, Caroline Fried, Interim Research Director at CAPRI, finds that language barriers between English- and Mandarin Chinese-language sources make it difficult “to get the local experience in Taiwan out to DC.” An important part of her work and other Taiwan specialists is to contextualize Mandarin-language discourse for English-speaking audiences, including researchers and policymakers outside of Taiwan. English language resources produced by Taiwan policy circles is still limited. Even though Taiwan has committed itself to the Bilingual 2030 policy, many Taiwan government websites have a “two Taiwans” dilemma themselves, in that their English language websites are often far less informative, robust, or data-rich than their Mandarin language versions. “To be a foreign researcher on Taiwan is very difficult,” observes Chiayo Kuo, because of these language and information asymmetries. 

In addition to the English-Chinese language barrier, another hurdle is the difference in industry language between Washington and Taipei. From the author’s own experience as a program administrator, Taiwan projects in Washington often have to be designed in a way that resonates with policy interests. In other words, every project on Taiwan, from public outreach to scholarship and professional development, has to be framed as contributing to Washington policy interests, typically dominated by security or geoeconomics. Adrienne Wu shares this experience, adding that “some fields in Taiwan affairs have a higher burden of proof to justify how they relate to international relations.” GTI’s podcast series Taiwan Salon, designed and hosted by Adrienne Wu, faced such initial hurdles in overcoming skepticism that a program dedicated to Taiwan’s soft power and cultural diplomacy could succeed in Washington. It can, and it does; with over 3,000 cumulative plays to this day, the small but growing podcast series shows that there are avenues to expand discourse on Taiwan among policy research communities.

Taiwan as a compartmentalized “subject” in U.S. bureaucracy

Another driver that this author finds understudied in public conversations on Taiwan affairs is the organizational structure of U.S. and Taiwan foreign policy agencies. John Tai notes that “policy perspectives and priorities are reflected in the organization and allocation of bureaucratic resources.” For the United States, we can see examples of its shifting policy perspective regarding Taiwan relations by observing changes in government offices that deal directly with Taiwan affairs. One is the creation of the “China House” in the Department of State. The creation of the Office of China Coordination was designed as a bureaucratic reorganization of the Department’s former China Desk, to increase informing-sharing and reduce resource siloing among U.S. government offices with equity in U.S.-China affairs, and to provide the U.S. government with a more nimble organizational mechanism to respond to foreign policy developments regarding China. 

What is revealing about this reorganization for Taiwan discourse is that the Office of Taiwan Coordination (TCO), the Department’s primary office directly working on Taiwan policy that was previously a separate office unit from the China desk, has been subsumed into the China House, and TCO now falls under the purview of the new Deputy Assistant Secretary for China and Taiwan, currently senior diplomat Mark Lambert. Several years ago, when this author was an intern for TCO in Washington, TCO played a similar function as the China House does now: leading coordination among Executive Branch agencies and offices on the U.S.’ Taiwan policy, as a unit separate from, though physically next to, the China Desk. From an institutional standpoint, this bureaucratic change may signify that while the Department wants to elevate agency-wide attention to China and Taiwan affairs, the Department considers its Taiwan policy coordination apparatus as a part of its broader China policy structure, and as such Taiwan discourse is structurally attached to China affairs rather than as a separate policy debate. In this way, Taiwan’s strategic value to the U.S. can be reflected by how the U.S. government designs its organizational structure to manage Taiwan affairs. As such, this structure also deepens the direction of Taiwan policy discourse in DC to frame Taiwan affairs as a component of, within, and critical to U.S.-China relations.  

The U.S. as penetrative priority in Taiwanese bureaucracy

Conversely, we can observe how Taiwan’s foreign policy bureaucracy reveals its strategic priorities. Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is the primary Executive agency conducting international outreach. Within Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the North American Division, responsible for management of Taiwan’s relations with the United States and Canada, is as John Tai notes, “the number one division in terms of prestige and ranking.” As MOFA’s organizational chart shows, there are four sections under the North American Division dedicated to U.S. policy, with the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) Task Force practically a fifth U.S. section because it started as a U.S.-Taiwan joint platform that has since expanded to include other organizing countries. No other country is given this much organizational commitment in MOFA; not even Japan (the closest runner-up with three) has such a bureaucratic footprint. 

Even more telling is that not one of MOFA’s sections listed are dedicated to any of Taiwan’s official diplomatic allies. From the author’s own interactions with MOFA, U.S. postings, and particularly TECRO in Washington, are among the agency’s most competitive positions and important for career advancement. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Taiwan’s representative office in DC – the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative’s Office (TECRO) – is one of if not the largest of MOFA’s missions, and TECRO’s top post is MOFA’s most prestigious appointment, arguably more so than its official ambassadorial appointments. Taiwan’s Representative in DC plays a key role in connecting U.S. and Taiwan discourse because they are often one of the few communication channels between Taiwan presidential administrations and DC policy communities. Posts in TECRO often lead to higher appointments in Taiwan’s government, perhaps best exemplified by the number of current and former senior MOFA officials, including outgoing Foreign Minister Joseph Wu, who were previously posted in TECRO. Another example, though arguably more of an anomaly, is Vice President-elect Bi-khim Hsiao, who served as Taiwan’s Representative in Washington prior to running with William Lai in the 2024 presidential election in Taiwan. 

However, MOFA, and particularly TECRO, are limited in shaping Taiwan discourse because they often must follow and adapt to shifts in U.S. policy interests. TECRO must constantly compete with other foreign actors to keep Taiwan relevant in DC policy circles, even now when Taiwan is more widely known in the United States. 

This structural asymmetry between the U.S. and Taiwan foreign policy bureaucracies contributes to discourse drift between both countries because while Taiwan is compartmentalized in very specific discussions in the U.S. government, the U.S. is a comprehensive intersectional subject across Taiwan government agencies.   

(1) Including the Taiwan-U.S. Policy Program, currently administered by the German Marshall Fund, and the Mosaic Taiwan Fellowship, administered by Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

(2) For example, the Wilson Center administers the Taiwan Scholar Program specifically to support Taiwanese scholars to live and work in Washington, D.C. during summer months. The Wilson Center also administers the Chiu Family Foundation Fellowship in Taiwan Studies for policy-relevant historical research.

This is Part two of a three-part series, “A Tale of Two Taiwans.” In this third part, the author looks into the opportunities to reduce the gap of the “Taiwan discourse drift.”

(Feature photo by Hugo_ob on pixabay)