
This is a translation of the original 小草會成為政治移民還是政治難民 by Hong-chih Kuo (郭宏治), a journalist and columnist. Originally published by Voice Tank. Translation by Stacy Tang.
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Ko Wen-je’s campaign donations scandal has become the biggest political crisis in his decade-long career. His long-held dream of becoming president might turn into a mirage as the party he founded, the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), falls apart and Ko himself might even end up behind bars. In the wake of this scandal, the most pressing question is: will his supporters, the “Little Grass,” abandon him? Will they become “political migrants” and shift their support to the two major parties, the KMT or the DPP?
The origin of the “Little Grass” concept
The term “Little Grass” was originally introduced by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In 2014, the DPP launched the “Democratic Little Grass” initiative to encourage young people to run in local elections and help the party build a grassroots network. Nearly a decade later, in early 2023, Ko Wen-je adopted this concept in a music video during his Baishatun Mazu pilgrimage, using the song Little Grass as the background music. The song was composed by someone nicknamed “Restaurant Waiter” and performed by someone nicknamed “Obnoxious Restaurant Customer.” The lyrics go:
I live in my own world
I gaze at the faintly lit, empty night sky
They look at me like I’m an idiot
I also think I’m quite an idiot
…
I’m a little grass, never to be knocked down
Living day by day, moving step by step
Even if I’m looked down upon, even if I’m a joke
No matter what happens
Injustice, sadness, sorrow
…
This song praises Ko P (Ko Wen-je’s nickname) for persistently moving forward step by step, even when made fun of (in reality it is Ko Wen-je who often looks down on others, and thinks more highly of himself than anyone else). Perhaps the song resonates with many young people who feel misunderstood by the world but still want to be part of it. In this music video, Ko P is portrayed as someone these young people can relate to, someone who understands them, making him the bridge between the “Little Grass” and the broader world. Ko’s campaign staff even described him as the youth’s “political first love.”
In the final stages of the election in December, Ko’s campaign made “Little Grass” a central theme. They organized meet-and-greet events with Ko Wen-je and his “Little Grass” supporters, calling on young people to “become resilient little grass.” These young Ko supporters proudly declared, “We are Little Grass, and we will grow strong in adversity.” On January 12, the night before the election, Ko Wen-je rallied the “Little Grass” at Ketagalan Boulevard in front of the Presidential Office. The rally was packed with young “Little Grass” supporters and, compared to the crowds for Lai Ching-te and Hou You-yi, the average age of the participants at Ko’s event was noticeably younger by at least a decade.
Ko Wen-je captured the hearts of young voters
Tsai Ing-wen’s two presidential victories demonstrate her strong appeal among young voters. Her 2020 win, which set a record with 8.17 million votes, became known as the “Tsai Ing-wen ceiling,” driven significantly by the enthusiasm of young and first-time voters. In the 2016 election, the turnout rate among 20 to 40-year-olds was 57.5%. By 2020, the DPP’s strong push for young people to return home and vote boosted the turnout rate for those under 40 to 71.5%, showing that young voters played a crucial role.
For the 2024 election, the Central Election Commission reports that there are 6.07 million voters under 40, accounting for about a third of all eligible voters, making this group a key battleground for all three parties. Compared to Lai Ching-te and Hou You-yi, Ko Wen-je’s image did resonate more with younger voters. In late 2023, mock presidential elections at seven high schools, including the elite Jianguo High School, Tainan First Senior High School, and Kaohsiung Senior High School showed that Ko Wen-je won nearly 60% of the votes, while Lai Ching-te received less than 30%.
But the Taiwan People’s Party’s (TPP) post-election data on party members’ age distribution shows that among the roughly 32,000 members, the largest age group is 31 to 40 years old, making up 38% of the membership. This is followed by those aged 41 to 50 at 27%, 21 to 30 at 19%, 51 to 60 at 10%, 61 to 70 at 3%, 16 to 20 at 2%, and over 71 at 1%. The share of young people under 30 is not the highest, and first-time voters in their 20s remain a minority within the party. The TPP actually uses this data to refute claims that they are “infiltrating campuses.”
Young voters are generally less interested in actively participating in party activities or officially joining a political party. Ko Wen-je’s team, however, has mastered the use of social media to engage with young people in a language they understand, especially through Ko’s “no filters” style that feels fresh and relatable to them, rather than old-fashioned. Consequently, even if not all “Little Grass” supporters formally join the TPP, they are likely to cast their votes to support Ko Wen-je and his party.
Winning the young people to shape future generations
From another perspective, even though young voters have supported Tsai Ing-wen and backed Ko Wen-je, the 2024 presidential election results show that Ko Wen-je lost to Hou You-yi and Lai Ching-te by 900,000 and 1.8 million votes respectively. These gaps are too large to be filled by the “Little Grass” alone. Even if all first-time voters in 2024 voted Ko Wen-je, it would not have been enough to win the election. When considering the overall demographic structure, voters under 40 are less than half the number of those over 40, and they also have lower turnout rate. Therefore, young voters are not the most decisive factor in determining the election outcome.
However, cultivating young voters is not just to win one or two elections; it’s about shaping the political inclinations of an entire generation for decades to come. This is a long-term investment. While people’s political preferences may evolve as people age, certain core values, once established, are difficult to change. If the TPP can establish a strong rapport with young voters now, it would be a crucial asset for its long-term political development.
However, before the “Little Grass” grow into big trees, they are still forming their identify, making them fickle and easily swayed. Their disillusionment with the TPP and Ko Wen-je did not start with the recent campaign donation scandal. The TPP’s collaboration with the KMT in the current legislature, under the guise of “parliamentary reform,” has led to many anti-democratic actions, dampening the enthusiasm of the “Little Grass.” For instance, on May 19, when Ko Wen-je, Huang Kuo-chang, and other TPP leaders called for the “Little Grass” to take to the streets, only around 8,000 showed up—a stark contrast to the 100,000 who gathered on Qingdao East Road during protests against the inappropriate expansion of legislative powers. The turnout likely raised concerns among Ko Wen-je and TPP leadership, who are known for their political acumen.
The Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation’s long-term national survey reports show that TPP support dropped by only 2.2% immediately after the campaign donations scandal, likely because the survey was conducted before the scandal’s impact was fully felt. However, a steady decline in TPP support is evident from March to August, with figures dropping steadily from 19.2%, 18.6%, 18.2%, 14.3%, 16%, to 13.8%. The most significant drop occurred in May and June, coinciding with the clashes between the ruling and opposition party over proposed revisions to expand the Legislative Yuan’s authority.
Huang Kuo-chang cannot replace Ko Wen-je, yet
The recent political donations scandal has revealed that the TPP’s organizational structure is incomplete. Efforts to build a grassroots presence in central and southern Taiwan have yet to yield results, and the party has failed in regional legislative elections across the island.
At present, the TPP remains a one-person party centered around Ko Wen-je, with the connection between “Little Grass” supporters and the party primarily rooted in Ko himself. The party does have Huang Kuo-chang, another well-known politician popular with the “Little Grass;” however when he abandoned the New Power Party (NPP) he co-founded to join the TPP, he announced a pledge he made with Ko on November 8 last year that he will not interfere with party leadership, which is to be headed by Ko and Ko alone.”
Unless Huang decides to break with Ko, he will be bound by this promise, making it difficult for him to replace Ko. Additionally, the admiration that “Little Grass” supporters have for Ko is unlikely to easily transfer to Huang.
A decade ago, young voters placed their hopes in the New Power Party, a party made up of people who rose to fame from the Sunflower Movement in 2014. However, after Huang Kuo-chang departed, the once third-largest party in the Legislative Yuan nearly vanished and now struggles to surpass the 3% party vote threshold to survive. Young voters have turned away from the NPP. If Ko Wen-je’s relationship with the TPP mirrors Huang Kuo-chang’s with the NPP, and if Ko’s political credibility continues to deteriorate, the TPP could face a similar collapse.
The “Little Grass” supporters could become political migrants or refugees in an blink of an eye
Ogasawara Yoshiyuki, an honorary professor at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies and a renowned expert on Taiwanese politics known for his accurate election predictions, has forecasted that “the TPP Chairman Ko Wen-je’s challenge to overturn the two major political parties has come to an end. Taiwan’s political landscape may revert back to a traditional two-party system.” If this prediction proves accurate, will Ko Wen-je’s “Little Grass” supporters shift to the blue and green camps as political migrants, or will they become political refugees, awaiting the rise of a “new political love?”
Currently, neither the blue nor green camps have charismatic leaders who can truly captivate the “Little Grass” supporters, leaving them potentially lost in the short term. However, with two years until the next election, many external factors could influence young voters’ political identities during this time. More importantly, movements such as the Losheng Sanatorium Movement, Wild Strawberries Movement, Wild Lily Student Movement, and Bluebird Movement demonstrate young people’s remarkable ability to seize the moment and drive new discussions —an influence that the elites in political establishments cannot overlook. The lost “Little Grass” supporters may yet lead their own era of revolution.
(Featured photo from TPP Facebook page)
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