Keeping Taiwan Free: Global Stability and Securing A Peaceful Future

On 20th March, Kyodo News exclusively reported that the Japanese government had refused a visit by former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai had originally planned to visit Tokyo after stepping down in 2024 to attend a memorial event for former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The visit was arranged by the Japan-ROC Diet Members’ Consultative Council (日華議員懇談會), a cross-party group of Japanese politicians dedicated to fostering Japan-Taiwan relations, which was previously advised by Abe.

For years, international media have aligned their Taiwan-related reports with China’s official narrative: China regards Taiwan as a “breakaway province” and has threatened to “reunify it by force if necessary.” As Japan is currently seeking to persuade China to completely lift its ban on Japanese seafood imports, the government feared that Tsai’s visit might provoke China and heighten diplomatic risks. As a result, the Japanese government expressed concerns to Keiji Furuya, chairman of the Japan-ROC Diet Members’ Consultative Council, which ultimately led to Tsai agreeing to cancel her trip. The news sparked heated discussions in Japanese society, with some Japanese netizens and expatriates in Taiwan even launching an apology campaign towards Taiwan.

In 2001, Japan had allowed former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to visit, triggering strong protests from China. Beijing claimed that Tokyo had violated the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué, which Beijing asserts recognises Beijing as the “sole legitimate government.” China argued that Lee’s visit could encourage Taiwan independence movements. Similarly, in 2015, when Tsai Ing-wen, as a presidential candidate, planned a visit to Japan, she faced strong opposition from China. At the time, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs urged Japan to adhere to the “One China Principle,” while the Taiwan Affairs Office reaffirmed its opposition to any form of “Taiwan independence separatist activities” on the international stage.

China frequently protests against exchanges between Japan and Taiwan’s local governments or legislatures, citing violations of the 1972 Joint Communiqué. Notably, on 11th March, the government of Shigeru Ishiba stated that the Joint Communiqué “is not legally binding” and emphasised that successive Japanese cabinets have maintained this position. Japanese media have pointed out that the 1972 Communiqué records Japan’s “full understanding and respect” for China’s claim that Taiwan is an “inalienable part of Chinese territory” but does not explicitly recognise it. Meanwhile, on 13th February, the U.S. State Department updated its official website’s summary of U.S.-Taiwan relations, removing the statement that it “does not support Taiwan independence,” which also sparked widespread discussion.

China’s Public Opinion Warfare

For decades, China has consistently emphasised United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 and asserted its sovereignty over Taiwan through a three-step syllogism based on the “One China Principle” (一個中國原則) to reinforce its position on “legal reunification”: first, there is only one China in the world; second, Taiwan is a part of China; and third, the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the sole legitimate government representing all Chinese people. Accordingly, China strongly opposes any claim of “Taiwanese independence” and rejects any “foreign interference” in Taiwan-related matters, insisting that the Taiwan issue falls under its internal affairs.

For a long time, international policymakers and media— including those in the U.S.—have generally assumed “independence” to be a movement attempting to separate Taiwan from the PRC. As China surpassed Japan in the 2010s to become the world’s second-largest economy, it intensified diplomatic pressure to further constrain Taiwan’s international space, insisting that governments adhere to its “One China” principle.

However, Taiwanese officials have repeatedly stated over the years that UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 does not mention “Taiwan,” does not affirm that Taiwan is part of China, and does not authorise China to represent Taiwan at the UN. The Taiwanese government maintains that only a democratically elected government can represent Taiwan’s 24 million people internationally and that the Chinese Communist Party, which has never ruled Taiwan, has no right to speak on its behalf.

On 21st March 2025, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Tokyo for talks. However, the Japanese government later discovered that China had unilaterally altered the meeting’s content, inserting statements that Ishiba had never made. The summary published on China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website claimed that “the Japanese side fully recognises the significance of the four Japan-China political documents, ‘respects the position articulated by China,’ and is willing to strengthen exchanges and cooperation with China to advance bilateral relations for the benefit of both nations’ peoples.” In response, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on 22nd March clarifying that the Prime Minister “had not made such remarks” and expressed regret over China’s actions. Japan lodged a protest with Beijing, demanding the removal of inaccurate statements.

This is not the first time China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has altered the statements of foreign leaders to align more closely with its own positions. For instance, following a July 2024 meeting between Wang Yi and then-Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa, China’s official summary claimed that Kamikawa had stated, “Japan’s adherence to the One China policy remains unchanged.” However, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs promptly refuted this, stating that “these remarks are inconsistent with Kamikawa’s statements and the Japanese government’s position” and that the information released by China “lacks accuracy.”

Similar incidents have occurred in high-level US-China dialogues. After meetings with American leaders, China frequently issues statements attributing positions to US officials that they had not expressed. For example, following the first virtual summit between US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping on 16th November 2021, China’s official summary claimed that Biden “does not support Taiwan independence” and quoted him as saying, “The U.S. government is committed to its longstanding One China policy, does not support Taiwan independence, and hopes for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.” However, the White House statement on the meeting said:

“On Taiwan, President Biden underscored that the United States remains committed to the ‘One China’ policy, guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances, and that the United States strongly opposes unilateral efforts to change the status quo or undermine peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.”

Notably, the White House statement did not include the phrases “does not support” or “opposes” Taiwan independence.

Similar discrepancies arose in subsequent calls between the two leaders in March and July 2022. According to Xinhua News Agency, Biden again stated that the U.S. government “does not support Taiwan independence” and hopes to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. However, the White House statements from those meetings did not mention “not supporting Taiwan independence.”

In October 2024, Reuters exclusively reported that China had sought a clear US declaration of “opposition to Taiwan independence” rather than the longstanding phrase “does not support Taiwan independence.” The report indicated that during a 2023 meeting in San Francisco, Xi Jinping had personally requested this change from Biden but was unsuccessful. In the months following the summit, Xi’s aides repeatedly pressed US officials on their stance, but Washington consistently refused to alter its wording. In reality, the U.S. has maintained a long-standing policy of neither actively intervening in nor encouraging Taiwan’s independence—hence the phrase “does not support Taiwan independence.” Notably, in 2021, President Biden stated:

“It (Taiwan) is independent. It makes its own decisions.”

Tsai Ing-wen: Taiwan Is Already An Independent Country

In 2005, the PRC enacted the Anti-Secession Law, which serves as the legal foundation for its Taiwan policy and explicitly states that force could be used to achieve unification. By June 2024, the PRC further issued 22 so-called “guidelines for punishing Taiwan independence”, targeting anyone who rejects the notion that “Taiwan is part of the PRC”.

On 2nd January 2019, Xi Jinping delivered a speech declaring that China would begin exploring a “One Country, Two Systems” model for Taiwan in pursuit of “unification.” He asserted: “Peaceful reunification and One Country, Two Systems is the best way to achieve national unification… Differences in systems are not an obstacle to unification, nor should they be an excuse for separation. The proposal of One Country, Two Systems was originally intended to accommodate Taiwan’s realities.” He further called for “democratic consultations” between representatives from both sides of the Taiwan Strait, based on the 1992 Consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence, to establish institutional frameworks for cross-strait relations.

Xi’s remarks triggered widespread alarm and debate in Taiwan. At the time, President Tsai Ing-wen firmly rejected the One Country, Two Systems model, reversing her previously declining approval ratings and ultimately securing re-election in the 2020 presidential race.

Following her re-election in 2020, President Tsai Ing-wen stated in an interview with the BBC: “We are already an independent country. We call ourselves the Republic of China (Taiwan).” This stance differs from those of her predecessors. The Kuomintang’s (KMT) Ma Ying-jeou emphasised the legitimacy of the ROC as the rightful government of China, while the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) Chen Shui-bian focused on Taiwan’s distinct national identity. Tsai further developed the concept of “the Republic of China on Taiwan”—a notion first proposed by the late President Lee Teng-hui—shaping it into a version of the ROC with a stronger Taiwanese identity.

However, this position has drawn criticism from opponents. Detractors argue that while Tsai stressed “ROC” during her election campaign, she later altered the designation to “ROC, Taiwan”, which they claim violates the ROC Constitution. The DPP’s Resolution on Taiwan’s Future, passed in 1999, explicitly states that Taiwan is already an independent country, with “Republic of China” being merely its current name. Opponents contend that what was once merely a party position is now being gradually implemented through presidential authority, diluting the concept of the Republic of China without undergoing a formal constitutional amendment.

A Clear Message to Xi Jinping: Let Taiwan Be Taiwan

On 23rd May 2024—just three days after President Lai Ching-te took office—China launched large-scale military exercises surrounding Taiwan without prior warning. Beijing declared the drills were meant to “punish” Taiwanese separatists advocating independence and to “warn” external forces attempting to intervene.

On the same day, the United Nations Daily Press Briefing highlighted the risks posed by China’s narrative in shaping international opinion to justify potential military action against Taiwan. When a journalist asked about the UN’s stance on China’s military exercises, UN Secretary-General spokesman Stéphane Dujarric responded that the UN urged all parties to exercise restraint and avoid escalating tensions, citing the 1971 UN General Assembly resolution.

The journalist then pressed further: “So, as far as the UN is concerned, China can take over Taiwan anytime?” Dujarric promptly refuted this interpretation, stating: “That is not at all what I said.” He clarified further: “What I said is that we urge the relevant parties to refrain from acts that could escalate tensions in the region.”

In recent years, China has steadily expanded its influence within the UN system, further constraining Taiwan’s international space. Should the international community remain passive in response to this trend, China may miscalculate the situation, interpreting global silence as tacit approval for military action against Taiwan.

Matthew Pottinger served as the United States Deputy National Security Advisor during Donald Trump’s first term from 2019 to 2021. In an exclusive interview with Taiwanese media, he emphasised that Xi Jinping is a rational decision-maker but may make misjudgements due to a lack of accurate information. Pottinger analysed that Xi’s advisors conceal certain realities from him, increasing the risk of flawed decision-making. According to intelligence released by the Biden administration, this issue has not improved, necessitating straightforward and unambiguous communication with China. For instance, if Taiwan were to reduce its defence budget, Xi Jinping might misinterpret this as a lack of defensive resolve, thereby influencing his decisions. Therefore, Pottinger advocates deterrence to mitigate the risk of miscalculation, with concrete measures including enhancing Taiwan’s overall societal resilience in defence, continued US military assistance to Taiwan, and Japan strengthening its defence budget to ensure that China’s leadership is deterred from initiating conflict.

In March 2025, Taiwan President Lai Ching-te officially designated China as a “hostile external force” and proposed a comprehensive response strategy. This declaration was widely interpreted as Taiwan solidifying its resolute stance on resistance. The U.S. government and officials have repeatedly and publicly opposed China’s misinterpretation of Resolution 2758, which Beijing attempts to conflate with its “One China Principle” for its own benefit. In November 2020, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that Taiwan has never been part of the PRC. In an interview, he stressed that US policy on Taiwan had remained consistent since the Reagan administration.

In October 2021, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia-Pacific Affairs, Rick Waters, also pointed out that China misuses UN Resolution 2758 to exclude Taiwan from the international community. For example, Taiwan’s airports serve 50 million passengers annually, yet the island is barred from participating in the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). Similarly, despite Taiwan’s outstanding pandemic response, it remains excluded from the World Health Assembly (WHA). Waters stated that the U.S. considers China’s actions an abuse of Resolution 2758, deliberately obstructing Taiwan’s international participation.

A growing number of countries have since expressed support for Taiwan and opposition to China’s distortion of Resolution 2758. On 21st March 2025, the Belgian Chamber of Representatives passed a resolution affirming that UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 does not determine Taiwan’s international status. The resolution underscored support for Taiwan’s participation in international organisations such as the World Health Organisation (WHO), the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Additionally, eight national parliaments—including those of Australia, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Czech Republic, Guatemala, and the Marshall Islands—as well as the European Parliament and the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC), have publicly opposed China’s misrepresentation of the resolution.

Beyond diplomatic statements, the U.S. and other democratic nations have taken concrete actions to uphold the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. routinely dispatches naval vessels through the Taiwan Strait to defend freedom of navigation and counter China’s territorial claims over these international waters. The UK’s representative to Taiwan, John Dennis, stated that due to Taiwan’s geopolitical and geostrategic position, the international community has become acutely aware of its significance in global supply chains and its strength in technology and scientific research. The UK also sent warships through the Taiwan Strait in 2021 and 2024, affirming its commitment to maintaining this right.

In September 2024, two German warships transited the Taiwan Strait for the first time in 22 years, reinforcing the area’s status as international waters. In February 2025, Japan’s Maritime Self-Defence Force deployed the destroyer Akizukifor an independent passage through the Taiwan Strait, demonstrating Japan’s concerns over China’s military expansion and its commitment to regional security. Historically, Japan had refrained from deploying its Self-Defence Force vessels through the Taiwan Strait to avoid provoking China. However, given Beijing’s increasing military assertiveness towards neighbouring countries, Japan has shifted towards actively upholding freedom of navigation.

To preserve peace and regional stability, Taiwan must continue strengthening its defensive capabilities against China’s military threats. At the same time, it should deepen international cooperation to enhance global awareness of the Taiwan Strait’s strategic importance and oppose China’s unilateral attempts to alter the status quo. Only by ensuring that more international actors explicitly reject China’s misuse of Resolution 2758 can the world effectively counter any justification Beijing might seek for military aggression against Taiwan, thereby securing regional stability and global security.

(Featured photo by Angela Hsiao)