On 26 July 2025, Taiwan held the first batch of a large-scale recall vote, known as the “Great Recall” (大罷免), with the second batch scheduled for 23 August. However, the first round of recall votes did not unseat any of the 24 legislators up for the recall.
The international media widely interpreted the outcome as a victory for “pro-China” politicians. The BBC and the Guardian both led with headlines like “Pro-China politicians survive”, while the Associated Press (AP) and National Public Radio (NPR) reported that Taiwanese voters had rejected the attempt to recall “China-friendly lawmakers”. Japan’s NHK went further, describing the result as a major political setback for Taiwan President Lai Ching-te.
Yet reducing the failed recall to a simple narrative of “Taiwanese public turning pro-China” risks exaggeration or misinterpretation of Taiwan’s complex political structures and sentiments. Such interpretations may mislead the international community and influence foreign policy based on flawed understandings.
A Recall Vote Is Not a Regular Election
First and foremost, recall votes differ fundamentally from regular elections. Public opinion in Taiwan on issues relating to China—whether favouring engagement or distancing—is typically expressed through presidential elections and the distribution of seats in the Legislative Yuan. In contrast, local elections and recall initiatives reflect constituents’ evaluations of individual politicians within specific districts and are not necessarily indicative of national sentiment.
International media may have misread the recall vote as a shift in national mood simply because the targets were central-level lawmakers. However, the mobilisation patterns and issue framing of this recall campaign exhibited dual characteristics—straddling both national and local dynamics. While the targets were national legislators, the campaign was largely led by local civil groups, demonstrating a grassroots nature with strong community-based political characteristics.
For instance, when Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) was elected president in 2008, it marked the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) strongest electoral performance since the 1990s. Not only did Ma secure the highest number of votes ever received by a presidential candidate in Taiwan, but the KMT also gained a parliamentary majority, ushering in a period of rapid cross-Strait engagement. His administration’s policies facilitated the “three links” with China（大三通). The further liberalising travel and education exchanges with China symbolised a broader shift towards engagement. However, such trends were primarily reflected in national elections; local contests, including recalls, rarely mirror Taiwan’s broader stance on China.
This was evident in the 2022 local elections, where the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) suffered a significant defeat despite campaigning on an “anti-China” platform. Then-President Tsai Ing-wen resigned as party chairperson following the result, underlining the limited influence of cross-Strait issues in local-level voting behaviour.
The Great Recall as a Grassroots, Not Partisan, Movement
Secondly, the 2025 “Great Recall” was, by nature, a grassroots movement initiated by civic groups rather than a party-led campaign. Unlike traditional elections dominated by party strategies, this movement was decentralised and citizen-led. While opposition parties framed it as a DPP-orchestrated power struggle, claiming it was a reaction by President Lai’s administration against unfavourable election results, the reality on the ground told a different story.
Most recall campaigns were spearheaded by non-partisan citizens, particularly volunteer groups composed mainly of individuals in their 30s and 40s. Notably, women made up 70–90% of campaigners in some constituencies, many of whom opted to remain anonymous during media interviews. Though all targeted lawmakers were KMT members, the KMT had also proposed its own counter-recall initiatives against DPP legislators. However, these efforts were marred by scandals involving forged petition signatures (偽造連署書與死亡連署), leading to their eventual collapse.
Under Taiwan’s electoral law, a recall vote must pass two requirements: the number of votes in favour must exceed one-quarter of the total electorate in the district, and must also outnumber votes against. Of the 24 cases voted on in July—including one targeting the mayor of Hsinchu—only seven met the first threshold. In all cases, however, the number of opposing votes surpassed those in favour, resulting in a complete failure.
According to the Information Operations Research Group (IORG), a think tank studying information warfare, Chinese state media intentionally portrayed the recall effort as DPP-controlled, using phrases such as “party manipulation” (政治操作) and “astroturfing” (側翼) to delegitimise the movement. If the international community accepts this framing uncritically, it risks playing into Beijing’s long-standing strategy of undermining the legitimacy of Taiwan’s democratic institutions.
Domestically, commentators generally agreed that the DPP adopted a calculated strategy of partial involvement, maintaining that the recall was led by civic groups while the party provided only technical support. This ambiguity likely dampened grassroots enthusiasm and lowered turnout, contributing to the recalls’ failure.
A similar scenario unfolded in 2008, when the DPP and KMT each proposed referenda on joining the United Nations under the name “Taiwan” or rejoining the UN in the name of ROC or other names. Both initiatives failed due to insufficient turnout. Yet these results did not indicate a rejection of international engagement, but rather underscored the structural limitations of the referendum process—parallels that can be drawn with the 2025 recall outcomes.
Vigilance Against Chinese Expansionism Is Longstanding
Thirdly, Taiwanese vigilance against Chinese aggression is not a recent development but a product of historical experience and gradual political transformation. Since the 1996 Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis, the island nation’s democratic identity and national consciousness have deepened significantly.
The 2014 Sunflower Movement saw students and activists occupy the Legislative Yuan in protest against the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (兩岸服務貿易協議), which they believed had bypassed proper legislative scrutiny. This marked a turning point in public resistance to further economic integration with China. The KMT government’s perceived closeness with Beijing led to lasting reputational damage, reinforcing the “pro-China” (親中、舔共) label.
From 1995 to 1996, Taiwanese people experienced the Taiwan Strait missile crisis, which had a profound impact on social psychology and national consciousness. Under this background, Taiwan held its first direct presidential election in 1996, following the repeal of the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of the Communists Rebellion (動員戡亂臨時條款) in 1991, marked Taiwan’s democratic transformation. Lee Teng-hui’s electoral victory symbolised a shift from authoritarian rule to popular sovereignty. President Lee later stated that the Republic of China’s jurisdiction was limited to Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu, with both the president and parliament elected solely by Taiwanese citizens—effectively acknowledging the reality of cross-Strait division. Lee further articulated that cross-Strait relations had evolved into “state-to-state relations, or at least special state-to-state relations”, challenging traditional frameworks that cast the PRC as a rebel regime. He argued that under these conditions, formal independence was unnecessary, since Taiwan already functioned as a sovereign entity.
In 2014, the Sunflower Movement reflected growing public insistence on transparency and democratic procedure in cross-Strait policymaking. Protesters occupied the legislature for 585 hours, requiring the government to suspend the Service Trade agreement. President Ma’s approval ratings plummeted to 9%, and the KMT’s image as a “China-friendly” party became entrenched.
In 2018, KMT candidate Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) won the Kaohsiung mayoral race, ending two decades of DPP rule in the third largest city in Taiwan. Capitalising on voter discontent over Beijing’s tourism bans and the resulting economic impact, Han surged in popularity. But during his 2019 visits to Hong Kong and Macau, his meetings with two directors of Chinese liaison office (中聯辦) and cancelled U.S. trip raised serious questions about his China-leaning stance. In the end, Han lost the 2020 presidential election and became the first mayor of a special municipality to be successfully recalled.
In 2019, during the commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” (告台灣同胞書) Chinese President Xi Jinping reinterpreted the so-called “1992 Consensus,” defining it as a mutual commitment by both sides to national unification under the “One China” principle. He explicitly proposed the formulation of a “Taiwan model” for the implementation of “One Country, Two Systems.” Xi further advocated that, on the basis of opposing Taiwanese independence and upholding the 1992 Consensus, “cross-Strait” relations should be advanced through democratic consultations involving political parties and civil society from both sides, with the goal of peaceful development and institutional arrangements.
This narrative seeks to reframe the Taiwan issue within the historical context of the Chinese Civil War, thereby reinforcing political linkages between the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT. At the same time, it attempts to undermine the legitimacy of the DPP government as Taiwan’s representative in Taiwan-China talks, instead inviting Taiwanese society to participate directly in a consultation process on “One Country, Two Systems” under Beijing’s leadership.
In response, then-President Tsai Ing-wen firmly rejected Xi’s proposal, emphasising that Taiwan could never accept the “One Country, Two Systems” framework, nor could it endorse the 1992 Consensus as defined by its implication. She reiterated that, as a democratic nation, any political negotiations concerning the future of Taiwan-China relations must be authorised by the people of Taiwan and conducted on the basis of parity through official, government-to-government channels. No individual or group holds the authority to engage in political negotiations on behalf of the Taiwanese people. Tsai further asserted that China must face the reality that the Republic of China (Taiwan) is a sovereign entity, rather than denying the legitimacy and validity of Taiwan’s democratic system.
The results of the 2020 presidential and legislative elections indicated that mainstream public opinion in Taiwanese society remained cautious, if not outright resistant, towards China-related issues. In the presidential race, Tsai Ing-wen was re-elected with over 8.17 million votes, breaking the record for the highest number of votes set by Ma Ying-jeou in 2008. She defeated Han Kuo-yu by a margin of approximately 2.65 million votes. DPP also secured 61 seats in the Legislative Yuan, maintaining its majority position established in 2016.
Notably, just a year earlier in the 2018 nine-in-one local elections, KMT had secured a strong lead with around 6.1 million votes, compared to only 4.89 million for the DPP. However, the 2020 election results revealed a dramatic shift in voter composition and preferences. Tsai Ing-wen’s vote count exceeded the DPP’s total in the previous local elections by 3.28 million, while Han Kuo-yu received 580,000 fewer votes than the KMT had garnered in 2018. These figures suggest that local election outcomes are a poor indicator of Taiwanese public sentiment towards cross-Strait policy.
Conclusion
The failure of the 2025 “Great Recall” must be understood as a politically significant event shaped by a unique combination of social and structural factors. It should not be oversimplified as a partisan conflict (藍綠惡鬥). The movement exhibited clear signs of grassroots mobilisation, reflecting the pluralism and autonomy of Taiwan’s democratic system. A more nuanced analysis should focus on the mechanisms of civic engagement and institutional design.
Moreover, continued vigilance is essential against Beijing’s efforts to delegitimise Taiwan’s democracy through media manipulation. The recall vote was not a sign of increasing support for integration with China, but rather a measured reflection on the structure and effectiveness of Taiwan’s recall system.
Simplifying the outcome as a “pro-China victory” or “anti-China defeat” risks distorting the political reality and promoting misleading narratives. Notably, President Lai Ching-te and the DPP legislative caucus have pledged to work more closely with civic groups in the second phase of recalls on 23 August, taking on a more active organisational role.
As such, the full meaning and political impact of the “Great Recall” cannot be properly assessed until the results of the second round become clear. Only then can a comprehensive and accurate evaluation be made.
(Featured photo by Jimmy Liao on Pexels)
