Trump 2.0: The Shape of His Foreign Policy – Part II

This is a  Part two of a translation of the original 川普2.0外交作為…… by I-Chung Lai (賴怡忠), a journalist and columnist. Originally published by Voice Tank. Translation by Stacy Tang.

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DOGE Slashes U.S. Government and Policy Circles, Marking a Major Shift in Washington’s Policy Landscape

Beyond Trump’s small decision-making circle, Washington’s policy environment has been dramatically upended. His long-standing hostility toward the “deep state” has evolved into a sweeping dismissal of federal career officials across the board. Acting under his authority, billionaire Elon Musk now leads the so-called Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE)—a body that, despite lacking formal federal status, wields near-unchecked power. In just six weeks, DOGE has dismissed 220,000 federal employees. In February alone, 62,000 were told to pack up and leave. These figures don’t even include staff from federally contracted research institutions, meaning the true number of affected personnel is even higher.

In the fields of foreign affairs and national security, the hardest hit are the Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs). Most of their funding has been slashed, affecting well-known institutions such as RAND Corporation, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), and MITRE Corporation. Other organizations heavily reliant on federal contracts—such as the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP)—have also been impacted, with too many to name in full. One Washington think tank director told me that laid-off federal officials and employees have begun selling their homes as they look for jobs elsewhere. Home prices in the D.C. area have reportedly fallen by 20% (though the media reports a little over 10%). Many fear that some FFRDC-affiliated institutions may shut down entirely or at least suffer massive staff cuts, significantly weakening their research capacity.

In contrast, think tanks that do not rely on federal research contracts—such as the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute—are relatively stable, and are now seeing a surge in job applications. As traditional funding sources shrink, many D.C. think tanks may become more receptive to foreign funding. Pro-Trump think tanks like the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) are even expanding. AFPI is hiring sixteen researchers in one go, establishing a new office right across from the White House, while retaining its Virginia office as well.

In the past, projects run by FFRDCs offered valuable insight into federal priorities and often served as early indicators of policy shifts. But as these institutions face deep cuts—or are dismantled entirely—visibility into U.S. policymaking will become far more opaque. Changes in Washington’s policy ecosystem rarely register in Taiwan’s public discourse, but Musk’s revenge campaign against the federal government could bring serious ripple effects. It’s a factor we cannot afford to overlook as we prepare for the second Trump administration.

Democrats Struggle as Trump Dominates Congress—”Trump’s America” Now Virtually Unstoppable

Bipartisan support in Congress has long been a pillar of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. But that foundation is now faltering, as Trump advances on all fronts and a weakened Congress fails to push back.

The Democratic Party remains mired in internal debates over its identity, still reeling from a sweeping electoral defeat too significant to be blamed on last-minute campaign changes. At its core, Democrats simply failed to grasp the extent of Trump’s enduring popularity. This confusion has left congressional Democrats divided and directionless— reflected in their response to Trump’s recent address to Congress. While Republicans’ lead in the House has shrunk from nine seats to five, the result has not sparked a meaningful Democratic comeback.

In the Senate, Republicans now enjoy a six-seat advantage—three more than the threshold for a majority. This cushion has emboldened Trump to go after GOP senators he dislikes, knowing that even with a few losses, the party’s control remains secure. Looking ahead to the 2026 midterms, Trump’s team is already laying the groundwork to replace dissenting Republicans with loyalists, aiming to avoid a lame-duck presidency.

The result: Trump has consolidated control over Washington, while a weakened Democratic Party struggles to push back. Laid-off federal officials and employees, with no real avenues for recourse, are left scrambling for survival under the shadow of Trump’s dominance. For now, Congress provides virtually no check on Trump’s power. This sudden shift has already sparked confusion among European allies—many of whom are baffled to see once staunchly pro-Ukraine Republicans, like Senator Lindsey Graham, flip their positions so quickly under Trump’s influence.

Signals and noise coexist, explaining Trump’s policies often leads to self-contradiction.

Anyone currently visiting Washington can sense it: if you’re trying to understand the Trump administration’s policies, there’s far more noise than signal. Several factors contribute to this. First, Susie Wiles has reportedly issued a gag order to Trump’s nominees, forbidding them from speaking publicly before their confirmation hearings. Second, many senior-level officials have yet to be appointed or confirmed. Trump has also mandated that positions above Deputy Assistant Secretary must be filled by political appointees—not career bureaucrats. Meanwhile, most Assistant Secretaries from the previous administration have already been dismissed, with no “retainers” in place to manage transitions. As a result, foreign delegations coming to Washington in search of concrete policy guidance often leave empty-handed. Worse still, a growing number of self-proclaimed Trump insiders are capitalizing on the chaos. This has created a deafening level of noise in Washington.

In Taiwan, there’s no shortage of voices trying to interpret Trump’s actions, often portraying him as a far-sighted leader with a grand strategic vision. But such interpretations only hold water if the Trump administration delivers clear signals and consistent behavior. In the absence of both, these explanations risk becoming little more than projection or wishful thinking. Given the current flood of noise, the lack of concrete decisions, and the frequent disconnect between Trump’s public statements and actual policies, it’s hard to identify any coherent logic behind his national security and foreign policy beyond a few broad themes: a focus on domestic priorities, demands for reciprocal tariffs, efforts to reduce trade deficits, and a push to revive American manufacturing and job growth.

Managing Relations with the Trump Administration: Quick Political Signals Outweigh Concrete Policy Proposals

Trump prefers blunt, rapid-fire communication and often acts first to seize control of the narrative and dominate political discourse. His statements are largely political, showing little concern for policy consistency. What matters most to him aren’t complex policy initiatives, but clear signals of political intent. Take, for example, the summit with Japan’s Shigeru Ishiba: Ishiba mentioned a $1 trillion investment plan but offered no specifics or timeline. He also brought up plans to purchase natural gas from Alaska, yet provided no specifics, timeline, or even location details. Still, Trump embraced the vague proposal enthusiastically and praised it as a win for the United States. Notably, trade and tariffs weren’t even discussed during the meeting, aside from a few remarks in response to press questions.

This underscores a key dynamic in managing ties with the Trump administration: delivering swift political signals that Trump can frame as a domestic win is often more effective than proposing well-crafted policy proposals that take months to develop. Trump approaches governance with the mindset of a CEO—he expects to set the direction quickly and leave the details to his subordinates. Presenting him with detailed policy plans doesn’t impress him; it annoys him, making him suspicious that his counterpart is trying to delay decision-making through overcomplicating the process.

For Taiwan, it’s especially important to recognize that under the current Trump administration, foreign policy and national security decisions may no longer be driven primarily by the State Department or the National Security Council. This shift makes it all the more critical to engage with Trump’s inner circle, where economic and trade issues are the main focus. While the State Department and NSC still play vital roles in shaping policy details, Taiwan cannot afford to fall behind the information curve. Many of Trump’s key decision-makers are unfamiliar faces compared to the past eight years, making it all the more urgent to establish new channels of engagement at the core of his administration.

Signal choices must be made carefully: Value-based messaging may be seen as “Biden language” and outright rejected.

Terms like “democratic supply chain” and “values-based alliance,” once central to Taiwan’s foreign policy vocabulary over the past eight years, are not only unconvincing to Trump—they may even be dismissed outright as hallmarks of Biden-era rhetoric. While Trump’s first term featured concepts like “trusted supply chain” and “clean network,” there’s a clear gap between those ideas and the value-laden language used under Biden. As such, Taiwan must recalibrate its messaging to better align with the current political climate.

Trump’s second term is expected to exclude many former officials from his first administration who endorsed value-based diplomacy. Coupled with his deep animosity toward the Biden administration, this creates an instinctive rejection of anything associated with Biden-era policies. As a result, Taiwan may need to adjust its public policy messaging—rhetoric supporting Ukraine, advocating value-based diplomacy, or framing Taiwan as part of the “democratic supply chain” could all risk backlash if left unmodified.

However, engaging with the United States is ultimately about managing Taiwan–U.S. relations. Many democratic countries across Europe, North America, and the Indo-Pacific have also felt the impact of Trump’s approach. Some in Europe are beginning to suggest that in addition to “de-risking” from China, a similar strategy may be needed to face the second Trump administration. Still, with Europe heavily reliant on U.S. defense guarantees, what “de-risking” from America would actually look like remains uncertain. To date, no major European power has moved to distance itself from the U.S.; most are instead trying to figure out how to navigate a working relationship with Trump.

This means Taiwan must not only find effective ways to manage its relationship with a second Trump administration but also seize the opportunity to strengthen ties with democratic countries that share similar concerns about Trump’s return. The internationalization of Taiwan Strait security—carefully cultivated during the four years under Biden—must not be allowed to unravel. Taiwan should proactively work to prevent a scenario where deteriorating relations between these countries and Trump push them closer to China and farther away from Taiwan.

After all, Trump can serve a maximum of four more years—unless Congress amends the Constitution or the Supreme Court rules otherwise on an extension proposal. Meanwhile, Xi Jinping is entering his fourth term following the 20th Party Congress. In this context, maintaining strong ties with the U.S. and other democratic partners is vital for Taiwan’s security. While we must tailor our signals carefully for Trump, we cannot afford to jeopardize our relationships with like-minded democracies in the process.

(Featured photo by Ernesto Huerto on Pexels)