Without Punishment, China Cannot Be Deterred

This article was originally published by Global Taiwan Institute in its weekly newsletter, The Global Taiwan Brief, Vol. 9, Issue 18. Used with permission. To get the Global Taiwan Brief in your inbox every week, subscribe at globaltaiwan.org/subscribe. Kevin Sun was a Summer 2024 intern at the Global Taiwan Institute.

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On May 23, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) launched a series of military drills around Taiwan as a response to the inauguration of Taiwan’s new president. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) naval vessels and warplanes were sent into the air and waters surrounding Taiwan. The drill, dubbed Joint Sword—2024A, ran for two days—and based on its name, had the potential for follow up exercises. (For further discussion of the Joint Sword 2024A exercises, see “The PLA’s Inauguration Gift to President Lai: The Joint Sword 2024A Exercise” by John Dotson and Jonathan Harman.) Such military force demonstrations have been the trend since August 2022, following the visit to Taiwan by then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi (see here and here); and following the meeting between then-Speaker Kevin McCarthy and former President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) in 2023 (see here).

The current Taiwan Strait situation has proven that the long-standing US strategy of deterrence by denial is not working against China, and that Beijing is now questioning the credibility of the United States. Therefore, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, 中國共產黨) will continue to squeeze Taiwan with more military exercises and further undermine its sovereignty.

China’s military aggression against Taiwan is nothing new. However, unlike the current crisis, the previous three Taiwan Strait Crises ultimately ended with China pulling its military back and ending the crisis. The security environment of the earlier crises was different because at that time the Chinese military was much weaker than the United States military. However, current circumstances are far different—and as China has consistently secured small advantages in the region that have gone unpunished, Washington needs to adjust its deterrence strategy to one of punishment instead of denial.

How the Previous Taiwan Strait Crises Came to an End

In 1954, during the first Taiwan Strait Crisis, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA, 中國人民解放軍) was able to occupy Yijiangshan (一江山島) and Dachen (大陳諸島) Islands. Yijiangshan, a nearly unnoticeable offshore island, was attacked by the PLA to probe Washington’s commitment to protecting the offshore islands. Once Yijiangshan was occupied by the PLA, the CCP leaders set their sights on Dachen. However, the US Navy Seventh Fleet’s presence in the strait caused the CCP to hesitate, as they did not wish to directly attack United States forces. Mao Zedong (毛澤東) reportedly instructed PRC Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai (彭德懷) that the Zedong Front Command should “let the enemy evacuate safely,” and to not involve the United States in the Yijiangshan-Dachen Campaign. [1] Once Dachen was fully evacuated, the PLA occupied the empty islands—all without attacking the United States. Still, despite these strategic gains by the PLA, due to other factors—such as the limited objective of probing Washington’s commitment, concerns of provoking a large military conflict with the United States, fear of a US nuclear counterattack, and uncertainty of Soviet support for the CCP’s campaign in the Taiwan Strait—the CCP leaders found themselves seeking a diplomatic solution to the Taiwan Strait Crisis and reducing tension in the region. [2]

The ROC Navy vessel Chung Hai (中海號) in drydock following damage from a torpedo hit sustained during the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. (Image source: Wikimedia Commons)

During the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958, the CCP was uncertain whether the islands of Kinmen (金門縣) and Matsu (連江縣) were included in the mutual defense treaty between the United States and the Republic of China (Taiwan). As a result, the PLA started shelling these islands to determine whether the United States was willing to hold them. Additionally, the CCP wanted to observe the international response to such an action before “deciding their next move.” [3] The United States also faced pressure when deciding how best to defend the offshore islands, and US forces weighed the dilemma of whether to sacrifice the islands, thereby losing influence and prestige—or whether to hold the islands through the limited use of nuclear weapons. US decision-makers unanimously chose the latter. Later, with President Dwight Eisenhower’s approval, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made this following statement: 

“[S]ecuring and protecting Quemoy and Matsu have increasingly become related to the defense of Taiwan. […] Military dispositions have been made by the United States so that a Presidential determination, if made, would be followed by action both timely and effective.” [4]

This statement psychologically prepared the American public for a possible conflict involving the offshore islands, as well as acting as a deterrent for the CCP. CCP leaders knew that they could not win against the United States in a confrontation; they were also unsure of the extent of Soviet commitment, and they understood the power of nuclear weapons. This uncertainty made US threats credible, and the CCP leaders were again at the negotiating table, finally ending the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. [5]

The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis came much later: in 1996, following the White House’s decision to approve then-President Lee Teng-hui’s (李登輝) application for a visa, and the US arms sale of 150 F-16s to Taiwan—which the CCP viewed as an act to change the military balance in Taiwan’s favor. China conducted a dramatic show of force consisting of military exercises and missile tests targeted near Taiwan. The United States responded to China’s aggression by deploying two carrier strike groups into the region—which, to CCP leaders, was a reminder of the “Century of Humiliation” they suffered under imperialist gunboats in the later 19^th and early 20^th centuries. CCP leaders, knowing that they couldn’t win in a direct confrontation, felt humiliated and were convinced that a mainland-Taiwan conflict would compel the United States to intervene.  Once again, the United States successfully deterred the CCP from further aggression. [6]

Why Is Deterrence Not Working Now?

The previous Taiwan Strait crises were de-escalated due to Beijing perceiving Washington’s threats as credible, and believing that they could not face the United States in a direct confrontation. Nearly thirty years have passed since the last crisis, and the region’s security environment has changed drastically. The CCP has a modernized military and has assumed many small advantages through its salami-slicing operations to control territory in the South China Sea. Moreover, the United States has become entangled with other ongoing conflicts, making CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping (習近平) believe that China cannot be deterred by denial.

After Xi stepped into power, all branches of the Chinese military saw rapid modernization. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF, 中國人民解放軍空軍) put in service both the Chengdu J20 Mighty Dragon and the Wing Loong II (in 2017 and 2018, respectively). The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN, 中國人民解放軍海軍) now possesses the largest navy in the world based on numbers of ships. In the recent Department of Defense (DoD) report to Congress, China operates the world’s largest navy, army, rocket force, civilian fleet, and industrial base, [7] making deterrence by denial ever more unrealistic as China’s military develops.

The major weakness of deterrence by denial is that determining its effectiveness is difficult, and it is up to the intended target to decide whether it is deterred. Even if the desired effect is achieved, it is also difficult to tell whether the measures implemented have deterred the unwanted action, or if another factor prevented the undesirable action. Therefore, a significant amount of time and resources can be spent on an ineffective measure that will fail in the long run. In the situation regarding the CCP’s ambitions for Taiwan, previous deterrence efforts worked because China could not face the United States in a confrontation. However, now—with its modernized military and a determined political leader—China can refuse to be deterred.

Since the United States’ commitment to defending Taiwan is ambiguous, it leaves room for Beijing to doubt US credibility. US strategic ambiguity does not communicate commitment to China: the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) did not explicitly declare that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense, and was also intended to act as a double deterrence for both China and Taiwan. However, the security environment has changed since 1979, and China has become a more competent adversary. For the United States to successfully deter China, it needs to be unambiguous in its commitment to defending Taiwan. To show commitment to Taiwan’s defense, the United States should advise and assist Taiwan in creating a genuine asymmetric defense posture, clear the arms backlog of USD $19.7 billion, and leverage its regional allies to also participate in the defense of Taiwan—all while dissuading Taiwan from pursuing capabilities that are ill-suited for the island’s defense.

Furthermore, where the United States draws the red line for China is also problematic. Washington signals to China that they will intervene if Taiwan were to be invaded, but it leaves a lot of gray area in which the CCP can operate. This allows the CCP to salami slice and inch closer to the red line without facing any consequences, while Washington and Taipei continue to downplay the CCP’s actions. The CCP becomes more prepared and more dangerous after every slice it takes, while the situation does not improve for Taiwan. If the United States does not punish the CCP for every slice, then it cannot deliver a credible threat.

Lastly, the perception of the United States’ efforts being spread too thin also makes Beijing question US ability to aid Taiwan in case of an invasion. Currently, with the United States’ continued support of Ukraine in the struggle against Russia, the United States has provided Ukraine with USD $175 billion in weapons, training, humanitarian aid, and budget support. Two years have passed, and that war is still dragging on. With the addition of the Israel-Hamas conflict, Washington is engaged in seeking an end to two conflicts—which signals to Beijing that Washington is unable to quickly end a conflict. The CCP’s perception of a weakening US military, when paired with the policy of strategic ambiguity that the United States is trying to maintain, has resulted in a security environment where the United States can no longer deliver a credible threat to deter China as it has in the previous three Taiwan Strait Crises.

The main point: China is no longer deterred by the denial strategy the United States is implementing. CCP leaders have found a way to operate in the gray zone, becoming better prepared while the United States continues to downplay the looming threat. Washington needs to pursue a strategy in which the United States can punish the CCP every time it tries to inch closer to the redline of attacking Taiwan.

[1] Zhang, Shu Guang. Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949–1958. Cornell University Press, 1992. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctvv415k7.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Felix Belair. Jr., “U. S. DECIDES TO USE FORCE IF REDS INVADE QUEMOY; DULLES SEES EISENHOWER; PEIPING IS WARNED LeMay Begins Flight to Far East — Stops Include Taiwan U. S. TO USE FORCE TO SAVE QUEMOY,” The New York Times, September 5, 1958.

[4] Zhao, Xuegong. “The Limits of Confrontation: Nuclear Weapons, the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, and China-U.S. Relations.” Journal of Cold War Studies 25, no. 2 (2023): 118. muse.jhu.edu/article/900750.

[5] Ibid., p. 112-149.

[6] Ross, Robert S. 2000. “The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force.” International Security 25 (2): 87–123. https://doi.org/10.1162/016228800560462.

[7] Department of Defense. 2023. “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.” October 19, 2023. https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

(Featured photo by AP)