Youth TPP Support Explained: A Shift from China to Domestic Economic Concerns

This article was originally published by Global Taiwan Institute in its weekly newsletter, The Global Taiwan Brief, Vol. 9, Issue 15. Used with permission. To get the Global Taiwan Brief in your inbox every week, subscribe at globaltaiwan.org/subscribe. Lillian Ellis is a Summer 2024 intern at the Global Taiwan Institute.

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Following Taiwan’s election this January, scholars focused their analysis on the surprising success of the Taiwan’s People’s Party (TPP, 民眾黨)—the once-fringe, third party in Taiwan  that managed to secure an impressive eight seats in the legislature. TPP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) received 26.5 percent of the vote. “It looks like over 20 percent of Taiwanese support the TPP,” GTI Advisor Shelley Rigger said in a post-election analysis piece for Brookings. “They voted for its presidential candidate, and they voted for its party list.”

The impressive success of the TPP within this election cycle can largely be attributed to the party’s strong youth support. Youth support of the TPP primarily stems from the party’s strong messaging surrounding Taiwan’s domestic economic conditions—conditions that young voters feel establishment leaders have failed to address. While the TPP’s economic platform does not differ significantly from that of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民進黨) or the Kuomintang (KMT, 國民黨) and despite the fact that Taiwan’s economy remains in healthy ranges at domestic and international levels, youth are increasingly frustrated with rising costs, inflation, and wage stagnation. These domestic economic issues have taken the forefront of TPP messaging, as relations with China are viewed as less of a priority.

Taiwan’s youth make up a large portion of eligible voters in Taiwan, making their voter base an increasingly important one. At least a fourth of Taiwan’s eligible voters are between the ages of 20 and 40—including one million first time voters in the recent elections who are aged 20 to 23. Furthermore, several analyses leading up to January’s election described the youth vote as having the potential to swing the presidential election. Taiwan’s youth, and their growing disapproval of traditional DPP and KMT politics, should therefore be carefully considered by analysts, leaders, and future candidates as they remain a crucial voter base in Taiwan—and as they increasingly value economic concerns over cross-Strait issues.

Taiwan’s Global and Domestic Economic Overview

While Taiwan’s inflation and unemployment rates at the macro level remain in healthy ranges for the country’s growth, young voters increasingly view the domestic economic situation as a top concern. Within the global context, Taiwan’s economic outlook remains strong. Due to a global increase in exports during the pandemic, Taiwan’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth in 2021 reached an impressive 6.6 percent. While GDP growth has slowed in recent years, dropping as low as 1.4 percent in 2023, growth has generally followed global trends—which makes sense given Taiwan’s economic reliance on trade. Analysis of Taiwan’s economy globally is generally hopeful for 2024, with consumer price index (CPI) growth—a common measure of inflation—projected to decrease. While Taiwan’s GDP growth mirrors global trends, domestic economic trends have stirred up frustration among Taiwan’s voters—particularly among young workers and students in Taipei.

At the micro level, increased prices, unemployment, and wage stagnation are seen as persistent issues. Most recently, Taiwan’s Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS, 行政院主計總處) announced a CPI growth forecast of 2.03 percent for 2024—a significant increase from its original 1.6 percent growth prediction—due to an 11 percent increase in electricity rates. This February, prices of goods in Taiwan grew by their highest rates since August 2022. Over a third of low-wage workers are younger than 30 years old, and analysts pointed out that wage growth in 2023 failed to keep up with the pace of inflation.

Despite Taiwan’s relative success on the global economic stage, Taiwan’s youth remain frustrated with domestic economic conditions—and these are frustrations that the TPP continues to successfully leverage.

Youth Frustrations and the TPP Platform

Frustration with how establishment leaders have handled these issues, combined with the TPP’s strong messaging on economic concerns—especially on social media—continues to leverage youth support. “There’s this anger against the DPP for failing to address these long standing economic issues that face Taiwan,” Brian Hioe, a Taiwanese political commentator for New Bloom Magazine, told the BBC. The TPP as a party benefits from their anti-establishment messaging and their lack of a political record. The TPP, able to recognize its unique position as an alternative option, has focused its messaging on anti-establishment rhetoric. Having a third party “can be exciting for young people who want a more anti-establishment platform,” Liu Wen, a researcher at Academia Sinica, told AP News in January.

TPP messaging throughout last year’s election was extremely successful. Soochow University in Taipei conducted a December 2023 poll in which 33.9 percent of undergraduate students reported favoring Ko, while 22.1 percent preferred the DPP’s Lai Ching-te (賴清德). The DPP’s Formosa Faction (美麗島系) released a December 2023 survey that reported that 40 percent of respondents aged 20-29 supported Ko, while 31.6 percent supported Lai and 19.7 percent backed the KMT’s Hou Yu-ih (侯友宜).

The TPP’s economic platform itself is not wildly different from DPP and KMT policies. For instance, the TPP’s “housing justice” policies, including increasing the number of social housing units especially for youth and elderly populations, mirrors almost entirely the language of DPP and KMT housing platforms. The TPP’s housing platform, as written online, describes economic issues of low wages and increased inflation—but does not explicitly summarize a clear solution to these conditions. During presidential debates, candidates from all three parties primarily spent time debating the progress of social housing goals—as opposed to the existence of the policies themselves.

Still, the content of specific TPP policies appears to be independent from the success of the party’s messaging. As long as the TPP’s social media platforms continue to vocalize frustrations about Taiwan’s economy, youth will remain connected to Ko and his party’s platform. Ko has emphasized economic priorities as a large part of his campaign, frequently posting videos on Instagram of him visiting supporters struggling to pay rent, find work, and get food on the table. “When you eat ice cream, you must lick the lid, when you eat pudding, you must lick the seal completely clean (你吃冰淇淋，一定要舔上蓋；你吃布丁，封膜舔得乾乾淨淨),” he wrote in a September Instagram post before emphasizing his commitment to alleviating economic anxieties. Ko has 1.2 million Instagram followers and hundreds of thousands of followers on TikTok, both platforms where he continues to publish political messages to his young audience. “It’s really nice to see that Taiwan still has level-minded politicians (看到台灣還有頭腦清醒的政治人物實在覺得欣慰),” read a popular comment on a recent Ko post about DPP political and economic failures.

A Dwindling China Priority

Although the TPP ultimately lost the presidential race, the party’s lasting ability to successfully connect with Taiwan’s youth and acquire eight seats in the legislature represents a growing prioritization of domestic economic concerns over cross-Strait issues from Taiwan’s youth. Young people in Taiwan, while not forgetful of China’s threat, have chosen—through their support of the TPP—to prioritize economic concerns. Ahead of the 2024 election, a Commonwealth Magazine survey that included 15,000 Taiwanese respondents found that economic development was the most important issue among voters, over national security and cross-Strait relations. This answer was especially prominent among respondents aged between 20 and 39.

This is not to say that the China issue is completely disregarded by Taiwan’s youth. Youth in Taiwan between the ages of 20 and 44 continue to overwhelmingly support an independent Taiwan, according to a September 2023 Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF, 財團法人台灣民意基金會) poll. However, increasingly, young voters in Taiwan have emphasized that domestic economic conditions should be prioritized. Henry Su, a 19-year-old student at National Taiwan University (NTU, 國立台灣大學), told AP News in January that he was “disappointed” with the DPP’s prioritization of the China threat over concerns surrounding high costs of living.

While the TPP has not disregarded cross-Strait relations either, TPP messaging surrounding relations with China is extremely neutral—appealing to youth favoring a prioritization of domestic issues. Frequently using analogies from his experience as a surgeon and describing China as a “tumor” that Taiwan should learn to live with, Ko describes China as an issue to be managed but not removed. “There’s no point in even talking about unification or independence right now because you can’t achieve either,” he said in a September interview with Bloomberg TV. The TPP’s relatively neutral stance on the China issue appeals to youth frustrated with a perceived over-prioritization of cross-Strait relations.

Youth Legislative Reform Protests

Even though young people in Taiwan remain connected with the TPP online, TPP youth support has yet to be entirely solidified as evidenced by recent legislative reform protests. Tens of thousands of Taiwanese citizens protested outside the Legislative Yuan multiple times in late May, opposing TPP and KMT legislative expansion bills that passed on May 28. [Many of these protests included high school and college students](https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/22/asia/taiwan-protest-parliament-reform-intl-hnk/index.html#:~:text=World %2F Asia-,Taiwan’s youth protest plans by lawmakers favoring closer,to tighten scrutiny of president&text=Protesters hold up umbrellas in,government on May 21%2C 2024.), some even carrying sunflowers in homage to the 2014 Sunflower Movement. “No dialogue, no democracy” was one of the chants repeated by the young crowd on May 21 as they opposed the KMT and TPP’s fast tracking of the legislation.

This recent push against TPP legislative actions demonstrates that youth support of the TPP is contingent on the TPP’s ability to vocalize their economic concerns, and born out of frustrations with how DPP and KMT leaders have handled issues related to the economy. The TPP itself, as recent protests have shown, has not completely won over Taiwan’s youth. Instead, it is more likely that the TPP enjoyed youth popularity through the circumstances of its rise and its successful messaging surrounding economic concerns.

Conclusion

As young people in Taiwan continue to experience high costs of living, low wages, and frustrations with the DPP and KMT establishment, young voters have echoed disapproval of what they perceive to be an over-prioritization of the China issue in Taiwanese politics. Although Taiwan’s youth have already become critical of the TPP’s actions in the Legislative Yuan, their overwhelming support of the party this January due to the TPP’s successful messaging on economic issues is crucial to consider. Additionally, the TPP has continued to build a strong social media presence online. As Ko wrote in a May Instagram post: “You can not let the Democratic Progressive Party become the democratic regressive party, you can not continue to use an arrogant attitude to create division, intensify confrontation, and worsen Taiwan’s problems such as low wages, inflation, high rent and housing prices, and power shortages (你不可以讓民主進步黨變成民主退步黨、不可以繼續用傲慢的態度製造分裂、激化對立，惡化台灣的低薪、通膨、高房租高房價、缺電等種種問題).”

The TPP maintains a strong connection with their young followers online, discouraging support of DPP and KMT policies while emphasizing the need to prioritize domestic economic issues over the China threat. The TPP’s success in harnessing the concerns of young Taiwanese should be closely watched by scholars and politicians as the party continues to inspire the youth vote—especially as Taiwan’s parties have already begun strategizing for their 2026 local campaigns.

The main point: The TPP continues to harness youth support as frustration with economic conditions and DPP and KMT leadership grows. As a result, within TPP messaging, relations with China have been put on the back burner in order to emphasize rhetoric intended to appeal to Taiwanese youth: The perceived failure of DPP and KMT leaders to combat low wages, high costs, and increased inflation.

(Featured photo from TPP Facebook page)