Trump 2.0: The Shape of His Foreign Policy – Part I

This is a  Part one of a translation of the original 川普2.0外交作為…… by I-Chung Lai (賴怡忠), a journalist and columnist. Originally published by Voice Tank. Translation by Stacy Tang.

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Trump has been back in office for just a month and a half, yet the impact has been beyond imagination. NATO faces potential disintegration, and U.S.-EU relations may unravel. The U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) signed during the Trump 1.0 era now appears on the brink of collapse, and anger toward Trump has become a central theme in Canada’s general election. The televised debacle between Ukrainian President Zelensky, President Trump, and Vice President Vance has had far-reaching consequences, prompting democratic allies in Europe to reassess not only Trump himself but the direction of his entire administration.

This year’s G7 summit will be held in Canada, but it’s unclear how Canadian anger toward Trump will impact the meeting—or whether Trump might simply opt out entirely. Meanwhile, Germany is outraged by billionaire Elon Musk’s vocal support for the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), and European leaders are shocked that Vice President Vance openly defended Europe’s far-right groups and Russia’s hostile election interference at the Munich Security Conference in February.

Compared to the high tensions in Europe and North America, the Indo-Pacific seems relatively calm. Trump held seemingly successful summits with Japan and India, and TSMC’s $100 billion investment—announced at the White House in front of Trump—was widely viewed as a nod to “Make America Great Again” (MAGA). In his congressional speech on foreign tariffs the next day, Taiwan went unmentioned. Still, India, fresh from a positive meeting, was hit by Trump’s tariff rhetoric. He’s also reportedly called the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty unfair. Meanwhile, Elbridge Colby, expected to become Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, criticized Australia’s defense spending as too low and argued against selling it submarines—calling into question the future of the AUKUS partnership.

Colby’s call for Taiwan to raise its defense budget to 10% of GDP is no longer breaking news. Notably, as recently as late 2024, he was still pushing for a 5% target, with his aides urging Taiwan to follow Poland’s example. But after Trump publicly floated the 10% figure, Colby swiftly aligned himself with the new benchmark—and has consistently echoed that demand ever since. It’s clear that even the Indo-Pacific hasn’t escaped Trump’s widening line of fire.

Trump 2.0 is not Trump 1.0—and certainly not an upgraded version

Understanding Trump’s policies requires a few key distinctions. First, Trump 2.0 is not a continuation of Trump 1.0. Many senior officials from his first term haven’t returned, with some having been openly cast aside by Trump himself. Those in his new circle often keep their distance from the old guard. More importantly, Trump 2.0 isn’t an “upgrade” from 1.0—several policies from his first term, such as the USMCA, increased defense spending, and ambitious naval shipbuilding plans, have not carried over.

During Trump 1.0, he held America’s career military personnel in high regard. In the 2.0 era, he appears to have cast them aside. His pick for Secretary of Defense is a media personality (although with prior military service), the Deputy Secretary was a CEO from the defense industry, and the Navy Secretary is a financial capitalist. Civilian leadership of the military isn’t new in the U.S.—Mark Esper, for example, once served as Army Secretary—but the shift marks a clear departure from Trump’s previous reliance on military professionals.

Many assume Trump 2.0 is a continuation—or even an upgrade—of Trump 1.0, expecting his first-term policies to carry over. As previously discussed, this assumption is flawed. In particular, there’s no guarantee the Indo-Pacific strategy will continue. That depends on whether the original architects of that strategy return to government, whether those in Trump 2.0 support the strategy, and whether its supporters actually hold influence over national security and foreign policy.

So far, Trump’s national security and foreign policy seem to be less driven by the State Department or National Security Council and more by a loosely organized circle of special envoys close to him. Even within this group, influence doesn’t always align with regional portfolios—for instance, Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff reportedly took charge of Ukraine policy, sidelining the original envoy, Keith Kellogg.

Moreover, Trump himself has yet to mention the Indo-Pacific strategy at all. His focus remains squarely on bilateral relationships, viewing both allies and adversaries alike through the lens of tariffs and trade reciprocity. This approach sharply contrasts with the broader, more cohesive vision usually associated with an Indo-Pacific framework. When assessing Trump’s administration, it’s essential to distinguish between his personal statements and those of his officials—this distinction often reveals important divergences and should not be overlooked.

Trump’s Foreign Policy: Personalism, Inner-Circle Decision-Making, and the Marginalization (or Absence?) of Professional Advisors

Some argue that Trump has a so-called “grand strategy”—that his pressure on Ukraine to negotiate peace is part of a broader effort to shift U.S. military focus to East Asia, while repairing relations with Russia, effectively reversing Kissinger’s strategic triangle to isolate China. But in practice, if the goal is to compel Russia into peace talks, a more rational approach—especially given Russia’s setbacks in Syria—would be to increase support for Ukraine and intensify pressure on Moscow. This follows the common strategic logic of “escalate to de-escalate.”

If Russia were pressured into peace talks under such terms, it would become much harder for China to secure Moscow’s support. This would leave the U.S. confronting only China in the Indo-Pacific without also having to contend with simultaneous backing from Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Yet Trump has taken a different approach—directly pressuring Ukraine not only to accept territorial losses, but also to forgo joining NATO (whereas the Biden administration had merely placed the issue on hold). He has likewise shown little interest in offering long-term security guarantees for Ukraine.

While the U.S. hopes Europe will take more responsibility for Ukraine’s security, Trump could have facilitated this by gradually scaling back U.S. involvement and prompting Europe to step up. Instead, he has dismissed this approach, insisting that Russia would never agree to such terms and therefore forcing Ukraine to do so instead, without offering a viable long-term roadmap.

Trump’s approach is strikingly similar to the peace proposal China proposed for Ukraine in January 2023. It suggests he’s more interested in a quick exit from the war than in a durable resolution—pressuring Ukraine to accept a deal simply to bring the conflict to an end. This move has already triggered major shifts in U.S.-Europe relations. For Europeans, forcing Ukraine into a peace agreement not only breaks the post–Cold War norm against altering borders by force, but also casts serious doubt on America’s commitment to NATO. Trump’s call for Europe to be responsible for its own security has left many questioning whether the U.S. would still uphold NATO’s collective defense pledge. If that credibility becomes questionable, the repercussions for the international order could be far-reaching.

Notably, this move on Ukraine bypassed the State Department, the National Security Council, and even the designated Ukraine envoy, Keith Kellogg. Instead, it came from Steve Witkoff, Trump’s Middle East envoy, who happened to be in Saudi Arabia at the time. The State Department only scrambled to respond after the fact. This reflects the current state of foreign policy decision-making in Trump’s circle: highly personalist (driven by Trump’s individual preferences), limited to an inner circle (reportedly just Trump and Witkoff were present at the time), and lacking professional input (with agencies like the State Department and NSC rushing to react after decisions are made).

Essentially, Trump treats cabinet members as subordinates, casting himself as the boss. His statements are designed to capture headlines and shape the narrative; whether the policy is workable—or how it might be implemented—is not his concern. That responsibility falls to his cabinet. Perhaps Japanese officials who interacted with Trump during the Abe administration captured it best: “Trump is not a leader—he’s a boss.”

(Featured photo by Polina Zimmerman on Pexels)