Brothers in the mirror: Taiwan & Korea’s road to democracy and future Partnership – Part II

This is Part two of a two-part series, “Brothers in the mirror”.

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The Political Spectrum and Foreign Policy Orientation in Taiwan and South Korea

Western countries typically categorise political parties as left-wing or right-wing based on the political spectrum. However, post-war political classification in Taiwan was primarily based on the KMT and the “non KMT party” or the tangwai (黨外) movement. “Non-KMT party” referred to political forces that were not part of the KMT, as Taiwan was under martial law until 1987, during which time the people were deprived of the freedom to form political parties. After Taiwan’s democratisation, the distinction between the major political parties and politicians was largely based on their stance towards the relationship between Taiwan and China.

For example, the two major parties in Taiwan, the KMT and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), did not adopt policies with clear left-wing or right-wing leanings during their respective terms in office. However, there were significant differences in their approaches to China. The currently ruling DPP adopts a relatively hardline stance towards China, being seen as advocating for Taiwan’s pursuit of an independent status, and is thus regarded as the “independence faction” (獨派). In contrast, the largest opposition party, the KMT, emphasises dialogue and cooperation with China and is considered more moderate. Some commentators classify the KMT as the “unification faction” (统派), supporting Taiwan’s integration into China.

In fact, regardless of which party is in power, Taiwan’s foreign policy generally follows a pro-American stance as a fundamental principle. This is due to the increasing military threat posed by China since 1949. As a result, whether the president is from the KMT or the DPP, they have consistently worked towards promoting US arms sales to Taiwan, with the goal of strengthening mutual trust between Taipei and Washington. Since Taiwan’s democratisation in the 1990s, most presidential candidates have visited the United States to reinforce bilateral relations, with the absence of visits by candidates like Hung Hsiu-chu and Han Kuo-yu becoming a focal point in public discourse.

However, the two major parties show significant differences in their attitudes towards China and Japan. Even after Taiwan’s political democratisation, the KMT continues to hold a strong identification with China in terms of national identity, remains more sceptical of Japan, and adopts a relatively moderate stance towards the Chinese Communist Party, emphasising cross-strait exchanges and cooperation. In contrast, the DPP stresses Taiwanese indigenous consciousness, seeks to downplay Taiwan’s Chinese identity, and its political figures tend to be more pro-Japanese. The DPP frequently condemns the CCP’s incursions into Taiwan and publicly supports human rights movements in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet.

It is worth noting that in 1979, when the US established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, Taipei was no longer Washington’s official ally and could only maintain unofficial ties. This event left a psychological shadow in Taiwanese society, leading to the lingering notion of “America Skepticism,” (疑美論) where there is a belief that the US might eventually abandon Taiwan. This sentiment is especially strong among some KMT members, who feel that Taiwan cannot fully rely on the US and must instead actively work to improve relations with China.

In contrast to Taiwan, South Korea and Japan have been formal military allies of the United States since the 1950s. Although Japan and South Korea have not established a military alliance, Seoul and Tokyo have continued to cooperate closely through Washington. From a political spectrum perspective, South Korea’s conservatives are on the right, while progressives are on the left. In fact, the right and left in South Korea have not always been in opposition. Both sides cooperated during the Korean independence movement under Japanese colonial rule, fighting together against the colonisers. After the 1919 March First Movement, (삼일운동), the nominal leader of the provisional government, South Korea’s founding president Syngman Rhee, was a typical right-wing figure, while Kim Gu (김구), who effectively operated the provisional government and is later regarded as the nation’s father, was a left-wing figure. On the other hand, South Korean politics is still deeply influenced by the historical legacy of “regional divisions.” This refers to long-standing historical conflicts between the administrative regions of the Korean Peninsula, dating back from Unified Silla to the Joseon Dynasty, the most famous being the rift between the conservative stronghold of Gyeongsang Province (경상도) and the progressive base of Jeolla Province (전라도). In modern times, out of South Korea’s 14 presidents, 8 have come from Gyeongsang Province, with only Kim Dae-jung (김대중) coming from Jeolla Province. To this day, regional divisions remain a key indicator in observing the dynamics of South Korean politics.

After Korea’s independence, conflicts arose between the left and right due to ideological differences and the issue of reunification. The first conflict was over the choice of economic system: right-wing politicians advocated for a capitalist model to develop the country, while the left argued that only a socialist path could truly revitalise Korea. The second conflict centred on the issue of reunification of the two Koreas. After Japan’s defeat in 1945, the northern part of the Korean Peninsula was occupied by the Soviet Union, which established a communist regime in Pyongyang, while the United States occupied the south and established the Republic of Korea. The right-wing in Korea advocated for unification through the elimination of North Korea, while the left emphasised peaceful negotiations with North Korea, seeking unification and national solidarity through elections. These conflicts further developed into differences in foreign policy between conservatives and progressives: conservatives believed that, during the Cold War, in order to counter the communist infiltration from North Korea, it was necessary for the government to adopt authoritarian measures to safeguard national security. In foreign policy, conservatives viewed the United States as a crucial ally in Korea’s fight against communism, while Japan was not only a neighbour but also an ally of the United States. Therefore, strengthening cooperation with both the United States and Japan was considered a pragmatic diplomatic choice for South Korea. Observing the foreign policies of conservative presidents Lee Myung-bak, Park Geun-hye, and Yoon Suk-yeol, one can clearly see the continuation of this mindset.

From the end of the Korean War in 1953 until the implementation of direct presidential elections in 1987, South Korea’s democratic movement never ceased, with civil society continuously resisting the military government. The three progressive presidents, Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in, were social activists and human rights advocates. In the recent martial law controversy triggered by President Yoon Suk-yeol, Lee Jae-myung, the leader of the opposition party who scaled the walls to enter the National Assembly, also comes from a background as a human rights lawyer.

For the progressive faction, the right-wing presidents Syngman Rhee and his successors Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan were seen as authoritarian rulers, while the United States, as the leader of the free world, was their staunchest supporter. Consequently, progressive sentiments towards the United States significantly declined, with Washington being viewed as a supporter of dictatorships and the primary culprit behind the division of the Korean nation. In contrast, North Korea emphasised patriotism and national reunification, actively courting South Korea’s left-wing and nationalist groups. These historical dynamics have shaped the perception of South Korean progressives as being pro-North Korea and sceptical of the United States.

Before South Korea’s political democratisation, Japan, being both an ally of the US and a former colonial ruler, naturally became a target of resentment for the progressive faction. It is worth noting that South Korean progressives tend to favour moderate approaches to dealing with North Korea and, as a result, place importance on maintaining relations with China, which has close ties to North Korea. For progressives, this is a matter of safeguarding regional stability and national interests, and should not be simplistically interpreted as being “pro-China.”

Future Partnership of Taiwan & South Korea: Becoming Regional Partners with Mutual Understanding

After the 2024 Korean martial law incident, Taiwanese society realized its affinity with South Korea’s democratic development. Despite quiet official relations between Seoul and Taipei, people-to-people exchanges remain vibrant. It is no surprise that Taiwanese people appreciate South Korean pop culture, but in recent years, Taiwanese television dramas and films have also gained popularity among Korean audiences, sparking a trend of Taiwanese stories being remade in South Korea. Korean directors have noted that Taiwanese productions often possess an authenticity and heartfelt emotional quality that resonates with Korean audiences. This alignment in storytelling preferences suggests that the trend of remaking Taiwanese stories is likely to continue, further strengthening cultural exchange between the two nations.

In the past, politicians in Taiwan and South Korea have largely focused on competition between the two countries in the fields of business and trade, while overlooking their shared interests in democratic ideals and regional security. Looking ahead, both sides should engage in exchanges to enhance mutual understanding and trust, thereby deepening confidence in democratic values and systems. Additionally, Taiwan and South Korea could collaborate on joint research to provide a more comprehensive and nuanced interpretation of the Japanese colonial period. This effort would help heal historical wounds in East Asian countries, lay the groundwork for genuine reconciliation, and prevent the recurrence of historical tragedies.

In recent years, Taiwan and South Korea have engaged in close exchanges through human rights organisations, such as Taiwan’s 228 Memorial Foundation, South Korea’s May 18 Memorial Foundation, and the Jeju 4·3 Research Institute. Moving forward, Taiwan could consider adopting a similar approach to the 2019 Memorandum of Cooperation on Transitional Justice signed with Germany’s Federal Foundation for the Study of the Communist Dictatorship in East Germany (Bundesstiftung zur Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur) to further strengthen exchanges and cooperation with South Korea.

Only by establishing a solid foundation of mutual understanding and trust can Taiwan and South Korea deepen regional security cooperation and jointly maintain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

(Featured photo from President Lai Ching-te Facebook page)