How Can Small Progressive Pro-Taiwan Political Parties Become a Third Force?

This is a translation of the original 進步本土的小黨，如何成為有政治實力的第三勢力？ by Yi-Hsuan Lin (林邑軒), a journalist and columnist. Originally published by Voice Tank. Translation by Stacy Tang.

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In terms of political influence and control over discourse, the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) remains undeniably the dominant third force in Taiwan’s political landscape. Even after Ko Wen-je’s resignation due to court-ordered detention and Huang Kuo-chang’s succession as party chairman, this reality has not changed.

However, is this truly the third force that Taiwanese society has long hoped for since the 2014 Sunflower Movement? A force capable of ultimately competing for governance by gradually replacing the right-wing Kuomintang (KMT) and holding the increasingly conservative and plutocratic Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)?

Clearly not. This is especially evident after Ko Wen-je’s presidential campaign and the confirmation of Chang Hsien-yao’s indictment for aiding CCP interference in elections and communications. When Huang Kuo-chang abruptly raised the banner of “pro-Taiwan progressivism” on the night of his election as TPP chairman, the party’s connection to the post-2014 third force movement became as distant as two parallel universes.

This raises critical questions: Can the TPP under Huang Kuo-chang’s leadership still claim to be a third force in Taiwan’s political landscape as Ko Wen-je once did? Can it continue to dominate the third force narrative? And how should progressive, pro-Taiwan small parties, including the New Power Party, find a path to break through their current predicament?

This article offers an insider’s perspective, aiming to spark reflection. I invite all who care about Taiwan’s future and its path toward a healthy party system to join in contemplating the future of the third force.

Kuo-chang Huang : Strategically Insignificant, Tactically Critical

Regardless of one’s opinion on Huang Kuo-chang, any discussion about the future of progressive, pro-Taiwan small parties must acknowledge the current reality—Huang holds significant influence over the TPP. His shifting stance and use of hate-driven mobilization have sparked widespread debate. The crucial question is not whether he employs hate politics, but rather how far and how long he can sustain it.

Polling data shows that support for the TPP and KMT has begun to exhibit a negative correlation: where one rises, the other falls. This marks a shift from 2023, when Ko Wen-je’s approval ratings moved in tandem with Lai Ching-te’s. In other words, the voter flow between the DPP and TPP in 2023 has now transformed into a shift between the KMT and TPP. The TPP’s support base has shifted from spanning light-green to light-blue voters to one that has largely abandoned the moderate green, instead competing with the KMT for deep-blue, anti-green supporters.

This shift is certainly the result of Huang Kuo-chang’s influence since his return to the Legislative Yuan over a year ago. Fantasizing about the 2026 “pan-blue primary” or coordination with the blue camp, Huang’s TPP legislative caucus has completely abandoned Ko Wen-je’s triangular centrist strategy and fully aligned itself with the KMT.

This “deep-blue transformation“ is a suicidal strategy that contradicts the very logic of the TPP’s survival. The party has followed the same path as the New Party and People First Party, both of which have been absorbed by the KMT. Strategically, the TPP has already lost its unique position and may similarly be on the path of becoming politically insignificant, requiring no further discussion.

However, before Huang Kuo-chang finalizes any blue-white cooperation with the KMT or positions himself for vice president, the TPP can still rely on its roughly 10% voter base to disrupt Taiwan’s political landscape through hate politics, having critical influence at the tactical level.

One must inevitably dismantle any organization he joins—this is undeniable. The only variable is how quickly the poison he ingests to satisfy the thirst takes effect. At present, Huang Kuo-chang faces two distinct poisons: the “blue poison” of KMT local factions and the “red poison” of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office.

The “blue poison” — Huang Kuo-chang has already yielded to Fu Kun-chi’s control. As 2026 approaches, Huang will surely follow Ko Wen-je’s old path, appeasing local powerhouses like the Chang Jung-wei family in Yunlin and the Yen Ching-piao family in Taichung, just to maintain his presence in local elections, just like he has been Hou Yu-ih’s follower in New Taipei for the past year.

The “red poison” — Huang Kuo-chang and the TPP have no choice but to drink it all. The reason is simple, Ko Wen-je was once China’s backup option within the blue camp, thus gaining significant media support. Now, Huang, who increasingly depends on both red and blue influence, must drink it all, otherwise he cannot secure his leadership position in TPP.

In light of the obvious developments, progressive local small parties, especially the New Power Party, from which Huang Kuo-chang left, must confront his shift toward blue-and-red politics. On the frontlines, they must expose his lies and exaggerations, while continuously engaging with centrist voters who oppose communism and corruption. This is the only opportunity, and it is the responsibility that the history has placed upon local small parties.

The Fusion of Pro-China and the Opposition, The Split of Democracy and Progress

The battle for anti-communist, anti-corruption centrist voters is driven by a force that is equally driven by the dynamic between the two major parties, the KMT and the DPP.

As Taiwan Statebuilding Party (TSP) Chairman Wang Hsing-huan stated, much of the support garnered by both the KMT and even the TPP comes from the Taiwanese people’s hope for checks and balances, rather than approval of their pro-China actions. When other options for meaningful checks and balances are lacking, voters have little choice but to turn to the opposition blue-and-white parties, which seem to have the most momentum.

For these blue-and-white parties, occupying the role of the main opposition has become almost their only justification. They use “opposition oversight of the ruling party” as a cover for their actions, legitimizing all impulsive behavior that claims to target DPP corruption but actually undermines Taiwan’s democratic system, economy, and the livelihoods of its people.

On the other hand, the DPP, heading toward 12 consecutive years in power, has achieved significantly in defending sovereignty, strengthening military power, and engaging with the global community. However, its increasingly sluggish progress in advancing domestic progressive pluralism and distributive justice has led to a deepening divide between its foundational principles of “democracy” (people’s sovereignty) and “progress” (fairness and justice).

Such a DPP makes voters who are clear on sovereignty and pursuit of social progress split their votes between central and local elections, or between different levels of elections, thereby dispersing the risk of corruption that inevitably comes with DPP’s continuous rule.

To put it more dramatically, if the DPP is evolving into a version of the Taiwan KMT from the Lee Teng-hui era—clear on sovereignty but deeply intertwined with powerful conglomerates and tainted by corruption—then who will step up to play the role of the 1990s DPP in overseeing and checking the KMT?

The answer, of course, lies in progressive, local small parties. Progressive, local, and opposition parties must confront the pro-China, destabilizing KMT and DPP, while also holding the DPP accountable for its lack of progress. The strategic conclusion is clear, but the question remains: If it hasn’t been achieved in the past decade, how can it be accomplished in the next?

The Evolutionary Stages of the Pro-Taiwan Party System

How can we foster a pro-Taiwan party system where parties check and supervise each other, ensuring that pro-China parties no longer dominate the opposition? This is not just about how progressive, pro-Taiwan small parties can secure their own future, but it is also a crucial step for Taiwan in deepening its democracy.

The author believes there are two key points to consider.

First, progressive pro-Taiwan small parties must recognize that building a healthy pro-Taiwan party system must proceed in stages.

Looking back at the past decade, we must acknowledge that the KMT has a stable social base and represents a segment of Taiwanese society. Therefore, there is no direct path for progressive, pro-Taiwan small parties to simply replace the KMT and become the second major force. This is especially true after the establishment of the TPP.

In contrast to the KMT, the Taiwan People’s Party, which lacks a solid social base, has attracted emotionally charged and disillusioned crowds through hate-driven mobilization, essentially creating a loose group united only by complaints.

They are neither willing nor able to build a new political order or vision. Instead, their rhetoric and actions are marked by aimless, destructive criticism, forming a political cult-like community that has caused lasting damage to the political values of Taiwan’s younger generation.

Whether motivated by a moral obligation to prevent such a political cult or by the necessity of self- survival considerations, progressive and local small parties must deem the Taiwan People’s Party as their main competitor. With a clear set of values and political actions, they must unite and fight together in the 2026 elections, aiming to match and ultimately defeat the Taiwan People’s Party. Only by becoming a viable third force with political power can they advance to the next stage of Taiwan’s political development.

Second, progressive and local small parties must continuously persuade Taiwanese society that a multi-party competitive system is the only viable path for Taiwan to achieve long-term stability and peace.

A key reason small parties remain small is their tendency to magnify small differences into insurmountable gaps, leading to infighting and exclusion.

Over the past decade, the lack of communication and unresolved grievances between small parties has made it difficult for people to trust them as a reliable political alternative. In the coming decade, progressive and local small parties must re-establish themselves within Taiwan’s political landscape by focusing on common ground while respecting differences and forming alliances where necessary.

Cooperation is a sign of maturity and strength. Most importantly, the alliances formed by progressive small parties must show how a multi-party competitive system can function effectively in Taiwan. How can they bring attention to vital issues of survival? How can they preserve their unique identities and priorities across various topics and regions? This is the path progressive small parties must follow, and the first step for Taiwanese society to begin understanding and embracing a new political system—one that departs from the old model.

(Featured photo from TPP Facebook page)