The Trump administration’s tone-deaf approach to ongoing protests in the U.S. risks serious repercussions on international concern and awareness regarding Hong Kong’s protest movements.

On the defensive and failing to register how his harsh characterization of protesters might compromise U.S. credibility when calling out treatment of Hong Kong protests, Trump’s “tweet from the hip” approach has confirmed perceptions of the president’s indifference to systemic brutality and inequalities within the United States. This has made it easy for embattled Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam to question U.S. credibility and evade criticism over the Hong Kong Police Force’s own record of brutality and suppression. This situation has allowed an onslaught of Twitter trolling by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials and proponents, signaling a descent into a game of one-upmanship that the CCP is now leading in.

This competitive edge has given the CCP an invaluable opportunity to dilute international scrutiny of its own injustices, feeding neatly into the CCP’s “whataboutism” strategy (deflecting criticism by calling attention to the accuser’s own issues at home) which it failed to deploy effectively when pointing to France’s own yellow-vest protests amid the European reaction to the Hong Kong protests last October. This opportunity has not been wasted, and CCP proponents seem to be developing a public relations competency, both in official communication and on Twitter, in attempts to refocus observer perceptions of competency between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China.

On May 30, PRC foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying tweeted in response to U.S. State Department spokesperson Morgan Ortega’s comments on Hong Kong’s national security law protest with the line “I can’t breathe,” a clear reference to the death of George Floyd aimed at highlighting perceived double standards of the Trump administration. The tweet received considerable traction online and has been cited by numerous news platforms, such as Reuters and Financial Times.

This trend continued with Hu Xijin, the editor of the state-run tabloid Global Times, tweeting on May 31 that “Hong Kong rioters” had infiltrated protests in the U.S. by drawing comparison to levels of destruction, despite having previously made numerous accusations— again, through Twitter—of U.S. infiltration and instigation of protests in Hong Kong. On June 3, Hu’s trolling went so far as to present the deployment of U.S. troops to confront protesters as ‘proving’ the People’s Liberation Army’s killing of students and civilians during the Tiananmen Square protests was necessary to “restore order in 1989.”

Aside from ridicule, Trump’s bungling has also offered the CCP a chance to present itself as a voice of international authority and concern regarding injustice toward black people. This is invaluable for the CCP’s PR efforts amid continued concern about PRC debt across many African countries, widespread reports in April of the targeted evictions of African people in Guangzhou on the basis of COVID-19 regulations, as well as subsequent attempts to divert and evade blame when public apologies and spin failed to sway African observers. PRC officials have been quick to jump on this opportunity, with the PRC embassy in Uganda retweeting a meme from the state-run China Daily on May 31 of a crowd of high-vis clad photographers around a lone armed officer (labeled as HK police & HK reporter) alongside CNN reporter Omar Jimenez’s on air arrest (listed as U.S. police & U.S. reporter) complete with the comment, “Hegemony philosophy: Do as I say, but not do as I do!”

Zhao Lijian, deputy director of the foreign ministry’s information department and one of the PRC’s more recognizable “wolf warrior” politicians, went even further. In a clear jibe against U.S. criticism of the CCP’s long record of human rights abuses, Zhao on June 1 called for the U.S. government to ‘protect and safeguard the legitimate interests of racial minorities.’ Zhao then took the opportunity to shore up the image of PRC-African support, stating the PRC ‘will work with African [nations] to firmly oppose all forms of racial discrimination, including inciting discrimination and hate speech.’

These instances quickly received the attention they sought, successfully co-opting the protests sparked by George Floyd’s death by garnering attention across English language news outlets as either official statements of concern or sharp ridicule. Attention toward Hua Chunying’s tweet has broadened observer perceptions of U.S. hypocrisy beyond the circles of U.S. and PRC watchers, while Hu’s brazen style enables him to wield inconsistency as a tool of derision, adding to the swathe of online commentaries that cloud wider discourse and awareness of the situation in Hong Kong. Meanwhile, Zhao’s opportunistic catch-all official statement—dressed in all the pageantry and professionalism his position and a well-funded state news outlet offers—presented a “rational voice” amid the Trump administration’s disarray.

Only time will tell the level of success these efforts have on swaying observer opinion. If effective, this may set a precedent for future deflections of criticism by the CCP, a potential flashpoint being UK Foreign Minister Dominic Raab’s June 2 statement to the House of Commons on the imposition of the CCP’s national security law, noting that it is in violation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and indicating the intention to open a pathway to UK residency for Hong Kong BNO (British National Overseas) passport holders if the PRC does not change direction.

This is all the more likely with Raab’s cautioning on June 3—thought notably diplomatic in focusing on trust, responsibility and the need to give the PRC “breathing space”—that the UK would pursue opening residency pathways to BNO holders even at the expense of a free-trade deal with the PRC. This position was reiterated in an opinion piece by British Prime Minister Boris Johnson in the South China Morning Post, also on June 3.

Yet above all, a pressing danger this situation brings is the risk of apathy toward the U.S. and Hong Kong movements, brought about by U.S. and PRC political posturing which risks numbing public interest on both sides in the reason behind the movements. If trolling and one-upmanship does become an accepted mode of state to state commentary, if discussion of these protest movements becomes a circle of mockery and blame, struggles against injustice will continually be co-opted rather than addressed for the sake of continued U.S.-PRC drama.

Max Lembke-Soh 蘇偉雄 is a freelance writer and Project Officer based in London. He holds an MA in History from SOAS, University of London and writes on issues of awareness and understanding of Taiwan from an English-language audience perspective.
Max Lembke-Soh