Trump 2.0’s Strong Comeback and Taiwan’s Strategic Options – Part I

This is Part one of a three-part series, a translation of the original 川普2.0強勢回歸與台灣的對應選擇 by I-Chung Lai (賴怡忠), a journalist and columnist. Originally published by Voice Tank. Translation by Stacy Tang.

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Eyes on America: the world watches the US election

The world watched closely the US presidential election on November 5, as Trump and Kamala Harris held vastly different views on a wide range of foreign policy and economic issues. If Harris was expected to continue Biden administration policies, a Trump return would mean significant changes based on his record from 2017 to 2021.

Trump generally sees many of America’s democratic allies as benefiting at the expense of the US and has previously threatened to, and indeed imposed, high tariffs to force rivals into submission. This was especially evident in his trade war with China, which continues to impact global trade. Therefore, traditional allies like NATO, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, as well as nations like China that have felt the sting of Trump’s trade policies, are all watching his return as a major variable for US relations and global issues.

Kamala Harris was widely regarded as a more predictable candidate than Trump, which offers reassurance to traditional US allies. Even China, America’s primary competitor, while not expecting improved US-China relations under her leadership, viewed Harris as someone likely to follow established norms. Therefore, a Harris presidency may have likely prevented US-China relations from worsening much beyond their current level.

Ukraine is among the countries most anxious about a Trump victory. The worry centers on whether Trump would bypass Ukraine to negotiate directly with Russia, pressuring Ukraine into unfavorable concessions. Additionally, Trump’s national security advisors have emphasized that “Taiwan is a higher priority than Ukraine” or that “the US should shift focus from supporting Ukraine to countering China.” This urgency was reflected in Ukraine’s recent actions—while defending fiercely in the Donbas, it also launched operations in Russia’s Kursk region. Such actions appear to be aimed at strengthening Ukraine’s leverage in case a Trump presidency pressures Ukraine into peace negotiations.

However, if there’s one leader and country eagerly anticipating a Trump victory, it would be Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Trump’s relationship with Netanyahu has been remarkably strong, with his support for Israel unmatched by any recent US administration. As Kamala Harris’s campaign momentum faded, Netanyahu has seized the opportunity to escalate his offensive against Iran-backed forces in the Middle East. Bolstered by the belief that Trump will once again offer staunch support, and perceiving Biden as a lame-duck president, Netanyahu is actively reshaping the region’s geopolitical dynamics, focusing on eliminating Iran-aligned threats.

US and Japan’s Political Upheavals in the Post-Tsai era

For Taiwan, this is a time of significant political change in both of its most important allies, the US and Japan. In the US, a leadership transition could bring profound shifts, while in Japan the ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party and Komeito narrowly retained control despite not winning a majority in the House of Representatives. The ruling coalition stayed in power primarily because opposition forces could not consolidate a majority. This fragile minority rule is expected to continue until Japan’s House of Councillors election next July. If the ruling coalition loses its majority there as well, a change in the prime minister—or even a full turnover of ruling parties—could be on the horizon.

These changes shake the foundation that has anchored Taiwan’s foreign policy over the past eight years, where steady US-Japan relations served as a reliable compass under President Tsai Ing-wen. With both the US and Japan entering a phase of uncertainty, Taiwan may now need to establish new strategic coordinates to guide its national security and diplomatic policies forward.

Key moments to watch in 2025

With Trump’s re-election now confirmed, the period from November 5, when the election concludes, to January 20 next year, when Trump assumes office, will effectively place the US in a caretaker state. The stark contrast between Biden’s administration and Trump’s team on international priorities and threat assessments almost guarantees that this transition will be a time when US decision-making is particularly vulnerable to paralysis. National security officials have previously expressed concerns that adversaries like China might exploit such transitional windows to provoke or even alter the status quo. For instance, former CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell and retired Admiral James Winnefeld, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, once warned in US Naval Institute Proceedings that China could potentially seize a similar transition period to launch a rapid assault and capture Taiwan within three days.

Additionally, after the new US administration assumes office, most political appointments such as positions in the State Department, Department of Defense, and other agencies will require Senate hearings. Although the Republican Party holds both the presidency and Senate, which should make the process relatively smooth, this process typically takes over four months. As a result, major appointees are expected to assume their roles only after May. Critical roles—such as the Under Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of State, Assistant Secretaries, and Deputy Assistant Secretaries in both the Defense and State Departments —will gradually be confirmed around that time.

This indicates that the new administration’s political leadership will initially rely heavily on National Security Council officials (who do not require Senate confirmation) and on career officials who remain in their positions across departments. As a result, substantial policy reviews and new initiatives may only begin after May. Japan, for instance, leveraged a similar transitional period in 2020 to engage proactively with the incoming Trump administration, successfully convincing the US to adopt Abe’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy.

However, with Japan currently under a minority government and preparing for the House of Councillors election, its focus will largely be on political maneuvers related to that election, leaving limited resources to dedicate to US-Japan relations. Although Ishiba Shigeru is expected to be the first Asian leader to meet with the new US president, Japan’s level of engagement and long-term planning for the US-Japan summit may be constrained. This reality makes it unlikely that any major policy initiatives will emerge before July next year—a situation Taiwan should pay close attention to.

Trump’s Second Term: Soon Will See the Lame-Duck Effect

Since Trump is serving a second term, his election immediately signals the start of a “post-Trump era” power struggle, with lame-duck effects likely surfacing soon after the 2026 midterm elections. In other words, this suggests that the Trump administration may have only about a year and a half to drive its policies agenda forward—a crucial timeline keep in mind when evaluating US-Taiwan relations under his leadership.

Additionally, with no possibility of re-election, Trump would face fewer constraints on his actions, while the Republican Party, particularly Congress, may also act with fewer reservations. This dynamic could cause increased unpredictability in executive-legislative relations under this term of Trump’s presidency.

In addition to the Republican Party’s internal political dynamics surrounding the “post-Trump era,” expected to intensify after the 2026 midterm elections, a new US president is likely to emerge in 2028. Therefore, how the Democratic Party recalibrates in the coming years, especially the party’s strategy to consolidate its position in the 2026 midterms, will be crucial as it seeks to build momentum toward a potential return to the White House in 2028—a process worth close attention.

For Taiwan, managing its relationship with the U.S now means planning for a future where a new president will take office in four years. In this election, the Democratic Party’s last-minute switch to Kamala Harris as its candidate left her with less than three months to campaign, while Trump spent a full four years staging a comeback. To some extent, any failure in the election cannot be fully attributed to Harris. The Democratic Party will certainly aim for a strong return in four years. Thus, over these four years, Taiwan will need to engage equally with the Trump administration, the Republican-controlled Congress, and the Democratic Party, investing equivalent effort and resources to build strong relationships with all parties.

(Featured photo by Alex Brandon / AP)