Sino-Vatican Relations: The Bishop Appointment Process

On May 20, 2024, Lai Ching-te and Hsiao Bi-khim were inaugurated as the President and Vice President of the Republic of China (Taiwan). They welcomed the Holy See’s special envoy, Archbishop Charles John Brown, who is also the Apostolic Nuncio to the Philippines, at the Presidential Hall to congratulate the new government.

However, they soon met with speculation that the 82-year diplomatic ties between the Holy See and the Republic of China (Taiwan) might be at risk because of a milestone meeting “100 years since the Concilium Sinense: Between History and Present” on May 21st to commemorate the first and the only Council of the Chinese Catholic Church held in Shanghai in 1924.

Understanding the Vatican’s position

It’s time to stop the voices predicting the downfall of the ROC (Taiwan) and criticize the Holy See for “aiding authoritarian regimes.” Misunderstanding the Holy See’s efforts does not contribute to consolidating freedom and democracy allies.

The Vatican News reveals that Cardinal Parolin’s original statement is as follows:

“We are all interested in renewing (the provisional agreement on bishop appointments) and also developing some points. We hope to establish a stable presence in China. Even if initially it might not take the form of a pontifical representation or an apostolic nunciature, it could still increase and deepen our contacts. This is our goal.”

This is the purpose of the Holy See’s Secretariat of State in promoting negotiations with the People’s Republic of China. But why is a “stable presence” necessary during the experimental phase of the bishop appointment agreement? Is this “presence” a “permanent office,” as some media outlets have interpreted? And why would an announcement to create a permanent office be part of a renewal of the bishop appointment agreement?

The responsibilities of this office and pontifical legate, listed in the 1983 Code of Canon Law, as well as in the concordats/agreements signed between the Holy See and various countries.

Since 1965, the Holy See has signed a total of 38 concordats in the form of overarching/general agreements, with at least 30 of these agreements containing chapters regulating the appointment of bishops and local church positions.

Countries including Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Estonia, Poland, the Republic of Congo, Benin, and East Timor, etc., have such agreements with the Holy See. Although government interference is particularly significant in China, it is not the first country with which the Holy See has negotiated such agreements.

Those agreements’ chapter regarding bishop appointments are all adhere to three principles:

1. 1. The counterpart admits that the Holy See freely appoints church administrators according to the canon law.
   2. In certain difficult situations, the Holy See will consult with the counterpart about the candidates before making the announcement.
   3. Before making the appointment public, the Holy See, out of courtesy and confidentiality, will inform the government of the counterpart where the bishop will serve.

The Holy See relies on the pontifical legate to travel freely between the host country and Rome to meet the requirements of canon law regarding bishop appointments.

Canon Law Articles 377 to 380 stipulate the principles and practices of bishop appointments. It states: “whenever a bishop must be appointed,……the pontifical legate is to seek individually and to communicate to the Apostolic See together with his own opinion the suggestions of the metropolitan and suffragans of the province ……The pontifical legate, moreover, ……also to seek individually and in secret the opinion of others from both the secular and non-secular clergy and from laity outstanding in wisdom.”

Canon Law Article 364 also describes, “The principal function of a pontifical legate” is to “make stronger and more effective the bonds of unity which exist between the Apostolic See and particular churches.” The pontifical legate’s authority includes “transmit or propose to the Apostolic See the names of candidates and to instruct the informational process concerning those to be promoted, according to the norms given by the Apostolic See.” This involves presenting the list of candidates to the pope and conducting investigations on the candidates according to the pope’s set rules.

The Vatican’s concerns with China

The purpose of the Holy See’s “stable presence in China” or the expectation to establish a permanent office in China at this stage is to address the uncertainties of the Chinese Communist Party’s attitude towards religious freedom — currently friendly to the Holy See but potentially not permanently so. Therefore, the Holy See aims to use bilateral agreements to constrain the behavior of the CCP government.

Of course, the Holy See might also be aware that CCP has a history of breaking promises or maliciously interpreting agreements.

However, if the Holy See can solidify the pontifical legate’s rights to “seek individually and in secret the opinion of others from laity” through bilateral agreements, it could support the healthy development of the Catholic Church in China, at least by clarifying the actual situation of the Church in China.

This “stable presence” or “permanent office” is necessary for pastoral work at this stage and is not politically intended to advance diplomatic relations between the Holy See and the PRC.

Nonetheless, would a mutual understanding between the Holy See and the PRC lead to better relations? The answer is yes.

The Holy See has established diplomatic relations with over 190 countries globally, including the ROC (Taiwan). Developing good relations with the remaining few countries is also fundamental to the mission of evangelization.

The Holy See is concerned about the PRC and, naturally, about the approximately 12 million Chinese Catholics. If the timing and circumstances are appropriate, for the sake of goodwill and respect, we can reasonably speculate that the Holy See would not rule out seeking diplomatic relations with the PRC—-but it is yet to be seen how much the Holy See will do that at the cost of potentially losing Taiwan.

However, I believe the Holy See would also desire the ROC (Taiwan) to respond with more “Catholic-friendly” goodwill towards the pope, the Holy See’s Secretariat of State, and all Catholics concerned about Taiwan-Vatican relations.

The Catholic population in Taiwan is only about 300,000, indeed a minority. However, the outstanding contributions of Catholic private schools, social services, and medical services are recognized and positively evaluated by the government and society.

What more can Taiwanese do to benefit the Catholic Church and help ROC (Taiwan) and the Holy See, as two friends, walk further together? This is something the ROC (Taiwan) government urgently needs to consider.